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ABSTRACT
THE APPLICATION OF A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TO
ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
George T. Hodermarsky
Old Dominion University, 2005
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

This dissertation proposes an approach and methodology for the utilization o f the
fundamentals o f systems theory as an aid to national security decision-making. At its core
is an examination o f the elements o f nations’ or non-state actor’s power resources. The
product o f the analysis is the compilation of a set of nodes, and the relationships between
these, upon which actions may be taken to achieve desired effects. Since the boundaries
between the subsystems o f power resources are flexible and permeable, and there will be
interactions between elements in different subsystems, a system o f systems approach is
essential so that the functioning of the system may be better understood and the
secondary consequences o f actions considered. The premise is that changes cannot occur
in isolation, and that alterations in one component will result in modifications (intended
or unintended) to related elements. The goal o f the approach is not precise prediction of
the effects o f actions, but rather to provide for understanding o f the relationships between
elements o f national power that will lead to expectations of the consequences o f those
actions. The hypothesis is: If national power is characterized as nonlinear and complex;
and, if approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical sciences provide a
means o f enhanced understanding of nonlinear systems; then, utilization o f such an
approach may provide a metaphor or model for increased understanding o f the system
and the secondary effects o f coercive actions taken to achieve objectives. This
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dissertation will attempt to confirm the existence o f the first two conditions, and will
provide arguments and a design for accomplishment o f the third. An ex post analysis o f
three conflicts where coercion by military means was the primary strategy— Somalia,
1992-1995; Kosovo, 1999; and, Afghanistan, 2001— will be used as case studies. These
examples will provide illustration of the utilization o f the principles o f the system of
systems construct and exposition of the potential of this methodology to enhance the
understanding o f the effects of coercive actions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Among the most critical components o f the relations between sovereign states in
an anarchic international system are the efforts o f nations to influence the behavior of
others. This endeavor is often described in terms o f the application o f some aspect o f
national power with the objective of coercing a change in the conduct, or deterring
actions of another state. While a variety o f methods may be employed, military force
historically has been the primary instrument of national coercive power. The successful
employment of a nation’s influence to this end requires, inter alia, a capability for
examination and understanding o f the power capabilities of other nations.
If power is thought o f in purely military terms, such assessments become
relatively simple. Force on force analysis is relatively linear, and is amenable to modeling
and simulation. Hence, in many cases an assessment may be accomplished through
relatively uncomplicated means such as a numerical summation o f capabilities. Among
the many examples is the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain resulting
from the launching o f the Dreadnought battleships in the early days o f the twentieth
century. Later, in the nuclear era, assessments o f relative power during the Soviet-U.S.
cold war often gravitated toward the counting o f launchers, warheads, and deliverable
megatonnage.
However, in a complex international environment, where the elements o f national
power are multifaceted and interrelated, the task o f accurate assessment becomes

The format for this dissertation follow s current style requirements o f the Chicago M anual o f Style, 15th ed.
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2003).
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exceptionally difficult, and the tools available for analysis are more limited.
Determination o f the relationship between cause and effect remains problematic. This is
particularly true in the anticipation and comprehension o f the secondary effects o f actions
that are designed to achieve national or coalition objectives. Consequently, a process or
methodology that can assist decision-makers in the formulation and execution of coercive
actions is a worthwhile aspiration.

Rationale for the Study
Throughout history, nations have attempted to influence the behavior o f other
states. If coercive actions by nations have been routine, the question emerges as to why a
new appraisal and fresh approach to assessments is necessary. The reasons are centered
principally on the altered nature o f the milieu in which the systems o f power exist. These
include a geo-political security environment where the contention for global military
supremacy has, at least for the present time, been generally accepted. Coincident with this
relatively stable security situation is steadily increased globalization and interdependence
between nations, and consequently the emergence o f interrelated and networked
societies.1
The former condition means that conflict and the occasions o f coercion are likely
to be short o f battles for national survival and will focus instead on limited scale
operations such as peacekeeping and military operations other than war. The latter
1.
Globalization is more than the existence o f increased interrelationships between societies and has
been described as “a state o f the world involving networks or interdependence at multicontinental
distances.” Robert 0 . Keohane, Pow er an d Governance in a P artially G lobalized World (N ew York:
Routledge, 2002), 193. He emphasizes that globalization refers to networks o f connections rather than
simple linkages. For an extensive analysis o f the changing environment see Gregory F. Treverton,
“Emerging Threats to National Security: Testimony Presented to the House o f Representatives Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence on 2 February 2005,” http://rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/
R A ND_CT234.pdf (accessed 5 April 2005).
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situation suggests that operations with multiple objectives, including humanitarian relief
and nation building, will be relatively unconstrained by political or geographic
boundaries.
These connections are an immensely extended consequence o f the economic
dependencies that emerged in the mercantile and colonial era, which expanded in the
industrial age and became a defining characteristic o f international relations in the
twentieth century. More recently, the advent o f an information age where knowledge
itself becomes a commodity has changed the environment. While the extent and future
impact of the effects of this globalization are contentious, the existence o f increased
interconnections and dependencies that transcend national boundaries is irrefutable.
When considered together, the result is an international climate that is increasingly
complex and substantially unlike that o f the cold war era. Recognition o f this radically
changed situation has been a primary rationale for political realignments and military
transformation efforts among nations across the globe.2
Regardless of the nature and character o f these transformations, the essential
purpose remains the same, i.e., the ability to influence the behavior o f other actors in the
international environment. Just as in earlier endeavors, an understanding o f system of
power o f the nation being acted upon is critical to effective achievement o f this objective.
Power is applied by one nation to affect the systems o f another. Hence, a calculus
that considers the political, economic, military, and social systems as interrelated

2.
In the military context, this transformation is sometimes referred to as a Revolution in M ilitary
Affairs (RMA). The RMA is principally a U.S. Department o f D efense concept and described as “a major
change in the nature o f warfare” that involves changes to application o f technologies, doctrine, and
concepts that “fundamentally alters the character and conduct o f operations.” Chris C. Demchak,
“Complexity and Theory o f Networked Militaries,” in The Sources o f M ilitary Change, ed. Theo Farrell
and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002).
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elements o f an overall system of power, which is different from the sum o f the parts, is
critical to the assessment. Therefore, a construct that can provide enhanced understanding
of the functioning o f that system can contribute to more effective and efficient attainment
o f objectives. However, an effective utilization o f such an approach requires an
understanding o f the systems to be acted upon, especially in the interrelationships
between elements within and across the systems.
Most past and extant net assessments have considered the elements o f political,
economic, military, and social power; however, these were often treated as separate and
distinct entities, and consequently did not adequately present the holistic view. This
results in a less than optimum level o f analysis. This shortfall produces, at minimum,
inefficient applications o f power and increased potential for failure to achieve the stated
objectives.
A segmented and linear view o f the adversary can lead to an inability to anticipate
secondary effects that occur beyond system boundaries. Incomplete assessments can
produce unnecessary levels of violence, increased destruction o f human life and the
means to support it, and a worsening o f the situation that the operation was intended to
alleviate. The deleterious effects of the lack of an adequate level o f understanding are
evident; tools to assist the decision-maker in dealing with them are less abundant. In an
attempt to reduce that shortfall, this dissertation proposes a methodology that approaches
assessments o f national power from a systems perspective. This construct is a logical
progression from, and synthesis of, previous work.
This study uses the complex adaptive systems (CAS) as a paradigm for national
power. With the publication in 1979 o f Kenneth Waltz’s seminal Theory o f International
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Politics, consideration o f dealings between nations from a systems approach became a
much discussed and debated concept. Hence, use o f the term system is not without
precedent in the field o f international relations. Additionally, there is little debate that
nations are adaptive, that is, they react to external as well as internal stimuli. Hence, a
portrayal o f nations as complex adaptive systems is not a radical departure from
mainstream concepts. Despite the relative lack o f contentiousness o f these suppositions,
acceptance has not provided significant practical advantages to those who desire to
influence those complex adaptive systems.
Robert Jervis presents the key challenge to the selection o f the optimum
alternatives when confronting a complex system. “To alter the state o f a system, it is
necessary to understand the interaction o f the elements that make up the system. It is
impossible to change one element o f the system without affecting the remaining
elements.”4 This condition presents to decision-makers a virtually universal problem that
lacks satisfactory solutions. This is the dilemma that this dissertation seeks to address.
The approach is to look beyond the traditional methods o f power assessment and to
explore the potential for incorporation o f processes that have proven useful in a wide
range o f intellectual disciplines.
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, a quantity of popular literature associated with certain
scientific communities, notably the fields of mathematics, biology, and physics, displayed
an increased attention to, and an advocacy for, a shift from linear to non-linear
paradigms. The emergence o f complexity and chaos theories into the parlance of

3. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International P olitics (Reading, MA: Addison-W esley Publishing
Company, 1979). Waltz focuses on an international system, vice the system o f systems o f individual
nations that are the core o f this study.
4. Robert Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” P olitical Science
Quarterly 112, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998): 582.
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educated observers outside o f those previously identified academic fields best
exemplifies this trend. Interest in these approaches expanded beyond the realm o f
technical scientific journals and entered the popular domain with publication o f James
Gleick’s Chaos: Making o f a New Science in 1987.5
Concurrently, researchers and scholars in the social sciences, most notably in
Behavioral Psychology, attempted to apply these concepts. Interest was slower to build
within the social sciences. However, a review o f academic journals from the 1990’s did
reveal some limited exploration into the potential for application o f chaos and complexity
theory into this arena.6 These initial searches for relevancy were intellectually appealing,
but interest waned, due at least in part to the inability to extract useful insights or
practical methodologies from the analysis.
While these theories, in their purest sense, never became integral parts o f research
and writing in the field, few would disagree with the description o f the international
political system and relations between sovereign but increasingly interdependent nations
as complex. Despite the lack o f controversy on this depiction, acceptance o f this
characteristic o f national power has not proven to be particularly useful. Perceived by
some as little more than stating the obvious, moving beyond agreement presents the

5. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1987). This work,
which made several bestseller lists, was followed by a related Public Broadcasting Service presentation.
Subsequent chapters will expand on chaos and complexity.
6. Very limited examination o f Chaos Theory emerged and most o f these were in the fields o f Public
Administration and Management. Among these are David Levy, “Chaos Theory and Strategy: Theory,
Application and Managerial Implications,” Strategic M anagement Journal 15, Special Issue: Strategy:
Search for N ew Paradigms (Summer 1994); and, E. Sam Overman, “The N ew Sciences o f Administration:
Chaos and Quantum Theory,” Public Administration Review 56, no. 5 (September - October 1996).
Complexity was addressed only slightly more often. Examples include Michael D. Wallace and Peter
Suedfeld, “Leadership in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no.
4 (December 1988); George Modelski, “Evolutionary Paradigm for World Politics,” International Studies
Quarterly 40, no. 3 (September 1996); and, Karen Guttier, Michael D. Wallace, and Peter Suedfeld, “The
Integrative Complexity o f American D ecision Makers in the Cuban M issile Crisis,” The Journal o f Conflict
Resolution 39, no. 4 (December 1995). Additional contributions will be cited in Chapter III.
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important question, “so what?” The important issue remains whether or not this
recognition o f nations as complex adaptive systems presents any practical applications.
Even if the models are accurate, an important question emerges. Can utilization o f the
components o f these theories provide any realistic assistance to those who must make
foreign policy decisions in such an environment? If so, are examples extant that can
provide additional insights into the potential value o f the consideration of these theories?
Satisfactory answers to these questions are far less evident.
There are many opportunities for further study and progress in this area.
Literature focused on complex adaptive systems is not abundant, and a systems approach
to the study o f the relative power o f nations has not generated sizeable interest. In System
Effects, an examination o f a systems approach to international relations, the renowned
and respected scholar, Robert Jervis, candidly provides that “several private foundations
and public funding agencies declined to support this research.”7
Perhaps terms such as complex adaptive systems and the technical nature o f most
o f the previous examinations o f chaos and complexity theory are viewed as too remote
and too difficult to apply to international studies. Alternatively, many scholars in this
field o f study may perceive this approach as being outside of their academic comfort
zone. The paucity of previous work in this area suggests that it resides beyond the
mainstream, and some may consider it to be threatening to current postulations. As LarsEric Cederman observes, “the CAS approach generates surprising and counterintuitive
insights about existing theories.”8

7. Robert Jervis, System Effects (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Acknowledgements.
8. Lars-Eric Cederman, Emergent Actors in World P olitics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1997), 7.
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While acknowledging that use o f a systems approach in examinations o f the
relations between states is not without precedent, efforts aimed at practical application o f
the relevant principles o f a systems methodology are less abundant. Hence, this inquiry
views national power from a systems perspective, and attempts to fill the existing gap in
the literature. It addresses the inadequacy o f tools available to policy makers by
proposing a methodology for application of these principles. However, further
exploration requires a common understanding o f terminology and a foundation in the use
o f systems in the context o f this study.

Why a Systems Approach?
A system may be described as a “regularly interacting or interdependent group of
items forming a unified w hole.. .under the influence o f related forces.”9 Most o f the
essential components of modem and technologically advanced societies may be depicted
as systems, and these often have been developed as the result o f systems analysis.
Sophisticated communications, transportation infrastructure, information management,
manufacturing, distribution o f resources, and health systems are but a few examples.
However, such a breakdown into component parts is not adequate for successful analysis.
While categorization is useful for descriptive purposes, such systems do not
operate independently. Due to the size and complexity of the total structure and processes
o f a nation’s capabilities, depiction as a system o f systems would enhance understanding.
The inherent complexity and interactions make this holistic system o f systems different
from merely an arithmetic sum o f the subsystems. Hence, the challenge facing those who

9.
edition.

W ebster's N ew C ollegiate D ictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “system .” All subsequent citations are to this
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would utilize a systems approach becomes more problematic. Nevertheless, some
intellectual energy has been expended in this arena.
Although most commonly connected with the physical sciences and engineering
spheres, a multiplicity o f academic disciplines now employ an analysis o f systems.
Observing this inclusion across many fields o f study, Jervis noted, “The fact that
congruent patterns can be found across such different domains testifies to the prevalence
and power o f the dynamics that systems display.” 10 While exceptionally useful in
mathematics and the technical scientific disciplines, concepts in the social sciences have
not included the systems perspective extensively or productively. In the field o f
international relations, the systems approach has been limited to examinations o f the
anarchical international political system, and most focus on the theoretical aspects.
Prescriptions for the pragmatic application o f systems theory have been less abundant.
A systems approach has been applied in the domains o f political science and
international security studies to a larger extent; however, employment has been more
often aimed at defense planning, and the development o f offensive and defensive military
systems, not specifically the analysis of the systems o f potential adversaries. Among the
areas where a systems approach has been proposed and utilized is in the concept o f
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Strategists and analysts within the U.S. defense
establishment continually examine, discuss, and debate the merits o f NCW .11 There is

10. Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role o f Interactions,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, an d
National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1997). Systems Analysis is an academic discipline in its own right with a set o f conventions and
standards. This study w ill use analysis o f systems in a more generic sense, extended to any examination o f
the interacting components o f the unified whole.
11. NCW is normally considered in the context o f design o f military command and control systems.
James Moffat, Com plexity Theory an d N etwork Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: DOD Command and
Control Research Program, 2003), 45, describes NCW as “an emerging theory o f war based on the concepts
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less evidence o f efforts aimed at applying these concepts to examinations o f the
individual and collective elements that comprise the set o f a nation’s assets and
capabilities. One reason for this reluctance to adopt a systems-based style include the
daunting task of explaining and understanding the complex nature o f national systems of
power, and the absence o f practical tools and approaches for such analysis. What are the
possible explanations for this paucity o f potential solutions?
Unlike many physical structures, national and international systems are nonlinear,
complex, and at times, chaotic; and the relationships between nations are complicated,
and not readily explained or fully understood. There is no calculus, and there are no
universal laws o f relations between states that can precisely equate cause to effect.
Further complicating the analysis, these systems are dynamic and reactive. In the physical
world, if the force applied to an object is changed, the laws o f motion lead us to expect a
commensurate alteration in the resultant velocity o f the object.
The effect o f a standard cue ball, traveling at a certain velocity, impacting a
grouping o f solid and striped balls o f known mass, at a specific angle o f incidence, may
be determined with some degree o f accuracy if the environmental factors, e.g., wind
velocity, temperature, humidity, etc, are known. Moreover, the effects o f the secondary
collisions are calculable. However, there is no equivalent equation to predict with much
confidence the consequences o f state actions. The law o f unintended effects, i.e., there
will be more than one consequence o f an action, remains in force.
If a government increases the level of efforts of its actions, e.g., tightens an
economic embargo against another regime, there is not a precise means o f determining if

o f nonlinearity, complexity and chaos.” Investigations into the use o f airpower as a means o f military
coercion also address systems.
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the resultant impact will increase proportionately, or even if there will be a variation at
all. Additionally, the secondary or unintended effects o f the action may work counter to
the embargoing nation’s objectives, such as strengthening, rather than weakening
domestic support for the regime in the targeted nation. Hence, the methods of analysis
that utilize a linear Newtonian approach in subjects such as mathematics and physics,
have had a more limited application to description and prediction in social sciences, and
particularly in international relations. However, examinations o f the seemingly linear
character o f physical systems now include a different perspective.
Systems previously described as simple, with linear relationships between
elements, are now attributed with complex nonlinear components. Investigations into
chaos and complexity theories since the 1970’s have resulted in nonlinear approaches in
multiple scientific disciplines. While many o f these are still in an embryonic stage, these
advances may provide some useful application to the task of analysis in areas previously
believed to be too dissimilar for useful application.
While the recognition o f nonlinearity is centuries old, and the scientific
community has made continuous attempts to understand and deal with this phenomenon,
it is the recent advances in information systems and computer technology that are largely
responsible for this increased ability to recognize nonlinear relationships. As Alan
Beyerchen observed, “What is new is that computers have allowed us to attack nonlinear
problems numerically, in the process highlighting patterns o f instability that have
captured scientific and popular imagination alike.” 12 Consequently, new approaches and
advances in the physical sciences may provide insights for other academic disciplines.

12.
Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” International
Security 17 (Winter 1992-93): 65.
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There are benefits to a cross-disciplinary approach. As Gleick argues, “Often a
revolution [in science] has an interdisciplinary character— its central discoveries often
come from people straying outside the normal bounds o f their specialties.” 13 This
excursion beyond the normal limits of foreign policy analysis is an attempt to capture and
apply these central discoveries to an examination o f national systems o f power,
specifically the consequences o f actions taken by one nation against another.
I undertake this study due to the recognition that a successful employment o f national,
coalition or alliance power requires a holistic knowledge of the systems o f power o f the
nation upon which the coercive actions are taken.14 Accepting this premise, I propose an
approach that uses a system o f systems analysis o f a nation’s sources o f power as the
basis for assessments.

The Hypothesis and Proposition
Fundamental questions emerge in appraisals o f the application of elements of
systems theory, particularly the recent advances in understanding nonlinear systems, to
analysis o f national power. Can the process and capabilities through which a nation
operates be properly described as a complex and nonlinear system? If so, do the
principles o f nonlinearity in other systems apply to national systems o f power? If national
systems o f power are nonlinear; and, if fresh scientific approaches, such as chaos and
complexity theories, provide aids to understanding nonlinear physical systems; can the
application of the principles derived from chaos and complexity studies contribute to the

13. Gleick, Chaos, 37.
14. While I will describe the approach with an individual nation as the normal target o f the coercive
power, the construct applies to certain non-state actors as well. I will expand on that supposition in later
chapters.
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understanding o f national systems of power?” Stated differently: If elements o f national
power are nonlinear and complex; and, if approaches recently developed in mathematics
and the physical sciences provide a means o f enhanced understanding o f nonlinear
systems; then, utilization o f such an approach may provide a metaphor or model for
increased understanding o f the system and the secondary effects of actions taken. This
dissertation first will attempt to confirm the existence o f the first two conditions—
systems o f national power are complex and nonlinear, and existing scientific approaches
may be relevant to assessments of national power. Subsequently, I will provide a design
for the product— a model for development o f an understanding o f the systems and for
anticipation o f secondary effects.
A fundamental assumption for the utilization o f a system o f systems analysis in
this context is that the elements of national power are interrelated, i.e., an action upon a
node (nexus, junction, leverage point) in one system is likely to have an impact on other
nodes in other systems. Awareness of these interactions represents the critical output of
the system o f systems process. The proposition is that improved comprehension o f the
elements o f national power, and the interactions within and between these, can provide a
broader knowledge o f the whole system, which may contribute to more informed
decisions regarding actions designed to influence those systems.
The foundation o f this premise is that a system of systems analysis o f a nation’s
elements o f national power can provide enhanced understanding o f the functioning o f that
system. This understanding will allow for improved comprehension o f the linkages
between units o f the system and could contribute to better awareness o f secondary effects
of actions. This awareness can be a useful tool for those who must consider the
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alternatives in selection o f the actions and resources applied to achieve desired effects.
This task is not new or unique to the geopolitical environment o f the early twenty-first
century. Consideration of the secondary effects of actions has been an element o f
relations between nations throughout recorded history.
There is a need for this approach now due to the dramatically changed
environment in which nations will employ coercive power. The evolving nature of
conflict and the perceived decreased likelihood o f symmetrical force-on-force
confrontations give this study an increased relevance. Historically, wars have involved
direct conflict between military forces. Hence, assessments that focused on primarily
military aspects were adequate. However, the wars o f the second half of the twentieth
century involved more than exclusively military engagements.15 That phenomenon is
likely to continue into the twenty-first. Therefore, assessments must consider all aspects
of national power.
During the Second World War, in discussions following criticism from the
Vatican o f Soviet actions, Joseph Stalin reportedly asked, “How many divisions does the
Pope have?” While that rhetorical question may have been appropriate in large-scale wars
o f national survival, it was less relevant to the successors of Stalin who learned that the
soft power o f the Pontiff could be a powerful force. Hence, assessments must extend
beyond numbers of divisions, tanks, and aircraft.
Vietnam and Afghanistan provide the models where overwhelming military force
was not sufficient to achieve the respective national objectives o f the United States and
the Soviet Union. The economic, political, and social structures have become as
15.
Certainly, there are multiple exceptions to this trend. Korea, Falklands/Malvinas, and the 1991 G ulf
War were primarily military conflicts. The Israeli military victories o f 1967 and 1973 have not yet
produced their primary objectives o f peace and stability in the region.
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important as the military correlation of forces. Conflicts that are more recent have
reinforced this need to consider all elements o f national power. To be effective, those
who employ coercive actions must consider the entire system o f power o f the adversary.
However, assessments still focus on the military, and examinations treat the other
components of power as separate entities. There is no adequate means o f developing an
understanding of the system as a whole, and as a result, the ability to anticipate the effects
o f actions is limited. Hence, decision-makers need better models and processes.16
Recognition o f the requirement for such tools is not new; the best strategists have
always sought a comprehensive understanding o f the adversary. This approach to
improving the level of understanding is possible now due to the merging o f new
approaches to complexity and systems analysis with advances in computer processing
and information technology capabilities. This synthesis o f evolving concepts and
information processing tools may overcome obstacles that made earlier attempts at
grasping the nature o f secondary effects ineffectual.
Enhanced understanding is the product of the process described in the chapters
that follow. While seemingly modest, this goal is o f great potential value to the decision
maker whose arsenal of analysis tools is currently limited. The inability to provide
precise predictions of secondary effects does not connote that the effort is not potentially
important. “Some problems are just too complicated for rational, logical solutions. They

16.
The National Military Strategy o f the United States declares, “Our experiences in Afghanistan and
Iraq highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy to achieve longer-term national goals and objectives. It
also provides, “commanders must expect and plan for the possibility that their operations w ill produce
unintended 2nd- and 3rd-order effects.” U.S. Department o f Defense, “The National Military Strategy o f
the United States o f America,” http://www/oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document.297_MT_.Strategy/
Doc.pdf, 33 (accessed 5 April 2005).
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admit insights, not answers ” 17 The objective o f this methodology is the development of
the former, as a tool to provide the latter.
The proposition does not represent a grand unification o f chaos, complexity, and
international relations theories that will provide a panacea of previously unattainable
capabilities. It is not a “Theory of Everything” and it will not always produce lucid and
unambiguous explanations o f how the elements o f systems interact or how the total
system operates. Nor will it enable precise predictions o f future events or the specific
effects resulting from an action. The methodology is not an attempt to make linear,
systems that are nonlinear. It is not a means o f directly applying the mathematical
equations developed by practitioners of chaos theory to the international relations
discipline. Most importantly, it is not a repackaging o f reductionist approaches hidden
under the banner of chaos, complexity or other more contemporary theories.
New or improved concepts and methodologies are important to decision-makers,
as well as the analysts who support them, not solely because o f the perceived increased
complexity of national systems, but also due to the acknowledged need to improve the
ability to understand the secondary effects o f actions. Recent applications o f American
power in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan provide examples where actions
designed to achieve effects in support of objectives also resulted in secondary
(unintended, unanticipated, undesired) effects, which may or may not have supported
these overall national objectives. While not a universal remedy for this problem o f
contending with secondary effects of actions, this methodology may at least provide an
awareness o f possible secondary effects that could help mitigate their deleterious impact.

17.
A. B. Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory: A Paradigm f o r Complexity (Washington, DC: Academic
Press, Inc., 1993), vi. Emphasis added. Attributed to President Emeritus o f MIT, Jerome B. Weisner.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

The justification for this study and proposed methodology is the need for a
rudimentary tool for decision-makers to contend with the consequences o f actions when
dealing with complex systems o f national power. This investigation into the relationship
between elements of national power, and the potential for benefits o f such an analysis
will consider three key questions:
1. Can the sources o f national power be examined and better understood through
utilization o f a systems approach?
2. Can the interaction between elements within a system be determined using a system of
systems model?
3. Can knowledge o f these interactions provide insight into the consequences o f actions,
including the secondary effects?
An examination o f coercive power and the basic elements o f systems theory will
provide the response to the first question. A methodology based on a system o f systems
approach will address the second proposition through illustrations o f the model. The
response to the third question must rely on case studies to demonstrate the potential o f the
approach.
The answers are important to foreign policy decision-makers who must operate in
an increasingly complex and interdependent geo-political environment. Actions taken to
produce desired effects may also generate outcomes that are damaging to overall
objectives. Therefore, identification o f alternative actions is a valuable product. While the
methodology can only provide estimates o f general patterns o f behavior, any tool or
process that can provide insight into these interrelationships is useful, and the potential
for exploitation is worthy o f examination.
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Organization o f the Dissertation
I have organized this dissertation into nine chapters. Chapter II begins with an
examination o f what power means within the context of this study and how that power
may be used to achieve objectives. It includes the theoretical foundations and
components o f power and a presentation o f the relevant terminology. The focus is on
coercion as the central strategy to goal attainment. The limitations o f current models
provide the rationale and justification for this analysis. Chapter III examines nonlinear
approaches, including complexity and chaos theories, and provides an evaluation o f their
applicability to assessments of national power. Chapter IV describes the foundations o f a
systems approach and the advantages its application may contribute to assessments of
national power. It also supports the contention that national systems o f power are
nonlinear complex adaptive systems; and, examines the impact o f nonlinearity on
assessments o f national power.
Building upon the insights provided in the previous sections, Chapter V describes
the system o f systems approach and presents a methodology for its utilization in
assessments o f national power. Chapters VI through VIII utilize case studies to examine
three distinctive episodes where elements of a system o f systems approach were used
(although not necessarily overtly) with varying degrees o f success. An ex post
determination o f the effects attained, and how these supported the declared objectives,
provides the foundation for the analysis contained in these sections. The final chapter
synthesizes the insights from the case studies and summarizes the contention that a
system o f systems analysis may be useful in the understanding o f secondary effects. With
the rationale for the study presented, the systems approach introduced, the hypothesis

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

stated, and the structure outlined, I will now commence with the first essential task— an
examination o f the concept of power.
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF COERCIVE POWER

Nations apply coercive power in order to produce effects that support objectives.
While they may achieve success in the generation of the primary effects, the same actions
may also be the cause o f secondary consequences. Although there is wide
acknowledgement of the problem presented by the phenomenon o f secondary effects,
there currently are no practical models available to decision-makers that focus on the
unintended, unexpected, or undesired effects resulting from actions intended to influence
the behavior o f other actors. Accepting this premise, a reasonable conclusion becomes
that an enhanced method and tool set for this task could be useful.
If adequate instruments were available to the decision-maker that could provide
some level o f understanding o f both the primary intended, as well as the secondary
effects, there would be little justification for this analysis and proposition. However, a
review o f the existing literature suggests that this is not the case and that the ability to do
so is at best limited; or at worst, non-existent. Therefore, a vital initial objective is to
provide evidence that demonstrates that currently available tools and processes are not
sufficient for a comprehension of the effects o f actions. It is not possible to accomplish
this task without a preliminary examination of the theoretical foundations o f the
application of coercive power, the rationale for its use, and the factors that make the
calculus regarding effects nonlinear and complex.
Since the primary utility o f the proposed methodology is within the context o f the
use o f power to influence behavior, this chapter will begin with a brief examination o f the
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sources of national power, identifying key elements and providing basic definitions upon
which to base the discussions that follow. This includes a description of how national
power is comprised o f a set o f interrelated components. Because power is such an
expansive concept, this coverage will be rather cursory and will provide only the
essentials necessary for subsequent discussion o f the points upon which I base the
construct o f the proposition. The focus will be on the application o f power to influence
the behavior of other actors.
Coercion best describes the type of power application central to this study, and I
will examine it in some detail in the second section o f the chapter. This concentration is
necessary, since coercive actions are the major source of the effects for which this inquiry
hopes to provide some level o f increased understanding. If coercion is the chosen
strategy, then currently available methodologies are not adequate for envisaging the
inevitable secondary effects resulting from coercive actions. This segment includes an
overview o f the decision-making process related to the selection o f coercive actions.
Again, this is a vast area for consideration, crossing multiple academic disciplines, and I
address it in a level o f depth only sufficient to support the proposition.
Subsequently, I will provide an examination of the impact o f linkages, along with
illustrations o f why current methodologies are insufficient, since they do not provide the
requisite holistic knowledge o f the relationship between elements within the larger
system. A primary cause of this comprehension deficit is often the result o f attempts to
apply linear concepts, models, and thinking to nonlinear systems. This assertion requires
an introduction to linearity and consideration o f arguments as to why it is an
inappropriate approach to understanding the effects o f actions. That supposition will
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segue into an examination of nonlinearity and the consequent complications to
development o f any practical predictive capability. This leads to the conclusion that
linear approaches are inadequate for the task, and provides the prologue for the
investigation into the benefits o f nonlinear approaches that I present in Chapter III.

Concepts o f Power
An analysis of power first requires some agreement on a definition o f the term.
Reduced to a simple statement, power is the ability of A to get B to do something B
would not otherwise do at a reasonable cost to A. Hence, power is the ability to change
behavior. In a variety o f permutations, this concept o f power is central to debates in
international relations theory.
Power is a fundamental, and some argue the most important, factor in the
relations between states. Not surprisingly, the concept o f power has been the subject o f an
immense amount o f study, analysis, and contention, and has generated an enormous
amount of academic discourse. There is no intention to capture the entirety o f that trove
o f data here, or to provide a treatise on contemporary political theory regarding the
interactions between nations. However, development o f a theoretical foundation upon
which to base the proposition contained herein is important to providing an understanding
o f the proposed methodology.
Traditional realist thought explains the international system primarily in terms of
the distribution o f power. This relative power relationship, derived from assessments of
capabilities, represents a key factor in policy decisions and the determination of
outcomes. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson assume that political leaders think
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and act in terms o f interest defined as power, which they define as, “man’s control over
the minds and actions o f other men.” 1 They distinguish power from the application o f
force, useable from unusable power, legitimate from illegitimate power, and hence, the
differences between political and military power. Additionally, they identify the
“elements of national power,” which are distinguished by those that are relatively stable,
such as geography and natural resources, and those which are subject to change,
4
2
including national morale and the quality o f government and o f diplomacy.
While he disagrees with many tenets o f the traditional realist approach, Joseph
Nye offers a definition similar to its advocates. He argues, “Power is the ability to
achieve one’s purposes or goals:” and contends, “Power is often equated with resources
and requires an ability to convert this potential power into realized power (the ability to
■>

change the behavior o f others).”
David Baldwin also equates power with the ability to influence or control, but
contends that the essential element in any discussion o f power must be scope and
domain.4 He believes it important to distinguish between power and capabilities. Baldwin

1. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, P olitics am ong Nations, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1985), 32. Presenting a realist perspective, the authors justify their approach to the definition o f
power in the relationships between nations. “The concept o f interest defined as power imposes intellectual
discipline on the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter o f politics, and makes the
theoretical understanding o f politics possible” (ibid., 5).
2. Ibid., 27-169. Among the subsets o f natural resources are food and raw materials. It is the
contribution o f these, along with geography and industrial capacity, to another factor, military
preparedness, that provides their importance to national power.
3. Joseph S. N ye, Jr., “The Changing Nature o f World Power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2
(Fall 1990): 177-78. He contends that power “is easier to experience than to define or measure,” but
nevertheless proposes, “the ability to do things or to control others.” He also offers Robert Dahl’s “the
ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do.” In a later work, N ye defines power as “the
ability to produce the outcomes you want.” Joseph S. N ye, Jr., “The Velvet Hegem on,” Foreign Policy
May-June 2003, 74. He elaborates, “Soft power is the ability to secure those outcomes through attraction
rather than coercion.”
4. David A. Baldwin, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, the Contemporary D ebate (N ew York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), 15. He provides additional views on the “troublesome” term “power,” including
Robert Gilpin’s 1975 observation that “the number and variety o f definitions should be an embarrassment
to political scientists.”
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also observes that a user o f the latter term must consider the “capability to get whom to
do what?”5 Similarly, Robert Keohane views Morgenthau’s definition as “murky” in that
it fails “to distinguish power as a resource (based on tangible as well as intangible assets)
and power as the ability to influence others’ behavior.”6
In the neorealist viewpoint o f Kenneth Waltz, “To use power is to apply one’s
capabilities in an attempt to change someone else’s behavior in certain ways.” To define
•j

‘power’ as ‘cause’ confuses process with outcome.” The important factor to Waltz is
relative, not absolute power. Gains and declines in power are important only in their
relationship to those of other actors.
Moving beyond neorealism, Stefano Guzzini examines the concept o f structural
power, which he describes as “indirect institutional power.”8 This widening o f traditional
concepts o f power to include features such as indirect institutional and unintended effects
is important to this study since an understanding o f these types o f effects is a major
rationale for the conduct o f a system o f systems analysis.
To those within the liberal or institutionalist camp, power remains an essential
element in international relations. They contend, however, that power in its purest sense
may not be the most critical factor. Rejecting the realist model, they contend that other
factors, such as the impact of information, domestic institutions, and international
5. Ibid., 17.
6. Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 11.
He also observes, “Theories based solely on definable power capabilities have proven to be notoriously
poor at accounting for political outcomes.” He later advocates, “When trying to explain a set o f outcomes
in world politics, always consider the hypothesis that the outcomes reflect underlying power resources,
without being limited to it” (ibid., 185).
7. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 191. In his analysis, “The first concern o f states is not to
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system .” Hence, “power is a means and not an end”
(ibid., 126). He adds “To define ‘power’ as ‘cause’ confuses process with outcome” (ibid., 191).
8. Stefan Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits o f Neorealist Power Analysis,” International
Organization 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 451. These notions o f structural power contain varied
categorizations o f power. Among these are indirect institutional power, nonintentional pow er, and
impersonal em powering (ibid., 450).
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regimes, provide an improved underpinning for understanding. A third, but less
developed epistemic paradigm, focuses on the impact o f collectives, ideas, roles, and
beliefs.9
While this pithy theoretical discourse regarding the concept o f power provides a
necessary foundation for further analysis, its inclusion does not represent a primary
objective o f this study. The key factors in this examination are the components o f power,
and the essential question becomes, what factors comprise a nation’s overall system of
power?
Across the theoretic spectrum, most analysts essentially agree that assessment of
power resources is not as straightforward or as palpable as the counting o f ships, tanks,
and aircraft. This type o f analysis is relatively simple, has been attempted before, and has
proven to be of only partial value. The overall system o f power may include more hidden
and nebulous factors.
John Mearsheimer differentiates between military and latent power, the latter
referring to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.10
Keohane, Nye, et al, contend that power goes beyond Mearsheimer’s limited view of
military power as the principal indicator o f overall power. They identify multiple

9. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravczisik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24,
no. 2 (Fall 1999): 10. Along with the epistemic model, they identify another two paradigmatic alternatives
to realism: (1) institutionalist, which “contains theories and explanations that stress the role o f international
institutions,” and (2) liberal, whose theories “stress the role o f the exogenous variation in underlying state
preferences.” Although, as the title would indicate, the authors are particularly critical o f the realist model,
this article represents one o f the best available sources for comparison o f the most prominent theories o f
international relations.
10. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f G reat P ow er P olitics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 2000), 55-56. The basis o f power is the particular material capabilities that a state possesses. See
discussion on wealth and power, 55-82. Both latent and military power will be considered elements in the
broader characterization o f national power used in this study, since it is these socio-econom ic elements,
along with the more commonly explored political-military power, that comprise the system o f national
power.
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additional components and dispute his view that socio-economic factors are important
only in the degree to which they support or enhance military power.
Regardless o f their theoretical persuasion, most investigators into the nature o f
power describe it as a multifaceted issue, i.e., not based on a single source. Power may
have tangible and intangible manifestations. It is possible to readily identify and
enumerate some o f these, such as the components of a highly developed electrical power
distribution network. Others, such as moral and cultural influence, are more esoteric and
difficult to quantity. The debate is largely over degree o f importance, not over whether
less concrete factors, such as ideas and beliefs, are part o f the power equation. Hence, for
the purposes o f this constrained analysis, the differences between the views of
Mearsheimer, Waltz, Nye, and Keohane provided earlier are not considerable.
This brief excursion into concepts o f power produced three tenets that are
important to this analysis: (1) power includes the ability to change behavior; (2) while
theoretical divides exist, power is a major element in relations between states; and, (3)
power is comprised of multiple elements, and these elements may be physical or
intangible. Further discussion and confirmation o f the limitations o f current models and
tools requires an examination o f the components o f national power.

Elements o f Power
Having established that national power is multifaceted, it is worth some effort to
identify a few o f the elements that contribute to it. As addressed earlier, national power
most often equates with military might. Ancient Greece extended its influence through its
skilled use of the phalanx and trireme; the British Empire through sea power; and the
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Post-World War II United States by its nuclear arsenal supplemented by potent
conventional forces. Although, as Nye and others insightfully point out, the total
influence of Greece, Britain, and the United States extended beyond raw military power.
Military conquest may be ephemeral. The culture of ancient Greece permeates the
western world; while little remains o f the Mongol martial victories.
Despite a general acknowledgement o f power as a multifaceted concept, there is
little agreement as to the number of categories or to their respective boundaries. In the
literature discussed in earlier paragraphs, military power was included in nearly every
theoretical viewpoint. Mearsheimer assigns socio-economic power to the role of
supporting elements o f military power. Waltz allows for some basic decomposition and
includes military, economic, and political potential as components in power assessments.
Nye has offered soft power to the discussion.
While the specific means o f acquiring and applying this power may have varied,
historically the major manifestations o f national power have been military might,
supported by economic capacity. Certainly, military power is itself comprised o f multiple
capabilities and resources such as population, degree o f industrial or technological
development, natural resources, etc.11 These assets are often regarded as sub-elements of
economic power.
Klaus Knorr observes, “We distinguish between military power, economic power
and political penetrative power.” 12 This distinction becomes germane and helpful in

11. Joseph S. N ye, Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1990, 153-71. Because the ability to control
others is often associated with the possession o f certain resources, politicians and diplomats commonly
define power as the possession o f population, territory, natural resources, econom ic size, military forces,
and political stability.” He adds, “The factors o f technology, education, and econom ic growth are becoming
more significant in international power” (ibid., 154).
12. Klaus Knorr, The P ow er o f Nations (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), 6. In the last category, he
includes propaganda and other information-centric actions.
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discussions regarding interconnectedness and interdependence o f activities. In an
examination o f the structure o f international trade, Steven Krasner observes this wide
range o f power and proposes a classification o f elements: “At least four major state
interests affected by the structure of international trade can be identified. They are
•

political power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability.”

1^

Historically, most categorizations o f power have included groupings under
military, economic, and political elements. However, Nye sees three sources of power:
military, economic, and soft. He has written extensively on the concept o f soft power,
which he attributes with the ability to influence without coercion. Resources such as
technology, culture, ideology, and education all contribute to the calculation o f a nation’s
soft power. Nye views both military and economic power as examples o f hard power that
could induce others to alter their behavior or positions. Although hard power may be
exercised through inducements or threats, “soft power co-opts rather than coerces.” 14 In
the context o f this study, I will consider both hard and soft power in the assessment of
national power.
While inclusion o f political, military, and economic elements o f power is not
particularly contentious, visualizations that are more recent describe power in additional
terms. This has necessitated the broad category o f social, which can have cultural, ethnic,
religious, and informational components. Adding to the confusion, Guzzini introduces the

13. Steven D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure o f International Trade,” in International Politics,
ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company, 1985), 341. Krasner
views power as the possession o f control over resources. He expands on this concept o f power as being also
a source o f influence in Steven D. Krasner, “Regimes and the Limits o f Realism: Regim es as Autonomous
Variables,” International Organization 36 no. 2 (Spring 1982): 497-510.
14. Joseph S. N ye, Jr., The Paradox o f American Pow er (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9.
Following on to previous writings, N ye explains that soft power is “not the same as influence, though it is
one source o f influence,” and in an interesting comparison, contends that soft power “like love is hard to
measure and to handle” (ibid., 12).
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concept o f “indirect institutional power.” Hence, there are no universally accepted criteria
for categorization or description o f the elements o f power.
While perhaps professionally discouraging, this condition does not render this
analysis unachievable. It is the interaction o f the elements, not the broad categorizations,
which is critical to the proposition. Therefore, an arbitrary segregation into broad
groupings for analysis is justified. For purposes o f the discussion o f the interactions to
follow, I consign the elements that comprise the overall system o f power into four major
categories: political, economic, military, and social.15
Specific elements or sources o f power are easier to identify than they are to assign
to a particular category. For example, most would probably consider a nuclear powered
aircraft carrier an element of military power. However, others are less obvious. Should a
religious leader in a theocracy be classified as a political, social, or economic node? One
could make compelling arguments for inclusion in any one, or in all three categories.
Chapter V outlines a methodology that offers some practical means o f overcoming this
dilemma, but for purposes of the discussion contained here, I defer that issue, and a
preliminary examination of interrelationships between elements will be undertaken first.

Relationship between Elements of Power
While the elements of economic and military power are mutually supporting, the
temporal order o f acquisition is not universally consistent. Historically, military power
was a means to attain economic assets. The Mongols, Huns, and Vikings all used military
power to achieve economic resources. More recently, economic prosperity enabled the
1 5 .1 present this initial categorization o f the subsystems now in order to facilitate understanding o f the
issues addressed in this chapter. I w ill be define and develop in the chapters that follow the criteria for
inclusion o f specific elements, as w ell as the scope and boundaries o f these categories.
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acquisition o f modem weaponry. The economic assets gained from sixteenth century
Spain’s American colonies allowed her to mount a challenge to British sea power. In a
modem example o f economic power enabling military power, the sophisticated weapon
systems possessed by many middle-eastern nations is a direct result o f their oil wealth. In
many cases, these factors are so closely interrelated that any discussion of what came
first—economic or military strength—becomes irrelevant.
External to the categorization issue is the interrelationship o f elements within and
across the arbitrary boundaries established earlier. Waltz contends, “The economic,
military, and political components o f the capabilities o f nations cannot be sectored or
separately weighed.” 16 However, acceptance o f this argument does not connote that the
separate parts are exchangeable. If power is a combination o f capabilities provided by the
various elements, the question emerges as to whether these elements or types o f power
may be interchanged. For example, can economic power be a substitute for military
power? If soft power is a viable concept, then is its utilization possible instead of the
more aggressive manifestations o f hard power?
David Baldwin looks at the issue of fungibility as the ability to transfer power, or,
“the ease with which capabilities in one issue-area can be used in other issue-areas.”

17

He

argues that power is not always fungible. Instead, multidimensional is a more accurate
depiction. The common perception o f power in the social sciences is, “a type o f causal
relationship in which the power wielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or

16. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 31.
17. Baldwin, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, the Contemporary D ebate, 20. The high-fungibility
assumption is more useful in the longer the period. In his view, “In politics as w ell as in economics, more
things are fungible in the long term than in the short.”
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Manifestations o f attempts by nations to influence the behavior o f others are frequent,
reoccurring, and varied. Actions may deny an opponent some vital commodity;
punishment may be the primary intent of others. The objective may be to maintain the
status quo, i.e., at least one opponent is convinced not to take actions that are counter to
the interests o f another. In other instances, the goal may be to get the adversary to take
actions that they would not undertake without the threat or application o f power. Making
the cost o f resisting appear to be greater than the costs o f complying is a means of
accomplishing both goals. Therefore, the objective just as well may be to influence an
adversary not to do something, as it may be to induce an action. Attempts to prevent
actions that have not yet materialized may be categorized as deterrence, while those
intended to reverse an action or alter the status quo normally are considered compellence.
The U.S Department o f Defense defines deterrence as “The prevention from
action by fear of the consequences intended to prevent an action.” 19 Two potential
adversaries, currently at peace, making efforts to persuade the other not to embark upon
courses o f action normally characterize deterrence. Compellence is similar, in that the
basis o f the concept is convincing the adversary that the costs exceed the payback. In the
case o f compellence, however, the objective is for the opponent to elect to undertake an
action because it evaluates the benefits o f doing so to outweigh the consequences o f not
taking the action. Compellence and deterrence combined may be regarded as subsets of
coercion.20

19. U.S. Department o f Defense, “DOD Dictionary,” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
data/d/01641.html (accessed 27 September 2004). Expanding on this concept and addressing the
multifaceted nature o f power, the dictionary defines deterrent options as “a course o f action, developed on
the best econom ic, diplomatic, political and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary ffom a
current course o f actions or contemplate operations.”
20. Deterrence itself has many faces, and may be categorized into general deterrence and immediate
deterrence. Immediate deterrence is the type germane to this study. See discussion in Daniel Byman,
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Arguments over characterization can result over whether deterrence actually
represents a change in behavior, and if strategies that employ denial and punishment are
in themselves types o f coercion. Avoiding that semantic trap, this project will focus on
the more active means o f eliciting behavioral change. While the proposed methodology is
applicable in other schemes, it is most relevant to the use of coercion and the subsequent
case studies will focus on this method. Therefore, further analysis warrants an inclusive
inquiry into the concept o f coercion.

Coercion
As with much terminology in the social sciences, there is no universal agreement
on the definition o f coercion, or on its scope and boundaries. Acknowledging that
condition, further investigation requires acceptance of definitions that are harmonious
with typical, albeit not all, understandings, and that are satisfactory for presentation o f the
methodology to follow in later chapters.
Dictionary entries include defining coerce as, “to enforce or bring about by force
or threat.”21 Karl Mueller provides a broad definition in describing coercion as, “a matter
o f changing the adversary’s expectations to make compliance with the coercer’s demands
appear more attractive than resisting them.”22 The definition is independent o f the means
used to achieve this coercion. Methods range from the application o f overt military force,
to economic sanctions or political initiatives, and these may take the form o f carrots
Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric V. Larson, A ir P ow er as a C oercive Instrument (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1999), 9-13.
21. Webster’s N ew Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “coerce.” To add to the confusion in com m only utilized
terms, another offering is “to compel to an act or a choice.”
22. Karl Mueller, “The Essence o f Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” A ir and
Space Pow er Chronicles. September 2001, 5. He includes in his definition both deterrence (making the
adversary not do something) and com pellence (making an actor take an action that he normally would not).
Much coercion lies in the gray area between these.
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(promise of rewards) or sticks (threats of punishment). Importantly, Mueller stresses that
the choices are relative vice absolute. Successful coercion only must make the coercer’s
preferred action to be more appealing to the adversary than the action it would take in the
absence o f the coercive effort.
Thomas Schelling makes the important distinction that while the use o f military
force may at times be an instrument o f coercion, its employment does not connote that
coercion has occurred. Coercion has as its goal a change of behavior. It requires “finding
a bargain,” that is, arranging for the adversary to believe himself to be better off by doing
what the coercer wants; worse off if he does not.23 If sufficient military force is available,
a nation may not have to take any purely coercive actions. Based on this disparity, it can
simply take or do what it wants.
A RAND study offers, “Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the
limited use o f actual force to back up a threat, to induce an adversary to behave
differently than it otherwise would.”24 This view stresses the advantages of displays of
force as threats, over what Schelling describes as the employment o f military capabilities
as brute force. Compellence is exceptionally difficult to distinguish from deterrence and
in practice, “they tend to blur.”25
Robert Pape offers, “ ‘Coercion’ means efforts to change the behavior o f a state by
manipulating costs and benefits.’”26 He does not consider deterrence to be a subset of

23. Thomas C Schelling, “The Diplomacy o f V iolence,” in International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and
Robert Jervis (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company, 1985), 173. Some actions may do both. He
uses the example o f the Soviet crushing o f the Budapest uprising in 1956. This application o f power solved
the immediate Hungarian problem for them, but also had a coercive effect on other Warsaw Pact nations,
especially Poland.
24. Byman, A ir P ow er as a Coercive Instrument, 9.
25. Ibid., 11.
26. Robert Pape, Bom bing to Win: A ir P ow er an d Coercion in War (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University
Press, 1996), 4. Here he differs from Mueller by equating coercion with compellence.
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coercion. In his view, coercion differs from deterrence only in that the intent o f the
former is to alter the behavior of an adversary while the latter seeks to maintain the status
quo. He concurs with Mueller’s observation that non-military means may be used in
coercive efforts, but contends that military actions deserve special attention because they
represent the most common applications.
Alexander George provides a different perspective in his examination o f coercive
diplomacy, the central task o f which is, “To create in the opponent the expectation of
costs o f sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing.” He
provides two major types o f coercion, offensive and defensive. The former is described
as blackmail and is the expectation that the opponent will give up something without
resistance. The aim of the latter is convincing the opponent to stop an action or undo
those already accomplished. Force is to be used in an exemplary manner—to persuade,
rather than to bludgeon. Through coercive diplomacy force becomes, “a much more
flexible, psychological instrument of policy.”

97

Pape segregates theories o f coercion into four broad groupings: (1) Balance o f
resolve—the state with the greater resolve prevails; (2) balance o f interests—the edge
goes to the protagonist with the largest stake in the outcome; (3) vulnerability o f the
civilian population to air attack; and, (4) balance o f forces—ability to strike an
adversary’s military targets. He believes these theories to be incomplete and possessing

27.
Alexander L George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simmons, The Limits o f C oercive Diplomacy:
Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 18. This strategy focuses on affecting
the opponent’s will rather than capabilities. Force goes beyond being merely an instrument o f military
strategy; it becom es subordinated to a political-diplomatic strategy. See also Alexander L. George, Forceful
Persuasion: C oercive D iplom acy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f
Peace, 1991), 5. Here he contends that both blackmail and coercive diplomacy would be included in
Schelling’s definition o f compellence. George prefers to distinguish between the two in order to
“emphasize the possibility o f a more flexible diplomacy that can employ non-coercive persuasion and
accommodation as w ell as coercive threats.”
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limited explanatory power, since they often represent single factor explanations.

28

Additionally, he contends it is not the intentions or the behavior o f the coercing state that
is most critical to defining coercion, rather it is the, “nature o f the decisions faced by the
potential target states.”29 In his view, success or failure o f coercion is in the final analysis
a function o f the target state’s decision process. Consequentially, knowledge about the
nature of this process is critical to the planning and execution o f coercive actions.
In the evaluation o f coercive threats, nations commonly use three factors:
credibility, capability, and communication. Is the threat credible? Does the target believe
that the coercive action will actually be carried out? Capability: Does the coercer actually
have the ability to fulfill the threat? Communication: Is the signal and intent clear, and is
the message transmitted the same as the message received? Applying examples from
1961 Cuban Missile Crisis: Did the Soviets believe that the U.S. would go to war over
Cuba? Did they believe that the U.S. had the military power to destroy the missiles in
Cuba or to launch a strike against the Soviet homeland? Was Kennedy’s threat clearly
communicated to Khrushchev? Without attempting to reproduce or even to summarize

28. Pape, Bombing to Win, 4-7. Pape considers air power as a principal, but not the sole manifestation
o f effective coercion. He also contends, “Coercion is generally assumed to operate according to the same
principles as deterrence” (ibid., 6). He views these as distinctly different activities, with coercion being
more difficult.
29. Ibid., 12. He argues that the target states must decide to make concessions or accede to demands.
This is more important to success o f coercion than the nature o f the threats. He has developed an equation
to display the logic o f coercion:
R
R
B
p(B)
C
P(C)

= B p(B) - C p(C), where
= value o f resistance
= potential benefits o f resistance
= probability o f attaining benefits by continued resistance
= potential costs o f resistance
= probability o f suffering losses
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the volumes dedicated to this event, analysts and historians generally agree that the
•

answer to all three questions would be yes, and that the coercion was successful.

TO

This section provided a brief examination o f coercion and concluded: (1)
definitions and categorization can vary, but Pape’s “efforts to change the behavior o f a
state by manipulating costs and benefits” is appropriate for purposes o f this study; (2)
coercion may be employed through multiple methods; and, (3) affecting the expectation
and perceptions o f the adversary is the critical element in coercion. This last observation
is the most significant aspect of the application o f power.
With this examination o f coercion complete, the next step is to develop an
understanding o f the factors that will cause an adversary to select one course over
another, i.e. what actions will cause the opponent to conform to the objectives o f the
coercive power? This requires an examination of the components and processes of
decision-making.

Selection o f Alternatives
Thus far, this chapter has looked at the specific applications o f power rather than
at power in a broader sense. While the overall equation of relative power is important, it
is not the primary consideration here. The relative power o f adversaries is not the most
important factor to this endeavor. Rather, it is the quality and utility o f the knowledge
base that supports decisions to take actions that are intended to coerce behavior.
Regardless o f how systems o f power are organized and how the components interact, at

30.
Mueller, “The Essence o f Coercive Air Power,” 4, proposes the categories o f threats, and notes,
“coercion is a matter o f the adversary’s perceptions, it depends upon a set o f subjective factors.” A variety
o f interpretations o f the crisis exists. The degree o f employment o f these criteria for coercion and the
degree to which they were successful remains a topic for debate.
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some point an explicit decision concerning possible actions must be made. Those
decisions rely on knowledge.
Within the context of this study, the consideration of secondary effects is part of
the decision calculus. That decision-making process is important whether the
understanding of potential secondary effects is deep and exhaustive, or thin and cursory.
Hence, a brief discussion o f decision-making in the selection of alternatives for the use of
coercive power is germane to this discussion.31
The debate over the rules that lead to decisions is animated and wide-ranging.
Extending beyond the traditional political science and international relations fields,
psychology and sociology have contributed to the debate. While other explanatory
alternatives exist, the rational actor and cognitive psychology schools contribute the most
models, and the relative merits of these have provided the largest amount o f discourse
'i'j

and contention.
Tracing its antecedents back to the 1940’s, the rational school assumes that utility
and optimization o f results are the primary goals o f the decision-maker. Simply put, the
premise is that the actors will operate in their own self-interest. In its most basic sense,
the process includes determining the possible results of a decision, evaluating the
probability o f the outcomes, and selecting the alternative that provides the best

31. Ryan Beasley, “Collective Interpretations: How Problem Representations Aggregate in Foreign
Policy Groups,” in Problem Representation in Foreign Policy D ecision Making, ed. Donald A. Sylvan and
James F. V oss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 109. He contends that many analysts
believe that policymaking is more than simply making decisions. He advocates the use o f the term foreign
policy problem solving, which he believes to describe more appropriately, what is accomplished when a
decision is made.
32. The plural must be emphasized; there is no single “rational’ model, and many cognitive models o f
choice exist.
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potential.33 Mueller contends that coercion theory, “does assume a minimal amount of
rationality in the target state’s behavior,” but believes that it is more accurate to require
only that the “adversary state not behave irrationally.”34
Proponents o f the cognitive (or psychological) model do not fully agree with the
basic premise o f actors’ striving to maximize utility. In their view, choices normally are
made for reasons that cannot be explained by a utility calculus. Those on the cognitive
side o f the debate tend to focus on filters through which people process information and
which can lead to “conflicting expectations about judgment and behavior.”35 Critics o f
cognitive models point out that the psychological approach does not provide additional
explanatory power. However, they often will concur with the contention that the rational
approach has inherent limitations and does not provide a total explanation for decision
making. While this debate is useful in analyses o f the decision-making process, for the
purpose o f this proposition it is sufficient to recognize that choices may not always be
understood or completely explained. This would apply to coercive actions taken to
influence the behavior of others.
Alex Mintz contends, “people/leaders/decisionmakers use a mixture o f choice
strategies (analytic, cybernetic, cognitive) on route to a decision.”

That conclusion is

fitting and adequate for the purpose o f this endeavor, which focuses on enhancing the
33. A lex Mintz, “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Bridging the Gap between the Cognitive Psychology
and Rational Actor Schools,” in Decisionmaking in War an d Peace, ed. Nehemia Geva and A lex Mintz
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997), 11-30. This collection provides an in-depth analysis o f the
debate and includes chapters on Prospect Theory and Poliheuristic Theory. I will not consider these
approaches further.
34. Mueller, “The Essence o f Coercive Air Power,” 5. Italics in original.
35. Janice Gross Stein and David A. Welch, “Rational and Psychological Approaches to the Study o f
International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and W eaknesses,” in Decisionmaking in War an d Peace, ed.
Nehemia Geva and A lex Mintz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997), 5. The authors do not view
cognitive psychology as a “true competitor to rational choice,” but believe it to be useful in determining
why deviations from the rational ideal take place” (ibid., 54).
36. Mintz, “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,” 215. The consensus o f the contributors to this collection
is that these approaches are not competing, but rather are complementary.
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knowledge upon which decisions are made, not the mental processes that are used to
formulate them. While examination o f the latter issue is an important effort, I leave it to
others.
Having selected appropriate understandings of power and coercion, and having
concluded that decision-making is not an entirely rational process; the discussion may
now consider how these theoretical constructs apply to the existing international
environment. I will examine the systems approach in some detail in Chapter IV.
However, for the sake of clarity in this discussion related to linkages, broad elements of
power, i.e., political, economic, military, and social, I will refer to as systems. This
perspective provides a basis upon which to develop further the suppositions that provide
the foundation o f this proposition.
I base this proposition on a primary assumption o f the existence o f connections
between elements of national power. The elements are interrelated but are not universally
substitutable. That is, although economic power may not be metamorphosed directly into
political power, they both contain interconnected and interrelated elements o f the same
overall system o f power. Therefore, by extension, an influence applied upon one o f these
interconnected elements is likely to produce a secondary effect on the other, as well upon
any nodes or elements connected further within the network.
While this premise will be developed further in subsequent chapters, a brief
departure is warranted in order to describe the environment where these assumptions
would be applied. The identification o f interrelated sources o f power is not a new
revelation. There is no major epiphany in that realization. The more important question is
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whether this recognition of interrelated elements is transformable into a practical model
for decision-makers. The issue o f linkages, therefore, becomes the next topic to consider.

The Impact o f Linkages
Earlier sections contain the contention that elements o f power within a holistic
system are interrelated. The existence o f linkages between elements o f national power is
not often contested. However, transformation of this recognition into an understanding of
how this condition can influence applications of coercive power is not abundant.
Linkages are the critical element in this analysis, since they provide an indicator o f where
and when secondary effects o f actions may occur.
Linkages vary greatly in type o f relationship and intensity. Mere geographic
proximity provides one type o f linkage. Tribal or ethnic identity, political allegiance,
religious sect membership, and economic dependencies also provide some type of
connection. Evaluation o f linkages includes an awareness o f the general nature o f the
relations and interactions that exist between entities. J. David Singer considers these
linkages to be in the horizontal plane (among entities is the same subsystem) and vertical
and diagonal planes (linking entities across different sub-system classes).

Hence,

multiple economic entities, e.g., mines, factories, banks, etc., may be related. However,
each o f these also may link to a political leader, foreign supplier, or transportation
facility.

37.
J. David Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems: A Developmental V iew ,” in Linkage
Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau (N ew York: The Free Press, 1969), 35. Singer observes the “operational
substitutability o f interaction and interdependence, but believes these to be conceptually distinct. That
distinction is not important to this discussion and both types o f relationships will be included as indicators
o f linkages. Additionally, he does not “consider it useful or necessary to define the boundaries among
social, economic, or political phenomena” (ibid., 24). “It makes little sense to differentiate between polity,
economy, and society, intertwined as they are, unless one is trapped in a ‘functionalist’ matrix” (ibid., 30).
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Figure 1 provides a simplified illustration. It depicts three subsystems: economic,
political, and social. Each box represents an entity within one o f those subsystems. The
lines indicate that a relationship exists between the connected elements.

P olitical
E conom ic

Social

E2

Figure 1. Linkages within and across Subsystems

Economic entity E2 is interrelated with another economic node (E3). It also relates to an
entity within the political subsystem (P2), as well as a social node (S2). For example, E2
could be a major industrial facility. It links to P2, for example, because the factory owner
is a political supporter of the prime minister. E2 also connects to S2, which could be an
ethnic group that comprises the majority o f the factory’s workforce. Hence, an action
taken with the intent of influencing E2 may also produce a second order effect on E3, P2,
and S2; and third order effects on the elements connected to those entities, e.g., P3 and
PI.
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This simple illustration appears to provide no major intellectual challenges.
Reasonable estimates o f where secondary effects can occur may be readily determined.
However, because some entities have multiple linkages, the results o f an action upon one
o f these, e.g., E2, produces results that are indeterminate. This exacerbates the analytical
challenge further in actual applications since even the least industrially and
technologically advanced nations have a number o f entities and linkages that defy precise
analysis. Thus, an understanding of the impact of linkages is no simple task.
In 1969 Rousenau observed, “political science as an intellectual discipline has yet
to develop theoretical constructs for explaining the relations between the units it
investigates and their environments.”38 He defines linkage, “as any recurrent sequence of
behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.”39 Nearly thirty years
later, Robert Jervis opined, “In politics, connections are often more idiosyncratic, but
their existence guarantees that here too most actions, no matter how well targeted, will
have multiple effects.”40 The existence o f multiple effects resulting from the linkages
between elements justifies the conclusion that reductionist approaches and methods that
employ a linear analysis are not suitable for the determination o f secondary effects of
actions. Before assessing currently available tools as inadequate, it is important to define
the uses for which they are lacking.

38. James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 4.
Advocating more work in this arena, he argues, “The need for linkage theory is multidimensional.” The
examples suggest that political analysis would be “greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability,
functioning, institutions, and goals o f national political systems to variables in their external environments
could be systematically developed (ibid., 7).
39. Ibid., 45. He distinguishes between outputs, which are conventionally called a nation’s foreign
policy, with inputs, or the reaction in the other system. In this reactive process, the behavior o f the latter is
a response to the actions o f the former.
40. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 571. He cautions against the
inappropriate use o f reductionism and rejects the reductionist claim that “the system is ‘nothing’ but
individual behaviors” (ibid., 573).
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Utilization o f coercive power with the objective o f changing behavior through
manipulating perceptions o f costs and benefits requires knowledge o f the adversary’s
system of power. The decision as to what course to undertake requires determination o f a
cause and effect relationship, i.e., what action will produce the desired effect? In the
simple physical world, this relationship may be readily determined. In a vacuum,
application o f a force will result in a predictable effect. However, when environmental
conditions are considered, such predictions become more problematic. When we add
multiple actions to the equation, then the foreknowledge of results becomes even more
imprecise. Since these conditions exist in the world in which the decision-maker must
operate, the process is complicated and simple solutions are impracticable.
At the outermost limits o f the range o f options are two radically diverse
alternatives. The first is to declare the quandary to be too challenging, and to abandon the
idea o f ever being able to develop practical models and methods that can aid the policy
maker. The other extreme is to inappropriately oversimplify the situation, ignore the
complicating factors, and assume the absence of nonlinear conditions. The former course
involves surrender to complexity, and does not provide much opportunity for further
productive analysis. However, an exploration into the common errors associated with the
attempts at the latter course, including the peril inherent in ignoring the impact of
complex conditions, is worthy of additional consideration and will be examined next.

Complexity and Linear Analysis
Determination of any compatibility between complexity and linear analysis first
requires a common understanding o f the terms. Simple cause and effect relationships,
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where an action taken upon A produces a constant influence on B are considered to be
linear. Such relationships are readily understood and present uncomplicated solutions. In
those situations, the use of linear methods to predict outcomes o f actions is apposite.
However, when we add a third variable to the equation the relationships become complex
and such applications are no longer valid. Nevertheless, there is temptation to ignore
these complicating factors and to apply linear analysis processes even when conditions of
linearity do not exist. This incongruity between linear methods and complex systems is
the focus o f this section.
A primary objective o f this chapter is to respond to the first question in the
hypothesis statement, i.e., to determine if systems o f national power are nonlinear and
complex. Atkins describes the international system as “a complex political, military,
economic, and social structure o f both power and interdependence.”41 Further
complicating the analysis, a complex system is dynamic, i.e., the condition o f the system
is time dependent. Although the interactions between components are complex, the
constituent parts are not the most important factors. Rather the system as a whole and
how the parts interact with each other, are most significant. The central contention o f this
section is that complexity does not hold up to linear analysis. Hence, more readily
comprehensible linear approaches fall short in providing an understanding of how
systems function. Support of this argument warrants a brief discussion o f linearity and its
limitations.

41.
G. Pope Atkins, Latin A m erica in the International P olitical System (Boulder, CO: W estview Press,
1995), 4. He later provides justification for this assessment: “Capability analysis, which is crucial to foreign
policy formulation at several stages o f the process, is partly an inventory o f relative strengths and
weaknesses as measured by a state’s military, economic, political and other resources “ (ibid., 11).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46

A prima facie characteristic of a linear system is that the whole is merely the sum
of its parts. In mathematical terms, a linear system is one in which all observations o f a
given variable plot as a straight line (hence, linear) against the observations o f a second
variable. No variable is raised to a power other than one.42 Beyerchen succinctly provides
two requirements for a system to be linear: proportionality and additivity,43 The
proportionality aspect means that the effect o f actions upon dependent variables directly
relates to the change in the independent variable. Replication may be possible, and the
linkage between cause and effect may be established. Behaviors may be understood and
predicted. Solutions to linear equations are known.44
While neat, clear, and relatively easily understood, the use o f linear analysis has
limited use in the complex world characterized by systems with multiple components and
interactions. Herein resides the danger to the analysis. John Casti discerns that many
inherently nonlinear processes are treated like linear phenomena until some type of
catastrophic event forces acknowledgement o f the “effect of the nonlinear structure on
the system behavior.”45

42.
Garnett P. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1997), 458. The
equation: Y = a + bX; where b gives the amount o f change in Y when X increases by one unit, most simply
expresses linearity. See David Byrne, Complexity Theory an d the Social Sciences (N ew York: Routledge,
1998), 18-20, for a clear expansion o f the relationship, and its limitations in the examination o f complex
systems.
43.
Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” 62. “If the behavior o f a
system can appropriately be broken into parts that can be compartmentalized it may be classified as linear,
even if it is described by a complicated equation with many terms.” He also offers, “linear systems are
often restrictive narrow and brittle” and “seldom very adaptive under significant changes in their
environment.” Alan Beyerchen “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance o f Imagery,” in Complexity,
G lobal Politics, an d National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, 1997). 162.
44.
For readable elaborations on the impact o f nonlinearity on the analysis o f systems, see Glenn E.
James, Chaos Theory: The Essentials fo r M ilitary Applications (Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center
for Naval Warfare Studies, 1996).
45.
John Casti, Nonlinear System Theory (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, Inc., 1985), 1. He notes that
the tools o f linear analysis are quite w ell developed, while those for nonlinear phenomena have until
recently been “feeble and fragmentary at best.” His text focuses on the mathematical tools for describing
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In the assessment o f the systems of power, the interaction of the component
elements makes the system nonlinear, not their size or numbers. National systems of
power—ranging from the largest, most populous, and industrialized nations, to those
furthest away on the developmental spectrum— may display complexity.
Regardless o f the number of the categories selected for analysis, all nations have
some type of political, economic, and social components. Although the interactions
between these elements can vary greatly in scope, intensity, and frequency, every nation
possesses these, and therefore their system of power may be regarded as complex. Eve
Mitleton-Kelly recognizes this relationship between interactive components and linearity,
and she offers, “Complex behavior arises from the inter-relationship, interaction, and
inter-connectivity o f elements within a system and its environment.”46 Therefore,
complex systems are not linear. That conclusion requires additional evidence and further
development o f the condition of nonlinearity.

Nonlinearitv
Simply stated, nonlinearity is the antithesis of linearity, i.e., that which is not
linear. The determination of that situation is o f critical importance to the decision-maker.
In conditions o f nonlinearity, we cannot extrapolate, change scale, or project; and we
cannot disassemble and combine the elements together again to provide a view o f the
whole. Nonlinear conditions require differential equations; most differential equations are
not amenable to solution. Most importantly, an action taken to affect a nonlinear system

and understanding nonlinear relationships, and can provide additional detail for those with sufficient
background to comprehend the equations.
46.
Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, ed. Eve MitletonKelly (Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science LTD, 2003), 26.
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becomes a part o f that system. As Glieck observes, “Nonlinearity means that the act o f
playing the game has a way o f changing the rules.”47
Nonlinear does not mean random. Nor are nonlinear systems always disorderly.
There may be order in the whole event although the components appear to be in disorder.
I will discuss this order embedded in apparently chaotic systems further in Chapter III.
W. Mitchell Waldrop observes that methods that reduce the world to a simple
system, where two or three laws explain a complicated environment, use Newtonian
physics as a model and have been the foundation of scientific endeavors up until the
twentieth century. However, while potentially useful in the analysis o f linear systems,
this reductionist, or Cartesian approach, possesses significant limitations when examining
nonlinear phenomena.
Diana Richards observes that nonlinear relationships imply that an independent
variable does not have a constant effect on the dependent variable. Manifestations of
nonlinear relations are, “lack o f closed-form solutions, complex and varying dynamics,
sensitivity to initial conditions, and the possibility of multiple outcomes or dynamic
patterns.”48 David Bearce adds, “Nonlinearity also means that the direction o f the
relationship between two or more variables may not be the same across all cases.”49
Chapter I introduced the proposition that a holistic approach to assessments of
national power can provide an organized means for analysis. However, if incorrectly
applied, even an appropriate methodology can result in erroneous or even
47. Gleick, Chaos, 15.
48. Diana Richards, P olitical Complexity: Nonlinear M odels o f Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann
Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 1.
49. David H. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks: Forecasting Effectiveness and
Reconsidering Cooperation,” in P olitical Complexity: Nonlinear M odels o f Politics, ed. Diana Richards
(Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 270. He also observes, “Nonlinearity means that an
independent variable, such as the ambition o f the sender’s goal, should not be expected to have a ‘constant’
effect on sanctions effectiveness (the dependent variable) over time.”
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counterproductive results. The most common errors are adoption o f a reductionist
approach, application o f linear methods to nonlinear problem, and expectations o f the
ability to predict phenomena that are beyond the capabilities o f the available tools. I will
consider each of these in turn.

Limitations o f the Reductionist Approach
This condition of nonlinearity has denied political scientists the ability to provide
useful explanations or, to a lesser extent, predictions o f the effects o f actions. In the
physical sciences, one method aimed at an understanding of complex systems is
deconstructing the elements parts of these into smaller, more manageable pieces.
Consequently, examination of the characteristics o f its parts and their interactions results
in understanding o f the whole. This typically describes a reductionist approach; reducing
the unwieldy whole to its component parts in order to enable analysis. However, the use
o f a similar scheme when dealing with complex nonlinear systems is inappropriate and
subject to significant limitations.
Waltz argues, “If we follow the reductionist route, we can deal only with pieces of
problems.”50 Similarly, Jervis contends, “seeking to understand the system by looking
only at the units and their relations to each other is not appropriate.” 51 Supporting this
viewpoint and providing a historical perspective, Beyerchen adds “Traditional analysis
that is aimed at breaking the system into simpler parts fails now just as surely as it did in

50. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 4. While reductionism historically has been a major
component o f scientific exploration, he contends that its effectiveness “rests on nothing more than faith.”
51. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 573. He also cautions, “Because
o f the prevalence o f inter-connections, w e cannot understand systems by summing the characteristics o f the
parts or the bilateral relations between pairs o f them.” See also Jervis, System Effects, 5 1.
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Clausewitz’s time, and for the same reasons.”52 A leading proponent in the development
of complexity theory, Murray Gell-Mann, also cautions, “It is not sufficient to think of
the system in terms of parts or aspects identified in advance, then to analyze those parts
or aspects separately, and finally to combine those analyses in an attempt to describe the
entire system.”53 It is helpful to consider some historical illustrations.
Examples where the sum o f the parts was different from the whole abound within
the context o f assessments o f national power. An appraisal o f the relative economic and
military strengths o f the seventeenth century Spain provides but one. The gold obtained
from its conquests in the western hemisphere made Spain a major economic power.
However, this wealth was of little value if the transshipment was vulnerable to British
privateers. Their economic power allowed Spain to build a powerful Armada. The naval
power it represented in turn allowed her to protect the gold shipments and enabled further
exploitation o f American resources. Hence, the components o f economic power
(characterized by gold and silver bullion) and military power (manifested by naval
frigates and ships o f the line) were mutually supporting. It is not possible to develop an
accurate assessment o f the overall national power o f Spain through mere addition o f the
components.
As observed earlier, the economic and military components o f a nation’s power
are intertwined, interactive, and interdependent. Unless there is a benefactor or sponsor
nation that will provide the instruments o f military power, the ability to develop, man,
and equip a robust military force is dependent upon economic assets. Similarly, a nation
52. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” 82. The reasons for this
failure are “interconnectedness and context, interaction, chance, complexity, indistinct boundaries feedback
on effects and so on, all leading to analytical unpredictability.”
53. Murray Gell-Mann, “The Simple and the Complex,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, an d N ational
Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense University,
1997), 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51

that cannot protect its economic wealth from military threats will not possess these for
very long, as was the case o f Spain’s American colonies. Therefore, the relationship is
synergistic, i.e., the mutually supporting nature o f the components makes the whole
different from the sum o f the parts. As a result, analysts must undertake any
decomposition into smaller units with great care and discipline.
Decomposition efforts must utilize a firm grasp o f the potential contributions, as
well as what it can and cannot offer. Beyerchen articulates this concern: “The purpose of
theory is to untangle confusion by creating distinctions, but to do so in order to
understand the whole better, not for the sake o f pedantic analytical
compartmentalization.”54 Despite these limitations, the reductionist approach continues to
be applied, even if not explicitly, to attempts to understand complex systems. Although
several explanations exist, among the most plausible is the natural desire for simplicity.
This emerges because, as Langdon Winner observes, “The systems in which we live are
far too complicated as yet for our intellectual powers and technology to understand.”55
The decomposition of large systems into more manageable sub-elements need not
be a binary, yes or no,. In some instances, reductionist techniques may be advantageous.
Ian King sees a role for some use o f reductionism and cautions against “Throwing out the
baby o f micro-level analysis with the bathwater o f a rigidly reductionist mechanism.”56

54. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War.” 59-90. Although he allows
for some use o f compartmentalization for analysis, he warns o f its dangers, p. 82. He adds, “Theorists must
not be seduced into formulating analytically deductive, prescriptive sets o f doctrines that offer poor hope
and worse guidance” (ibid., 87).
55. Langdon Winner, O rganized Social Complexity, ed. Todd R. La Porte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1975), 40. Attributed to C. West Churchman. Although human intellectual powers remain
relatively constant, unarguably there have been significant advances in technology since that time that
reduce the impact o f this observation.
56. Ian T. King, Social Science and Complexity (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2000),
xii. He argues against the Newtonian-positivist-behaviorist worldview and a “horizon-narrowing,
rigidifying mechanistic reductionism,” which he defines in terms o f a worldview. “The universe is
essentially mechanistic, processes in the universe and relations between entities are reductionistic, the
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Waltz, Beyerchen, Jervis, Gel-Mann, et al, have clearly articulated the dangers
inherent with the use o f a reductionist approach. These are not to be discounted.
Therefore, the methodology presented in Chapter V seriously considers this aspect of
reductionism. While inappropriate for many purposes, decomposition into components is
a worthwhile analytical tool, as long as one acknowledges its limits. With this
examination of reductionism complete, it is now time to move on to the next common
error and threat to effective analysis.

Inappropriate Uses o f Linear Analysis
If systems o f power are complex, and complex systems are typically nonlinear, it
does not necessarily follow that no aspects o f the system include some linearity. The
danger to the analysis is not the result of the use o f linear techniques; rather, it is their
inappropriate utilization. Linear solutions at times are applied to nonlinear situations.
The result has been incomplete, inaccurate, and unsupportable analysis and the inability
to explain the effects of actions. This condition is particularly problematic in assessment
o f national power. Recognizing this, Beyerchen contributes, “Linearity is excellent for
the systems we design to behave predictably, but offers a narrow window on most natural
and social systems.”57 Despite these limitations, the use o f the linear approach is not
universally discredited, and there may be cases where its employment is appropriate.
When utilized correctly, and with effective measurement criteria, linear analysis
provides part of, but not all of the solution. Any analysis of national power that did not
include tangible and quantifiable factors would revert to entirely subjective judgments.
whole is reducible to its foundational parts, basic units are discrete and isolatable, and causation is direct,
local and concrete” (ibid., 7).
57. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” 162.
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Assessments o f power usually involve some degree of capability analysis. Atkins
describes this as partly an “inventory o f relative strengths and weaknesses as measured
co

by a state’s military, economic, political, and other resources.”
Certain elements o f power may be accurately depicted using linear means.
Compilations o f numbers o f tanks, aircraft, missiles, and ships provide an input into the
equation of military power. Similarly, natural resources, population, and education level
are subject to empirical analysis and comprise an important part o f any economic
assessment. However, as Nye contends, even “economic power cannot be measured
simply in terms o f tangible resources.”59 The problem becomes more acute when other
elements o f power are considered. Development o f quantifiable measures o f soft power
components such as culture, religion, and ideology is exceptionally difficult. The most
deleterious effects result not from use of linear methods, but from the over reliance upon
and misuse o f these techniques.
Despite these serious limitations, linearity should not be totally absent from the
consideration o f national power. Aware o f this potential for use in the economic arena,
Bearce provides, “Linear statistics may be useful to infer broad relationships, but the
approach obscures any nonlinear patterns that may be hidden in their (mostly ordinal
level) sanctions data.”60
There is a temporal aspect also to be considered. Cederman contends, “As long as
the analyst studies sufficiently short periods o f time, the linear approximation is likely to

58. Atkins, Latin Am erica in the International P olitical System, 11. W hile acknowledging the impact o f
environmental factors, he urges skepticism o f theories o f environmental determinism.
59. N ye, “The Changing Nature o f World Power,” 180. Factors such as relative costs and vulnerabilities
are also essential components o f econom ic power.
60. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks,” 272.
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be helpful even in the presence o f nonlinearity in the real world.”61 However, in the
assessment o f systems o f national power, a longer-term view must be taken, particularly
when examining the potential for secondary effects. Hence, the result is that most, but not
all, linear solutions must be rejected.
This is particularly true in the understanding of the secondary effects of actions.
While it is possible to predict the impact o f a single action, the additional effects that
result from that action are far more difficult to ascertain. For example, a naval enforced
embargo may produce the desired effect of reducing a nation’s ability to import strategic
materials that are vital to an armament industry; however, it also may produce unintended
effects that run counter to the initial objective o f the embargoing nations. While the
constriction o f vital materials may negatively affect economic and military power,
increased domestic political support for the targeted regime also may be a repercussion of
the embargo. This is because o f the linkage o f one element o f power (the general
population) with the element influenced by the action (vital imported commodities). The
disbanding of the Iraqi Army after the 2003 Gulf War provided the desired effect of
removing a military threat. However, because o f the complex linkage between the
military and the political elements of power in Iraq, the action produced the unintended
effect o f leaving the nation without a viable internal security apparatus.
In these illustrations military and economic actions had unforeseen political
effects due to the complexity of the environment. This dilemma resulted from the
connections (or linkages) within and across elements o f power in a complex environment.
The consequence was the emergence of secondary effects that could not be satisfactorily
understood completely using linear models.
61. Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics, 43.
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As in the case of the use o f reductionism examined in the previous section, we
should not totally reject utilization of linear analysis techniques. In assessments of
national power, some relationships will be linear, and their use is appropriate and can
benefit the analysis. However, due to the complexity that exists in most systems of
national power, the occurrences o f purely linear relationships are likely to be few. With
this caution against an over reliance upon and the misuse o f linear techniques established,
the discussion may now proceed to the issue o f how the condition o f nonlinearity affects
the ability to foresee the effect of actions.

Expectations of Predictability
While not always an essential product of academic inquiry, especially in the
social sciences, the ability to transform an understanding of events and outcomes into
practical extrapolative tools is potentially valuable to the decision-maker. Some argue
that development of an ability to forecast outcomes is an essential objective for a
scientific endeavor. Michael Young contends, “If political science cannot generate
predictive theory, then any capacity for intervention in the world, for good or evil, is
lost.”62 While he acknowledges that there is value in understanding why a particular
person acted in a certain way, the goal should be higher. James Voss views prediction as
“a rather lofty positivist goal,” and contends, “prediction and control have been the
watchwords o f being ‘scientific.”63 The objective should be to acquire at least a modicum

62. Michael D. Young, “Representing Problem Representation,” in Problem Representation in Foreign
P olicy D ecision Making, ed. Donald A. Sylvan and James F. V oss (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 244. His essay attempts to provide an answer to, “can the “effectiveness o f econom ic
sanctions be forecast using the currently available case study data?”
63. James F. Voss, “On the Representation o f Problems: An Information-Processing Approach to
Foreign Policy D ecision Making,” in Problem Representation in Foreign P olicy D ecision Making, ed.
Donald A. Sylvan and James F. V oss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23. He
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o f predictive power that would provide some ability to intervene in processes to influence
outcomes. Although this goal is a worthy one, it remains elusive.
Nye sees an inverse relationship between complexity and predictability resulting
from a density o f networks that are “increasingly complex, and their effects are therefore
increasingly unpredictable.”64 Due to its simplicity and apparent explanatory power, at
times an understanding o f linear relationships is extended in order to provide predictions
of future results. Pure deductive reasoning is applied. If action A repeatedly produces
effect B, then it may be expected to do so in the future. And if action C is similar to A,
then C also is likely to produce B. In conditions o f linearity, this is a reasonable
conclusion. However, in dealing with the application o f power, the limitations o f this
logic are apparent. In relations between nations, especially in those involving applications
o f coercive power, few actions are repeated precisely, and the environments in which
they occur vary considerably.
A basic tenet of American foreign policy in the second half o f the twentieth
century was the professed lesson from Chamberlain’s 1938 capitulation in Munich and
the discredited policy o f appeasement. While the predicted outcome o f a dictator being
emboldened by acquiescence to threats and demands may have been valid when applied
to Nazi Germany, this conviction often was applied incorrectly in diverse regions and
under political conditions that did not fit. That is not to say that domino theories are
always incorrect, only that they are not universally applicable.

acknowledges, “prediction is quite difficult in any subject matter domain and only possible under highly
controlled circumstances.”
64.
N ye, The Paradox o f American Power, 86. He refers to the density o f the networks o f
interdependence as part o f a “thickness o f globalism.”
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Warfare represents the ultimate application of coercive power. The inability to
predict accurately the outcomes o f armed conflict has long been recognized. The
nineteenth century strategist, Karl Von Clausewitz, recognized the limitations inherent in
our ability to predict the outcome o f a conflict and described war as, “inherently a
nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct o f which changes its character in ways that cannot be
analytically predicted.”65 Despite the technological transformations in warfare, the
capability to predict the consequences o f actions in conflict has not improved
dramatically since the days of Bismarck. The critical element that is missing is an ability
to determine when reasoned inferences may be properly utilized and when the level o f
understanding is attained that is sufficient to provide at least some minimal predictive
capability. Complexity and nonlinearity have an impact on the ability to relate effect to
cause.
Bearce identifies limitations in the ability o f some economic actions to provide
even the primary intended effect: “Past efforts to explain and forecast the effectiveness of
economic sanctions using traditional linear statistical methods have been remarkably
unspectacular.”66 In modern societies, it is exceptionally difficult to segregate economic
elements from those in the political and social spheres. Hence, it is particularly hard to
assess or predict the resultant secondary effects of actions taken against economic nodes.
The primary explanation for the failure o f linear solutions to provide a sufficient
level o f understanding and predictability is that in applications o f coercive power the
equations typically are complex and nonlinear. The elements o f power are not isolated

65. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” 82. He adds, “linear
relations and the predictability they offer are the exceptions in the real world.”
66. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks: Forecasting Effectiveness and Reconsidering
Cooperation,” 269.
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and do not exist in a vacuum; they are interrelated and interconnected. Therefore, an
action taken upon one is likely to produce an effect on the elements to which it is
connected. Simple cause and effect relationships are rare and, as some argue, nonexistent.
Jervis contends, “the effects o f actions are always multiple”67 This condition applies
across all elements o f international politics and is particularly evident is the uses of
power.
The application coercion to change the behavior o f an adversary may produce its
intended effect in the near term, but may also produce an unintended effect in another
area. Because o f the geographic linkages, threats may also result in driving a neighboring
state into a larger adversary’s camp. A power relay station may be a legitimate military
target; however, since it may also provide electricity to a civilian hospital, its destruction
or incapacitation may have far-reaching effects on the population’s willingness to resist
and on world opinion.
In another illustration, if the desired effect is to reduce the funding available to
insurgents, then the destruction o f an opium processing facility may temporarily disrupt
the trade in heroin that supports them. However, if the revenue obtained by the poppy
cultivation is the sole source of income o f a tribal group, the action may also generate
economic, social, and political effects that run counter to overall objectives.
Because o f the linkages and the resulting complications, complexity is the rule
rather than the exception. Consequently, understanding and predictability in a macro
sense has proven elusive. If concentration on the whole is not productive, then perhaps a

67.
Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 570. In System Effects, 2, Jervis
cites multiple examples across the spectrum o f human interaction: welfare can decrease the incentives to
work; providing housing for the homeless may draw additional homeless to that locality; subsidized flood
insurance encourages building in areas prone to flooding; and increased defense spending sometimes
results in making the adversary more belligerent.
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focus on the connections between individual elements may provide an option worthy of
consideration. The danger of falling into a reductionist trap is apparent. However,
decomposition into more readily examined components to determine the linkages within
and across systems can provide some useful insights— if applied carefully and with
awareness o f the limitations.

Summation
This chapter provided a basic review o f terms and definitions and a suitable
lexicon for use in the development o f the methodology. This required a brief examination
o f power, its theoretical foundations, and components, and how it may be applied to
influence the behavior o f other actors. Despite the lack o f a universally accepted
definition, I referred to this type o f application of power as coercion.
This led in to a brief consideration o f the principal factors in decision-making. I
determined that decision-makers employ a synthesis o f rational and cognitive techniques
in the use o f coercive power. However, regardless of the intellectual domain selected,
knowledge is an important factor in effective decision-making related to the employment
of coercion.
While the overall system of power is most critical, this macro view is not
receptive to analysis. Hence, some decomposition into components is justified. The
elements o f power were deemed not be universally fungible, however, they are
characteristically interconnected. The first task in the hypothesis statement was to
determine if systems o f national power are nonlinear and complex. In response, based on
the evidence presented, the conclusion is that these conditions o f nonlinearity and
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complexity do indeed exist. Illustrations o f linkages within and across systems provided
substantiation. These multiple connections between elements make the overall system of
power complex.
Although some linearity exists within these subsystems, due to the existence o f
interrelated components and subcomponents, the conclusion presented is that the
relationships are not universally amenable to linear analysis. This condition makes
understanding o f potential secondary effects exceptionally difficult. This problem has
confounded those who must make decisions regarding the exercise o f power. Multiple
examples o f deleterious unintended effects are evident. Some o f these will be examined
in the case studies to follow. If the only available tools are reductionist techniques and
linear solutions, the worthy goal o f a consistent ability to predict outcomes remains
unattainable.
This leads to the conclusion of a need for an improved method o f assessing
complex nonlinear systems. However, even in the physical sciences, development of
adequate explanations o f nonlinear phenomena is embryonic; and these are near non
existent in the realm of international relations and foreign policy analysis.68 This is the
primary reason why a fresh approach to the problem is worthy o f pursuit. An initial step
must be to examine the work in other disciplines with the objective o f determining if
there are applications to the assessment o f national power. An investigation into
approaches to nonlinearity in other academic disciplines is, therefore, important to this

68.
Among the exceptions to this generalization are: Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the Social Sciences',
Alvin Saperstein, “Chaos: A Model for the Outbreak o f War,” Nature, 24 May 1984: Alvin Saperstein,
“War and Chaos,” American Scientist 83 no. 6 (November-December 1995); Keith Warren, “N ew
Directions in System Theory: Chaos and Complexity,” Social Work, July 1998; and, Nicanor Austriaco,
“Causality within Complexity,” The Journal o f Interdisciplinary Studies XI (1999).
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discussion. The overarching concepts are contained in complexity and chaos theory,
which is the focus of Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III
THE ANALYSIS OF NONLINEAR SYSTEMS

A conclusion reached in the previous chapter was that national systems o f power
are complex and nonlinear. The significance o f that condition is that development o f an
effective understanding o f the effects of coercive actions and the secondary consequences
resulting from those acts requires utilization o f some form of nonlinear analysis. The
objective o f this chapter is to begin to respond to the second question in the hypothesis
statement, i.e., can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical
sciences contribute to enhanced understanding o f nonlinear systems?
While scholars have long recognized the challenge o f understanding the
consequences o f actions when nonlinear relationships exist, it was only in the mid
twentieth century that scientists attempted to discover order out o f the apparent disorder
o f nonlinearity.1 Two broad paradigms represent the vast majority o f academic discourse
in this area. Hence, chaos and complexity will be the central focus o f the exploration of
nonlinear systems presented in this chapter. This will require an analysis and assessment
of their potential for their application to the understanding o f the effects o f actions.
Some argue that there is nothing new here, and that chaos and complexity have
'y

always existed, albeit “sometimes obscured to many, but always recognized by some.”
Others see chaos-complexity as an “overdramatized fad,” “too vague or cult-like,” or

1. In the late 1800’s, French mathematician Jules Henri Poncaire was frustrated in his attempt to predict
the behavior o f as few as three interacting spheres.
2. Alvin Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?” in
Complexity, G lobal Politics, an d N ational Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), 104.
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“just another conceptual spin around the block.”3 Despite the lack o f a clearly defined
and firmly established academic discipline o f chaos-complexity, or widespread
acknowledgement o f the potential for its extension into the social sciences, there are
examples of attempts to apply the principles o f chaos and complexity into realms beyond
mathematics.
Samir Rihani contends, “Assimilation o f nonlinearity is now well established
within the natural and life sciences,” and has begun to “spill slowly into the social
sciences.”4 Voicing a similar view, T. Irene Sanders offers that the “science o f chaos
theory and complexity is providing us with information about the dynamics o f change in
the real world.”5 Concurring with this outlook, historian Roger Beaumont states, “Interest
in nonlinearity, chaos, and complexity has intensified since the mid-1970s.”6 Hence,
application of these principles into the social sciences has precedent.
While possessing some similarities, chaos and complexity have several important
differences. Consequently, I will examine each separately. The assessments o f both chaos
and complexity will follow a pattern of: (1) definition and explanation, (2) presentation of
characteristics o f each that may have practical application to the task o f understanding
secondary effects, and, (3) identification of limitations and hindrances to their
incorporation into the process. Both chaos and complexity are expansive concepts, with a
sizeable amount of research and analysis already applied to them. As with the
examinations o f national power, coercion, and linearity provided in Chapter II, these
3. Roger Beaumont, War, Chaos an d H istory (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 3, 10, and 185.
4. Samir Rihani, Complex Systems Theory an d Developm ent P ractice (N ew York: Zed Books Ltd,
2002), 7.
5. T. Irene Sanders, Strategic Thinking an d the New Science (N ew York: The Free Press, 1998), 5.
6. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, 3. He credits advances in information technology with enabling
the enhanced exploitation o f nonlinear phenomenon. In a later work he observes that historians and social
scientists “have turned to chaos-complexity for images and metaphor” See Roger Beaumont, The N azi's
March to Chaos (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 5.
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sections will drill only deep enough to support the concluding evaluation o f the potential
for application o f the principles o f the theories. However, evaluation o f relevance
requires an establishment of a fundamental level o f knowledge and familiarity with the
terminology. Additionally, it is important for those whose expertise is outside the realm
o f mathematics and the physical sciences to develop at least a basic understanding o f the
lexicon and foundation o f these approaches. Hence, I dedicate some time to extant views
on both chaos and complexity. However, the primary objective remains to determine the
existence of a concept or way o f looking at organization, structure, and function that may
be relevant to assessments o f national power.
The chapter will conclude with a return to the hypothesis question and will
address the potential for applying the principles o f nonlinear analysis to the primary
objective o f the proposition, i.e., the development o f an understanding o f the secondary
effects o f actions. The objective here is not to condense the whole host o f volumes of
sometimes very technical material into a restricted number o f pages. Rather it is to probe
into these theories to determine if there is any realistic potential for incorporation o f some
o f the principles contained within chaos-complexity into the process o f determination of
the effects of coercive actions.
Before proceeding further, a brief divergence from the chapter outline is
appropriate in order to provide some qualifying remarks. Much o f the work in chaos and
complexity theory has been accomplished in mathematics, meteorology, physics, and
biology. Consequently, the lexicon, processes, and subject area content might be
unfamiliar to those whose background, experience, and interests are in political science or
international studies.
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The intended users o f the methodology proposed by this dissertation are national
security analysts and decision-makers, many o f whom, while capable and intelligent, may
not possess formal schooling in higher mathematics, physics, or engineering. This
requires conducting this investigation into chaos and complexity at a level that is
generally understandable to an educated person regardless of academic discipline.
There is no condescension here. Some o f the more distinguished figures in the social
sciences have admitted their struggle with some o f the concepts and equations contained
in chaos and complexity theory.7 Indeed, this is professed as a reason why there has not
been an abundance o f application of these theories into the social sciences. Hence, I
present this analysis from the perspective o f a non-mathematician.
Nevertheless, the concepts and mathematics associated with the study of
complexity, and particularly with chaos, are complicated enough so that a few readers
will find even this simplified presentation challenging. The qualification statement is
complete. The focus o f the outline may now return to the central topics and issues.
What possible benefits could accrue from examination o f nonlinear systems? Are
the skeptics correct, and are chaos and complexity merely vague and loosely constructed
and coupled concepts without any serious potential for exploitation? Diana Richards
would not agree. She argues, “The ramifications o f nonlinearity have not been
sufficiently realized,” and believes that “one can gain explanatory power by considering

7.
Among these are Robert Jervis. The list includes myself, not as a notable in the field, but as a
national security analyst with limited exposure to advanced mathematics or expertise in the physical
sciences. Certainly, there are multiple exceptions to this broad generalization. For instances where these
concepts have been applied outside o f the hard sciences, see David Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the
Social Sciences (N ew York: Routledge, 1998). Among his relevant observations: “Chaos theory is founded
on the mathematics o f nonlinear systems. Economists and political scientists have applied chaos theory
with considerable mathematical rigor and success to the temporal dynamics o f a variety o f phenomena in
their fields” (ibid., 2-3).
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endogenous interactions and relationships.”8 That acquisition o f illuminating capability is
the primary goal of the proposed methodology. The vital undertaking for this chapter is to
explore the possibility: “If chaos-complexity theory enhances our ability to identify
patterns and steer the crafting of history only a point or two closer toward absolute truth,
that might put it ahead o f the other models of the past.”9 With the chapter outline and
objectives presented, and the necessary qualifying explanation provided, the discussion
may now directly address the first of the nonlinear theories for consideration— chaos.

Chaos
Chaos is also known as dynamical instability. Some view it somewhat
conservatively as “a new mathematical approach that allows scientists to study the
behavior o f nonlinear systems.”10 Others are more generous in their outlook. In 1990,
Heinz-Otto Peitgen observed, “For many, chaos theory already belongs among the
greatest achievements in the natural sciences in this century.” 11 While this assertion is
controversial, certainly the emergence o f theories o f chaos has provided an impetus to
discussions within the scientific community across a wide range o f disciplines.
Its most notable popularizer, James Gleick, views chaos as an expansive idea.
“Chaos has become not just a theory but also a method, not just a canon o f beliefs but

8. Diana Richards, “Nonlinear Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Stability in International
Environmental Agreements,” in P olitical Complexity: Nonlinear M odels o f Politics, ed. Diana Richards
(Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 2.
9. Beaumont, N a z i’s March to Chaos, 186.
10. Sanders, Strategic Thinking an d the New Science, 61.
11. Heinz-Otto Pietgen, “The Causality Principle: Deterministic Laws and Chaos,” in Chaos: The New
Science, ed. John Holte (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, Inc., 1990), 35.
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also a way of doing science.” 12 Care is required in dealing with this term, since its
meaning varies depending upon its context. The word has a broad definition in its general
usage, and a more constrained and precise elucidation when used in connection with
modem paradigms aimed at the understanding o f nonlinear systems.
First, I will address the more common connotation of chaos. Most widespread
usages conform to the dictionary “extreme confusion or disorder.” Integrating a set of
definitions, Beaumont proposes, “an order o f infinite complexity: intricate, turbulent,
multicomponent processes, beyond effective monitoring and reasonable approximate
depiction or prediction; cannot be precisely duplicated or simulated;”

i ■)

Chaos implies

randomness, instability and unpredictability. While these characterizations are suitable
for non-technical discussion, the genesis o f the new theories o f chaos requires a more
precise description.
A vital preliminary task is to differentiate between social chaos and mathematical
chaos. The former term describes a condition, and is commonly used to indicate a total
lack of any controlling mechanism, resulting in the absence o f social order and the
emergence o f anarchy. It may result from a multiplicity o f factors including a variety o f
natural disasters, or by societal upheavals as the result of interstate war or revolution.
In the mathematical usage, chaos is declared by some to be a “new science;” by
others as “a heterogeneous amalgam of different techniques o f mathematics and
science.” 14 Mathematical is the type o f chaos that I will examine initially. However, the

12. Gleick, Chaos, 1987), 37. The essential question that an investigation into chaos may provide some
insight into is how “in a universe ruled by entropy, drawing inexorably toward greater and greater disorder,
how does order arise” (ibid., 5)?
13. Beaumont, War, Chaos an d History, xiv.
14. A. B. Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory, 14. The “new science” moniker is used by Gleick, Sanders,
Holte, et al.
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phenomena are similar in many ways, and the limited transfer o f the principles of
mathematical chaos to conditions where social chaos is the issue is the central rationale
for this examination of chaos.
In the 1970’s, some scientists who were not content with the reductionist
approach considered new models that would provide an enhanced view o f the whole and
could serve to overcome some o f reductionism’s perceived limitations. These efforts
would be loosely combined under the umbrella o f Chaos Theory}5 James Gleick, in his
popular 1987 treatise, Chaos: Making a New Science, provides an excellent entry-level
overview of this new approach.16 This employment o f chaos refers to a much narrower
understanding of the term, and carries with it its own supporting concepts and lexicon.
Under the more restrictive rubric of Chaos Theory, additional precise definitions
are provided: Phillip Holmes, “The complicated, aperiodic, attracting orbits o f certain
(usually low-dimensional) dynamical systems; Hao Bai-Lin, “A kind of order without
periodicity;” H. Bruce Stewart, “Apparently random recurrent behavior in a single
deterministic (clockwork-like) system;” and, Roderick V. Jensen, “The irregular,
unpredictable behavior o f deterministic, nonlinear dynamical systems.”

17

The field of

mathematics contributes, “Stochastic behavior occurring in a deterministic system.”

18

15. Gell-Mann, Quark an d the Jaguar, 27, cautions against careless utilization o f the term, which is
often incorrectly used as a “catchall expression for any sort o f real or apparent complexity or uncertainty.”
For clarity, James, Chaos Theory, 17, suggests the use o f Chaos to refer to the term in the context o f the
paradigm or theory, and the use o f the lower case chaos in the general use o f the term. James believes that
“a Chaotic system must be bounded; nonlinear; non-periodic; and sensitive to small disturbances.” Also see
Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory, 16, for a discussion o f what he considers to be the confusion between
“chaos” and “chaos theory.” The latter he defines as “a collection o f mathematical, numerical, and
geometrical techniques that allows us to deal with nonlinear problems to which there is no explicit general
solution.” In subsequent references I will use Chaos Theory to describe the most restrictive use o f the term.
16. Chaos Theories have also been described as “nonlinear dynamics literature.” See Chris C.
Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f Networked Militaries,” esp. 224-26.
17. Gleick, Chaos, 306.
18. John Holte, Chaos: The New Science (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, Inc., 1990), viii.
This statement is seem ingly oxymoronic. The system is simultaneously random, but with direction. He
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Douglas Kiel argues, “Chaos is typified by behavior that can, over time, appear
random and disorderly. However, it occurs with definable parameters or mathematical
boundaries.” 19 Williams offers, “Sustained and random-like long term evolution that
satisfies certain special mathematical criteria and that happen in deterministic, nonlinear,
dynamical systems.”20 Deterministic in the sense that behavior follows a rule, and a
dynamical system being one that changes or evolves over time.
While a review o f a selection of contributions is worthwhile, laboring further over
development or identification of generally accepted descriptions o f Chaos does not
represent the most effective line o f attack in development of this analysis. Within the
context of this study and the objective of this chapter, an acceptable definition is that
chaos is a condition o f system nonlinearity that displays apparent disorder and
randomness, but may also provide some detectible order. Although there is not universal
acceptance o f the precise definition of Chaos, the more important issue to this discourse
remains the potential applications o f the theory. Therefore, it is more productive to focus
on what its proponents argue it can do, and what its detractors argue that it cannot.

Potential Uses o f Chaos Theory
Proponents believe that Chaos Theory could be applied across a wide range of
disciplines. As the most widely known advocate o f the application o f Chaos Theory
argues that disagreement abounds among scientists on the definition o f the term. Gleick, in Chaos, 307,
describes this phenomenon as “a delicate balance between the forces o f stability and the forces o f
instability.
19. Douglas L. M. Kiel, M anaging Chaos an d Com plexity in Government (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1994), 28, provides clarification: “Chaotic does not mean random; nonlinear does not mean
chaotic.”
20. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 9. Emphasis in original. He defines random as behavior that is
“based strictly on a chance mechanism, with negligible deterministic effects” (ibid., 12). Citing alternative
views, he echoes that some consider chaos a mathematical curiosity and that a large group contends,
“Nobody has yet conclusively found it in the physical world” (ibid., 13).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

contends, “In our world, complexity flourishes and those looking to science for a general
understanding o f nature’s habits will be better served by the laws o f chaos.”21 Supporting
this view, John Holte believes that “the range of applications o f chaos theory is awesome:
Information processing in the brain, protein formation, cardiac arrhythmias, epidemics,
99

•

fluctuations in wildlife populations, business cycles, [and] the arms race.” Also having
detected applications beyond the mathematical sphere, Kathleen Alligood contends,
“Chaotic behavior can be observed in experiments and in computer models o f behavior in
all fields o f science.”23 However, due to the relative novelty o f the approach, at this point
in time there may be more potential than progress toward practical applications in the
social sciences. From the field o f public administration comes the contention that Chaos
Theory is a “misnomer” and is more properly, “the study o f complex, dynamic systems
that reveal patterns o f order out of seemingly chaotic behaviors.”24
Indeed, some contend that Chaos Theory is not a theory in the commonly
accepted understanding o f the term, “but rather is a frame o f reference or a way o f
thinking about complex phenomena.”25 An essential element o f Chaos Theory is that
there is order within apparently totally random and unstructured systems.26 Supporting
this view, Beaumont contends that there exists within Chaos Theory, “a degree or order

21. Gleick, Chaos, 308.
22. Holte, Chaos, ix. His explanation for the wide range o f areas that may benefit from applications o f
chaos theory is that they have a common language, i.e., mathematics.
23. Kathleen T. Alligood, Tim D. Sauer and James A. Yorke, Chaos: An Introduction to Dynamical
Systems (N ew York: N ew York: Springer Verlag N ew York, Inc., 1996), viii. W hile this collection
concentrates on the physical sciences, the authors argue that chaos is a phenomenon that is common
throughout science.
24. Overman, “The N ew Sciences o f Administration,” 487.
25 Kathleen A. Bolland and Charles R. Atherton, “Chaos Theory: An Alternative Approach to Social
Work Practice and Research,” Fam ilies in Society: The Journal o f Contemporary Human Services 80, no. 4
(July-August 1999): 367. This article provides an excellent summary o f the application o f the new sciences
to areas beyond mathematics.
26. Gleick, Chaos, 15. Lorenz described this as a “pattern o f disturbances and orderly disorder.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

that lies buried within what at first glance looks like random turbulence.”27 The existence
o f evidence to support this order out o f disorder proposition, and the possibility o f
detecting some type o f self-organizing pattern, shape, or structure in a seemingly random
entity, represent the most contentious aspects o f Chaos Theory.
This order within disorder is centered on the existence o f an attractor, or “the end
state or final behavior toward which a dynamical system moves.”

9R

•

Alternative

definitions view attractors as a way to describe the long-term behavior o f a system. These
centers of attraction provide the emergence o f patterning within a system. The simplest
systems reach a fixed-point attractor. However, in complex systems a variation o f these,
known as strange attractors, emerge that “may take the form o f events, interactions, or
developments that coalesce energy and focus attention.”29 Equilibrium and steady states
correspond to fixed point attractors .. .and chaotic states to strange attractors.

TO

The

mathematics and the resulting models that support the existence o f these attractors are
themselves immensely complex, and acknowledgement o f their occurrence must be more
o f a matter o f faith than an acceptance o f proof for those whose education, experience
and interests are in other areas.
Cambel provides an elucidation o f attractors that is useful for the non
mathematician. The following illustration is an adaptation of his explanation. He uses the
examples of a child’s swing or a clock pendulum that at some point will come to a stable
vertical position once the force (the parent’s pushing or the effect o f gravity on a weight)

27. Beaumont, N a zi’s March to Chaos, 5.
28. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 66.
29. Ibid. She adds, “Strange attractors may also be viewed as “chaotic systems that never settle into a
predictable end state” (ibid., 74).
30. Peter Coveny and Roger Highfield, Frontiers o f Com plexity (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1995),
Glossary.
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ceases to be applied. The points where the swing or pendulum comes to rest are the fixedpoint attractors, which were addressed in a previous paragraph. The issue important to
this discussion is whether the system is stable at the equilibrium state. In both the swing
and pendulum examples, and assuming the absence of external forces, the response
would be yes; the systems are stable.
The next test is determination o f the durability o f system stability: Is it possible
for any disturbances o f the system to change the arc or orbit o f the objects? If changes
produce consequences that are highly irregular, then the previously identified
phenomenon o f strange attractors is said to exist. Returning to the pendulum example,
assume a small change in the arc. If that motion remained stable and predictable, fixed
attractors remain the dominant equilibrium state. If however, a wild oscillation that defies
predictability results, strange attractors may be evident. Since strange attractors exhibit
bizarre and unpredictable motions, they are also called chaotic attractors.

31

This

condition o f random and unpredictable behavior is most relevant to an assessment o f the
secondary effect of coercive actions. The existence of attractors is important to a basic
understanding of Chaos Theory, but in isolation, it provides but one piece o f the puzzle.
Further investigation is required in order to develop some useful insight.
The study o f Chaos Theory may be subdivided into various schools or
approaches. N. Katherine Hayles notes that there are two major branches o f emphasis in
the study o f Chaos Theory. One, dubbed the order-out o f chaos branch, accentuates chaos

31.
Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory, 13-17. While the terms chaotic attractor and strange attractor are
commonly used interchangeably, this is not true in all cases. “Strange attractors are not necessarily chaotic”
(ibid., 70). For those who wish to examine this concept in more depth, his Chapter 4 provides illustrations
and a much more detailed explanation o f attractors. The abbreviated explanation provided here represents
only the most cursory excursion into the phenomenon. It should be noted that in mathematical models the
chaotic behavior is not caused by outside sources, but rather by exponentially close trajectories within a
bounded system.
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as “order’s precursor and partner,” rather than as its antithesis; the other, the strange
attractor branch, emphasizes the ability o f chaotic systems to generate new information
and the “hidden order that exists within chaotic systems.”32 Providing a similar analysis
and acknowledging that there are subtle but important differences between the American
and European outlooks regarding Chaos Theory, David Byrne cites contentions that the
US view is to find the “order that lies hidden in chaos,” while the more common
European focus is on “order that emerges from chaos.”

This deterministic chaos,

generated by fixed rules, is a key discovery upon which the behavior within a chaotic
system may be understood.34
The presence o f attractors is less contentious than is the potential for applications
of this characteristic of chaotic systems. The element most important to all o f these
perspectives is agreement that systems that display apparent completely random behavior
contain some type o f pattern. The existence o f a pattern suggests at least a basis for
understanding, and perhaps even for some level o f predictability. Since deterministic
chaos involves nonlinear systems that conform to dynamical laws, then an understanding
o f these laws and the initial and present state o f the system may provide some ability to
project into the future. If this perspective is valid, and predictability is possible, then
decisions regarding the use of power could benefit immensely from the incorporation of
Chaos Theory into the process.
32. N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: O rderly D isorder in Contemporary Literature an d Science
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 9-10. Emphasis in original. She acknowledges Ilya Prigogine
as the leader o f the first school, and associates Edward Lorenz, Mitchell Feigenbaum, Benoit Mandelbrot
and Robert Shaw with the second.
33. Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the Social Sciences, 16.
34. Pietgen, “The Causality Principle: Deterministic Laws and Chaos.” 36. He identifies other
significant achievements o f Chaos Theory, including development o f methodologies that will evaluate the
presence o f chaotic behavior. However, Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,”
108, cautions, “Determinism does not imply predictability,” and that prediction requires knowledge o f the
present state.
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Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart believe that an important element o f Chaos Theory is
that “simple laws can have very complicated— indeed, unpredictable— consequences.”

35

Ian King contends, “Chaos theory builds on Newtonian world view” and that “chaos is a
dialectical, incorporating seeming contradictions within a nonetheless unified, coherent,
yet dynamic framework.” He adds that this can provide “a subtle, yet powerful form of
order.”36 James offers, “When we construct an attractor we construct an image o f the
system ‘s global dynamics. ” This condition “allows us to predict short term trajectories
and long term trends for pattern recognition.”37Adding their support for the potential
contributions o f the study o f Chaos Theory, David Peak and Michael Frame assert,
10

“Fortunately, deterministic chaos does allow some prediction.”

The general consensus

of this sampling o f scholars and authors is that this order and framework do, at minimum,
indicate some potential for an ability to envisage concealed order within apparently
chaotic systems.
An important question is whether the concept o f attractors presents any practical
uses. An earlier section addressed the distinction between social and mathematical chaos.
It is conducive to understanding to present an illustration o f how the emergence o f
strange attractors in mathematical chaos may provide some insights relative to social
chaos. This potential for transforming the end-state of a stable system into one that is
chaotic is pertinent to considerations for the application o f coercive power. If overall
system stability were an objective, then it would be valuable for those planning such
35.
Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse o f Chaos: D iscovering Sim plicity in a Complex World
(New York: Viking, 1994), 2.
36. Ian T. King, Social Science and Complexity, 51.
37. James, Chaos Theory, 33. Italics in original.
38.
David Peak and Michael Frame, Chaos under Control: The Art an d Science o f Complexity (New
York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1994), 151. For those with the background and interest, this volume
provides an abundance o f mathematical equations, graphs, and illustrations to further an understanding o f
Chaos.
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actions to be able to predict that a specific action may result in the emergence o f strange
attractors that could possibly send the system into unpredictable chaos.
For example, if removal o f a particular political leader results in the collapse o f
the internal political system and destroys any ability to further influence that system, that
action may run counter to overall objectives. The danger of inadvertently creating a
chaotic situation through coercive actions should be a concern o f those who must
undertake such decisions. If the contentions o f its adherents are accepted, then Chaos
Theory, or at least the condition o f deterministic chaos, may provide some degree o f
predictability. However, there are other complicating factors.

IQ

Another component o f chaotic systems is sensitivity to initial conditions, which is
described as “The propensity o f non-linear systems to change properties far out o f
proportion to the scale of forces changing their original state.”40 That is, even minute
changes in the point of origin can result in large changes to the outcome, or as Gleick
describes “Tiny differences in input could quickly become overwhelming differences in
output—a phenomenon given the name ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions.’”41
The discovery o f this phenomenon is popularly credited to Meteorologist, Edward
Lorenz.42 Although the logical presumption is that the future should be determined from

39.
Any transfer o f elements o f mathematical chaos to examples o f social chaos is fraught with danger,
and a mathematician could find this analogy weak, since an outside force caused the chaotic behavior and
not the internal dynamics o f a chaotic system. The important point is that if a system is on the critical point
or edge o f chaos, then even very small changes can push a system into chaotic behavior, or alternatively,
lock it into a fixed state.
40. Beaumont, War, Chaos an d History, xiv.
41.
Gleick, Chaos, 8. For a clear explanation o f the relationship, see James, “Chaos Theory,” 31-33. He
professes, “The presence o f sensitivity to initial conditions (SIC) will not always result in chaos; however,
a system without SIC will not be Chaotic” (ibid., 32).
42.
Lorenz is credited with the discovery o f the Butterfly Effect,” which has been w idely misinterpreted
to suggest that the movement o f the wings o f a single insect could produce a miniscule change in airflow
patterns that eventually causes a major meteorological event. His important lesson, rather, is that in a
chaotic system even the minutest perturbation (as represented by the butterfly’s wing flapping) could result
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the past, Lorenz discovered that minute changes in measurement are amplified over time
and can lead to unpredictability in the long term. Therefore, although the behavior o f two
systems may be identical, very small changes in their point o f origin, when amplified,
could produce dramatically different results. Herein resides the major limitation on
applying the principles o f Chaos Theory to the understanding o f effects. There are no
agreed criteria for determination o f whether or when this condition exists.
James proposes that if a system is sensitive to initial conditions (SIC), then “any
two initial states that deviate by the slightest amount must deviate from each other
exponentially.”43 He adds “If a system is SIC, you are not guaranteed to find Chaos; if,
however, a system is not SIC, it cannot exhibit Chaos,” and that SIC is a “necessary but
not sufficient cause for Chaos to occur.”44 Hence, the most obvious indicator of
sensitivity to initial conditions is the presence o f a chaotic system.
In Cambel’s view, this sensitivity to initial conditions causes the system to be
unstable; and this instability leads to uncertainty. “Deterministic chaos in not just
arbitrary randomness; there is order involved.”45 However, the presence o f deterministic
equations that have unpredictable results may be an indicator o f chaos. Therefore,
whether or not a system is sensitive to initial conditions could be an indicator of its
potential for becoming chaotic. While this may be of value to the decision-maker, there
are significant problems in determining the existence o f sensitivity to initial conditions.

in abject failure in predictions. See Peak and Frame, Chaos under Control, 146-150, for a more detailed
explanation along with illustrations.
43. James, Chaos Theory, 30. In his definition, for a system to be chaotic, it must be bounded;
nonlinear; non-periodic; and sensitive to small disturbances.
44. Ibid., 32.
45. Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory, 14.
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Although the theory provides a tool that may assist understanding o f chaotic systems, its
practical applications appear to be limited.
Chaos Theory is concerned with finding underlying order in data that appears to
be disordered and random. Proponents of the application of the principles o f Chaos
Theory to disciplines beyond pure mathematics acknowledge the relative immaturity of
the concept and the difficulty in grasping many o f its components. Some have observed,
“Since formal chaos theory is primarily a mathematical construct, the nonmathematical
use o f it is primarily as an analogy.”46 However, some argue that a total understanding o f
Chaos Theory or o f the system under examination is not a prerequisite for its use. James
contends, “Chaos theory can provide an idea o f behaviors and dynamics to expect
without knowing anything about the workings o f the system.”47 If this is correct, then
Chaos Theory offers significant improvement to analyses related to the effects o f actions.
However, skeptical observers see this as at best a possibility in the future.
Additionally, they consider the determination of the presence o f attractors and sensitivity
to initial conditions, and the finding any o f this alleged order out o f chaos, as
problematic. Therefore, any ability to predict behavior is unlikely at the current state of
development o f the theory. I will next consider a sampling o f the recognized limitations
and problems associated with the use of the principles o f Chaos Theory.

Limitations on the Use o f Chaos Theory
Saperstein presents a piercing but essential question regarding Chaos Theory and
other “fashionable” approaches and asks, do we gain anything “besides some new, exotic

46. Bolland and Atherton, “Chaos Theory,” 370.
47. James, Chaos Theory, 21.
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descriptive metaphors?”48 Some consider chaos a mathematical curiosity; a large group
contends, “Nobody has yet conclusively found it in the physical world.”49 Dismissing
commonly expressed examples of its applicability, in Beaumont’s view o f Chaos Theory,
“Rational assumptions and simple stratagems align with reality only by coincidence.”50
Most damaging to the conclusions of its proponents is the reality that practical
applications o f Chaos Theory have not been abundant, even in the field o f mathematics
where much o f the previous and ongoing research is conducted. While I have identified
multiple problems, the determination of the existence o f sensitivity to initial conditions,
and the appropriate use o f this information if detected, provide the major obstacles for
analysis and understanding.
Sanders argues, “It is important to recognize a system’s initial conditions before
they erupt as a strange attractor.”51 Going beyond this declaration, Gell-Mann affirms that
successful exploitation o f Chaos Theory requires precise knowledge o f initial conditions,
i.e., near perfect knowledge o f the extant conditions o f the system, so that any predictions
may be made as to the system’s future conditions.52 Unfortunately, this perfect
knowledge remains unattainable even with the most sophisticated information gathering
equipment and analytical processes. Saperstein believes that perfect knowledge is not
CO

possible, that there will always some measurement errors.

If this is challenging in the

hard sciences, some deem it unattainable in matters concerning relationships between

48. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security,” 101.
49. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 13.
50. Beaumont, War, Chaos an d H istory, 10.
51. Sanders, Strategic Thinking an d the New Science,” 74.
52. Gell-Mann, Quark an d the Jaguar, 26. Poincare observed in 1903 that because we can only know
initial conditions approximately, prediction becomes impossible. Expanding on this, Gell-Mann contends,
“Since nothing can ever be measured with perfect accuracy, chaos gives rise to effective indeterminacy.”
53. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 108. He contends that when dealing
with chaotic systems, “prediction is difficult or impossible.”
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states. Therefore, if the value o f predictive capability relates directly to the quality of
knowledge o f present conditions, and our ability to obtain this perfect knowledge is
limited, then Chaos Theory may not provide much potential for practical use.
Byrne contends, “If we can deal with robust, determined, organized chaos, then
we may be able not to predict, but to act so that some things happen and others don’t
happen.”54 For those responsible for foreign policy decisions, a methodology that can
provide for prediction would be a most welcomed, albeit an elusive capability. If we
could predict the precise effect of an action, as well as secondary effects o f that act with
any degree of accuracy, this would simplify the task o f meeting foreign policy objectives.
Others assert, “Any system that obeys rules— even if the behavior is chaotic— can be
controlled once the rules are known.”55 While the statement in itself may be supportable,
when dealing with chaotic systems there is inadequate evidence to sustain the assumption
that the conventions are recognized and accepted.
Saperstein observes, “It is not evident to me that a single metaphor/tool— like
chaos— is available or useful to us in dealing with a world system characterized by
‘complexity.’”56 Based on this limited analysis, and focusing on the use intended for the
application o f principles of nonlinear analysis, I conclude that while Chaos Theory
provides some interesting perspectives, and apparently has proven useful at least in the
field o f mathematics, the potential contributions for its use in the development of
understanding o f secondary effects is extremely limited.
A supposition made earlier was that the detection of chaos might be an indicator
of sensitivity to initial conditions. If the reverse were true, and if there were some
54. Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the Social Sciences, 26.
55. Ibid., 26. Claim is attributed to Peak and Frame.
56. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 120.
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mechanism, other than the presence o f chaos, for determination o f when sensitivity to
initial conditions exists, then the theory would be more useful. If Chaos Theory could
provide some ability to define when a system is on the edge of chaos, that knowledge
could enable better decisions regarding actions that could influence the movement o f the
system toward or away from the precipice.57 With such a potential capability, its
application would be extremely useful. However, in its current state o f development,
Chaos Theory does not provide such contributions.
This assessment o f Chaos Theory resulted in a negative response to one part of
the hypothesis question. Can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the
physical sciences contribute to enhanced understanding o f nonlinear systems? I presented
arguments to support the conclusion that application o f the principles o f Chaos Theory
will not appreciably facilitate prediction o f the ramifications o f actions, or enhance
description o f the systems o f power. However, reaching this conclusion does not justify
discontinuation o f the quest. Further examination is required to reveal models of
nonlinear processes that may be more appropriate for application to the problems
presented by secondary effects. To that end, I will now address the other major
perspective on the nature and operations o f nonlinearity.

Complexity
Since both provide a means o f understanding nonlinear systems, and because
many o f their principles are similar, the terms chaos and complexity are frequently

57.
For a detailed description o f this critical point, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging
Science a t the Edge o f O rder an d Chaos (N ew York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 12. “This balance point—
often called the edge o f chaos— is where the components o f a system never quite lock into place, and yet
never quite dissolve into turbulence, either.”
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confused. Consideration o f several offerings of definitions helps to alleviate some o f this
misunderstanding. A good place to begin is to regard complexity as “a characteristic of
systems made up o f two or more elements, suggesting intricacy o f structure and process,
but not randomness, sometimes with a high degree o f regularity in their dynamics up to a
point o f transition; usually implies a reasonable degree o f predictability and
controllability.”58 This rather lengthy description provides a basis upon which to compare
and contrast chaos and complexity.
Among the available alternative definitions that may be appropriate for use in this
discussion, complexity is “a type o f dynamical behavior in which many independent
agents continually interacting in novel ways.”59 As with Chaos Theory, the more limited
scope o f the term that is germane to theoretical discussions should be distinguished from
the more general usage o f complexity. As the antithesis o f simplicity, complexity
commonly is used along with similar terms such as complication, intricacy, convolution,
and entanglement. While the use of the word in the scientific community is more precise,
this same direct contrast with simplicity applies.
The lack o f explicit definitions for either term makes comparison exceptionally
difficult. Indeed, in some treatments “chaos theory, the nonlinear and complexity are
treated as a single paradigm.”60 Chaos Theory and complexity share some characteristics.
Cohen and Stewart describe as a basic tenet of complexity theory that “complex causes
can produce simple effects” and they contend, “simplicity in nature is generated from

58. Beaumont, War, Chaos an d History, xiv.
59. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 449.
60. John Urry, G lobal Com plexity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 17.
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chaos and complexity”61 The connection is between the simplicity emerging from
complexity and the order within disorder believed to result from chaos.
Adding to the difficulty in understanding the differences between these
phenomena is a certain degree o f overlap, or fuzziness, resulting in a state o f complexity
that is not wholly random or chaotic. Seeing similarities in the two models, at least in a
temporal sense, Byrne contributes, “Chaos and complexity are not time reversible.”
That is, both involve a continuum of time that is not repeatable, because the conditions
have changed irreversibly. These similarities exacerbate the difficulty in clearly defining
the boundaries between chaos and complexity. However, a brief look at characteristics
provides a means for enhanced understanding o f the ways in which the two are alike, and
therefore, difficult to differentiate.
Rosenau proposes four underpinnings o f complexity theory: (1) self-organization;
(2) adaptation and co-evolution; (3) the power o f small events; and, (4) sensitivity to
initial conditions. Self-organization refers to the characteristic of complex systems to
generate “some type o f pattern or structure from a (usually) orderless dynamical
system.”63 This is not too distant o f a departure from the order out o f disorder
characteristic o f Chaos Theory. Adaptation is “The capacity o f the agents to cope
collectively with the new challenges.” The power o f small events results in the “often
massive disproportionalities between causes and effects,” and “unpredictable and yet
irreversible patterns seem to characterize all social and physical systems.”64 Sensitivity to
initial conditions explains “The quality whereby two slightly different values o f an input

61. Cohen and Stewart, Collapse o f Chaos, 2.
62. Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the Social Sciences, 15.
63. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 467. For added clarity, consider, Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory,
20. “N ot all com plex systems are self-organizing, but all self-organizing systems are com plex.”
64. Urry, G lobal Complexity, 7.
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variable evolve to two vastly different trajectories.”65 Hence, there is commonality
among many o f the characteristics of Chaos Theory and complexity. However, the two
models are distinct in several aspects, and it is possible to identify lines o f demarcation.
Axelrod and Cohen propose a concise answer to the common question regarding
the differences, asserting, “chaos deals with situations such as turbulence that rapidly
become highly disordered and unmanageable. On the other hand complexity deals with
systems composed o f many interacting agents.”66 The inference obtained from this
observation is that there is little potential for successful prediction or influencing of
behavior in chaotic systems. The important difference in their view is that in complex,
but not chaotic systems, there is some possibility o f altering the systems through
“thoughtful interventions.”
In Beaumont’s opinion, chaos is random and not directly predictable, whereas
complexity is complicated, but “reducible to a high degree o f predictability and precise
numerical expression.”67 According to Axelrod and Cohen, complexity is a way o f
thinking and it “indicates that the system consists of parts which interact in ways that
(LO

heavily influence the probabilities o f many kinds o f later events.”

The important

distinction is that complexity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for chaos.
However, not all complex systems are chaotic. Further examination o f definitions of
complexity will help to emphasize these distinctions.

65. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 496. James, “Chaos Theory,” 30, view s this divergence in
trajectories as exponential. Beaumont, War, Chaos an d History, xiv, describes SIC as the propensity o f
non-linear systems to change properties far out o f proportion to the scale o f forces changing their original
state.”
66. Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Com plexity (N ew York: The Free Press, 1999),
xv.
67. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, 12.
68. Axelrod and Cohen, H arnessing Complexity, 1.
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Adding the temporal aspect, Covey and Highfield describe complexity as “the
study o f the behavior o f macroscopic collections o f such units that are endowed with the
potential to evolve in time”69 Others advocate consideration o f the situation and
environment in any description o f the term. Gell-Mann offers, “Complexity, however
defined, is not entirely an intrinsic property o f the entity described; it also depends to
some extent on who or what is doing the describing”70 While insightful, this observation
does not bring us any closer to development of a consensus on terminology.
As with the often-cited Supreme Court opinion on obscenity, complexity is
sometimes described as an “I know it when I see it concept.” Cambel contends, “There is
no agreed-upon definition of complexity, because it manifests itself in so many different
ways,” and he proposes four basic characteristics for consideration: purpose and function;
size and configuration; structure; and, type o f dynamics.71 Size is not a criterion for
determination o f the existence of complexity. The interaction o f the parts is the critical
element, not the number o f parts. Gell-Mann also contends that there are several different
kinds o f complexity and “any definition is context dependent.”

79

•

•

Hence, the definition o f

complexity is a function of the purposes for which it is employed.
Since agreement on a definition is difficult, a means o f determining when a
system is complex is useful. King provides such a guide. In his view, several factors
indicate the presence o f a complex system. Detection o f the following conditions
indicates that a system is complex:

69. Coveny and Highfield, Frontiers o f Complexity, 7.
70. Gell-Mann, “The Simple and the Complex,” 4. He later adds, “randomness is not what w e mean by
com plexity.” 7.
71. Cambel, A pplied Chaos, 2. Description being more readily achieved than definition, he provides 15
statements that can be applied to complexity in systems. Among the most valuable is “The system is neither
com pletely deterministic nor completely random, and exhibits both characteristics.” pp.3-4.
72. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 17.
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1. Large number of elements, whose interactions defy description by differential
equations
2. Interacting elements; the interactions are dynamic and nonlinear
3. Loops in the interactions, positive and negative
4. Operations in conditions far from equilibrium, and
•

*

5. Complexity emerges as a result o f patterns o f interactions between the elements

73

Caution must be exercised in the use o f these conditions. These factors are some
indicators o f complexity, and not an all-inclusive list for determination o f its presence.
Presentation of a means of quantification can be useful in understanding when it
exists. Demchak offers factors for measurement o f complexity:
Complexity (C)
C = / (N, D, I),o in operation at time zero
Where N = number o f components
D= differentiation among components
1= interdependence among components
to = initiating time period zero74
The important elements are multiple, varied and interacting components. The degree of
complexity is a function o f those factors. Her listing includes consideration of
differentiation, which King does not include in his inventory o f factors provided earlier.
As with the discussion of Chaos Theory, it is more productive to look at the
consequences o f complexity than it is to struggle with definitions. H. A. Simon avoids
presenting a definition o f complexity, preferring to “regard a system as complex if it can
73. King, Social Science an d Complexity, 77-78. Several factors were combined from the author’s more
extensive list.
74. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 246.
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be analyzed into many components having relatively many relations among them, so that
the behavior o f each component depends on the behavior o f others.”75 This interaction
between elements represents the essence o f complexity as it relates to this study. Since it
is behavior and the product o f complexity that is most critical to this assessment, it is
prudent to shift focus to the potential uses o f an understanding o f complexity.

Potential Uses o f Complexity
As a precursor to any utilization, an imprecisely defined condition such as
complexity requires some type o f framework for development o f understanding. The
emergence of organizations dedicated to the study and advancement o f complexity theory
is an indicator o f the belief that that there may be promise in this area. The Santa Fe
Institute in New Mexico, the Center fo r the Study o f Complex Systems at the University
of Michigan, The Ilya Prigogine Center fo r Studies in Statistical Mechanics and Complex
Systems at the University o f Texas, and the Center fo r Social Complexity at George
Mason University are a few o f the educational and research structures that focus on
complexity theory and are dedicated to its advancement.

7 f\

Refereed journals such as

Complexity International and Complexity Digest complement the work and products of
•

these institutions.

77

In its most basic sense, complexity theory provides a basis for investigating the
properties of nonlinear systems. However, its proponents see a larger role. Coveny and

75. H. A. Simon, “Near Decomposability and Complexity: How a Mind Resides in a Brain,” in The
Mind, the Brain an d Complex A daptive Systems, ed. Harold. J. Morowitz and Jerome L. Singer (Reading,
MA: Addison-W esley Publishing Company, 1995), 26. Emphasis added.
76. O f these, the Santa Fe Institute is the best known. See Waldrop, Com plexity, for an engaging
narrative o f the origins and workings o f this organization.
77. The Complexity in Social Science site, http://www.irit.fr/COSI.html (accessed 11 October 2004),
provides an excellent introductory tutorial into nonlinear systems as well as multiple links to related sites.
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Highfield contend that the science o f complexity is “the quest to see the forest through
the trees, distill unity from diversity, and seek an account of the emergence of
organization.”78 Urry adds, “Complexity theory generally analyzes systems as unstable,
dissipative structures.”79 Providing a connection to more focused studies o f this
phenomenon, Rihani asserts, “Complex and Complexity refer to certain systems that have
large numbers o f internal elements that interact locally to stable, but evolving, global
patterns.”80 Nicolis and Prigognine prefer to consider complex behavior, rather than
complex systems, since in their view, “simple systems can display complex behavior.”81
Even the most cursory review of the activities of the academic and scientific disciplines
to which complexity theory has been applied confirms that the theory is wide-ranging.
However, escape from the current confines o f research institutes requires consideration of
its potential practical applications.
James Rosenau poses the question: Can complexity theory “point the way to
policies which can ameliorate the uncertainties inherent in a fragmegrative world?”
In his search for applications o f complexity into the social sciences, Byrne presents a
bold assertion: “Complexity theory can be used as a technique that allows us to

78. Coveny and Highfield, Frontiers o f Complexity, 2. “This complexity is intrinsic to nature; it is not
just a result o f the combination o f many simple processes that occur on a more fundamental level.”
79. Urry, G lobal Complexity, 28.
80. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory an d Developm ent P ractice, 6. He adds, “Complex behaviour is
defined to a large extent by local interactions between their components” (ibid., 7).
81. Gregorire N icolis and Ilya Prigognine, Exploring Com plexity (New York: W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1989), 8. The objective o f an analysis o f com plex behavior should be the determination o f
“common characteristics among different classes o f system s.”
82. James N. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity and Theory in World
Affairs,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, an d N ational Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J.
Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), 73. Fragm egration relates to
globalization pushing and pulling in com plex and conflicting ways. He concludes, “com plexity theory does
have insights to offer,” but cautions that their potential benefits may have been exaggerated, (ibid., 74).
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understand the changing social world.”

Extending this theme of a search for

knowledge, Sanders argues, “while it may not be possible to solve or predict the future of
nonlinear systems, it is possible to provide a qualitative description o f its characteristics
and behavior as a whole over time.”84 Adding a British perspective, Urry believes that the
complexity sciences may be emerging as a potential new paradigm for the social
sciences, and also may provide “concepts and methods that begin to illuminate the global
as well as a system or series o f systems.”85
While achieving understanding is a worthwhile goal in itself, the ultimate
objective is some type o f prognostic capability. The potential for using the principles of
complexity theory for prediction emerges as a desirable trait; however, debate continues
over whether this is a realistic aspiration. Cohen and Stewart assert, “Complexity may be
unpredictable in detail, but its general course may be comprehensible and foreseeable.”

86

Rihani supports this view: “Within a complex regime, some global patterns are
predictable.”87 Although skeptical o f what he considers to be exaggerated claims by the
proponents o f chaos-complexity, Saperstein concedes, “Complexity theory may be useful
on

in modeling how real-world situations get out o f control.”
Precise prediction, while desirable, is not mandatory for a model to provide
benefits. “If you have a truly complex system, then the exact patterns are not repeatable.
And yet there are themes that are recognizable.”89 However, the ability o f complexity
theory to deliver even the more restricted product o f recognizable themes remains
83. Byrne, Com plexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 71. The key to this understanding is the
“individual interactions may constitute the source o f changes in the social order itself.”
84. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 60.
85. Urry, G lobal Com plexity, 7.
86. Cohen and Stewart, C ollapse o f Chaos, 3.
87. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory an d D evelopm ent Practice, 9.
88. Alvin Saperstein, “War and Chaos,” 548.
89. Waldrop, Complexity, 332.
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contentious. This, and other perceived limitations o f the use o f complexity theory is the
topic for the following section.

Limitations o f the Use of Complexity Theory
Earlier discussions concluded that a complex system consists o f many interacting
parts, many o f which are interacting nonlinearly. The existence o f interrelationships
between the components of a system and the nonlinearity of these relationships is
commonly accepted. However, recognition that a complex system exists and that linear
solutions are not applicable, does not provide much practical assistance. The utility is in
being able to use the principles o f complexity theory to provide, at minimum, a level of
understanding that could contribute to some predictive capability.
Addressing the optimistic views o f the proponents of complexity theory, Axelrod
and Cohen counter, “it can still be very disquieting to act on the ‘fiction’ that we have a
reasonable prediction of the consequences o f a particular event in a complex system.”90
The problems associated with assuming a predictive capability that does not exist are
obvious. Although he discerns some potential for further study, Rousenau cautions, “For
despite the strides, there are severe limits to the extent to which such theory can generate
concrete polices.”91 He expresses concern that in searching for a panacea for the
shortfalls in understanding nonlinear systems, some proponents have overstated the
potential benefits of complexity theory. Based on his analysis he concludes that
complexity theory “cannot presently— and is unlikely ever to—provide a method for

90. Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complexity, 13.
91. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 74.
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predicting particular events and specifying the exact shape and nature o f developments in
the future.”92
Eve Mitleton-Kelly cautions against “adapting the widespread practice o f using
complexity as a metaphor or analogy” and advocates developing an understanding o f the
nature of complex social systems.93 Misunderstanding and misuse o f the analogies
represent the major weakness in the arguments o f advocates o f complexity theory.
Demchak observes a poor system fit in attempts by many nations to modernize their
militaries, due “in large part to the widespread misunderstanding o f complexity and
surprise among defense leaders.”94 The errors are not in assertions that complexity can
provide useful insights; rather it is the exaggerated and unjustified claims for its
predictive capabilities. While these may evolve in some point in the future, the current
offerings are more limited. Theory and animated discussion are abundant; practical uses,
less so. Richards believes that much o f the difficulty in applying nonlinear methods,
including complexity, is that there is “no template for nonlinear modeling.”95
Complexity theory attempts to describe the operation o f complex systems, but is
not helpful for those who must make decisions and operate within multifarious systems.
Previous attempts at utilization of complexity theory in the realm o f relations between
nations have not been helpful because they often only acknowledge that complexity
exists, without providing guidance on how to make decisions when dealing with a

92. Ibid., 89.
93. Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, 5.
94. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 222. The author uses the term
“surprise” which is roughly equivalent to “unexpected” or “unintended.” Sensing a proportional
relationship between knowledge, system complexity and the potential for unintended effects, she contends,
“Increases in com plexity are inextricably linked to increases in surprise, unless accommodated” (ibid.,
225).
95. Richards, P olitical Complexity, 10. It follows that “the ramifications o f nonlinearity have not been
sufficiently realized” (ibid., 2).
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complex system. The critical shortfall is that if theory is considered to be a set of
interrelated propositions, then a true theory of complexity does not exist. Hence, it is
preferable to consider complexity as a condition rather than as a theory. If treated as a
condition for further analysis, then the potential remains for development o f propositions
for methodologies with utility to the decision-maker.

Summation
This chapter provided a brief examination o f the two most predominant
approaches to the problems presented by nonlinearity. Chaos Theory describes a situation
where system nonlinearity displays apparent disorder and randomness, but may also
provide some detectible order. While displaying some similarities, complexity is less o f a
theory or concept, and I concur with its more accurate depiction as a characteristic of
systems that contain interacting components. Complexity was determined to be a
requirement for chaos, however, not all complex systems are chaotic.
The potential benefits and the limitations o f the use o f these approaches were
presented, and I concluded that chaos-complexity theory provides some interesting and
challenging paradigms. These insights can provide a description o f the inner workings of
interrelated elements of systems. Hence, their major contribution to this effort lies in the
presentation o f models o f system behavior. As Beaumont contends, chaos-complexity
theory “may give us new metaphors and make us more sensitive to its intricacy and to the
possibility that the range of possible outcomes may be greater than common sense or
linear thinking leads us to believe.”96 Metaphors and models have value; however, they

96. Beaumont, N azis ’ March to Chaos, 36.
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can provide only limited practical applications, especially when based on emerging,
unrefined, and largely unproven scientific concepts.
At their current level o f maturity, Chaos Theory and complexity approaches do
not provide a practical means to understand the elements of national power or a viable
ability to anticipate the nature of secondary effects of actions. Additionally, there is no
credible evidence that these approaches can provide much prognostic capability. This is
largely due to the need for near perfect information upon which to base any predictions of
behavior. Beyerchen concludes that the knowledge required to anticipate effects is
unattainable: “Due to our ignorance o f the exact initial conditions, the cause o f a given
•

effect must, for all intents and purposes, often be treated as unavoidable chance.”

07

Demchak concurs: “Knowing all the possible outcomes o f a dynamic system is
theoretically impossible, and thus there remains a final subset o f unknowns that are
simply unknowable.”98 If a high degree o f predictability is the objective, then clearly
chaos-complexity approaches fall short.
However, even this limitation does not signify that there is no value in
consideration o f these approaches. Saperstein agrees that chaos-complexity can provide
no more than metaphors, but identifies possible benefits from their use: “Instead of
specific new tools, these metaphors can contribute to the development o f the new
attitudes required for the more complex modem world.”99 Rosenau notes that the lack of

97. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War,” 77.
98. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 226.
99. Saperstein. “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 120. See also Saperstein, “War and
Chaos,” 548. “Complexity theory may be useful in modeling how real-world situations get out o f control.”
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an ability to predict “is not a serious drawback” and urges the adoption o f a complexity
perspective.” 100
This leads to the response to the hypothesis question that is the focus o f this
chapter: Can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical sciences
contribute to enhanced understanding o f nonlinear systems? Based on the evidence
examined the response would be a qualified yes. Plainly, Chaos Theory and complexity
can provide some degree o f enhanced understanding. However, that level o f awareness is
limited. The principal benefit is an appreciation o f the exceptional difficulties, and some
argue impossibility, associated with prediction o f behavior in nonlinear systems.
The brief examination of chaos provided in this chapter introduced the lexicon
and provided a non-technical overview o f the theory. This excursion led to the conclusion
that Chaos Theory does not represent the most advantageous approach to nonlinearity
that could support development o f a useful instrument for assessments o f national power
and the determination o f effects o f actions. In this context, Chaos Theory can provide
little beyond interesting analogies and metaphors. Claims for its application in this
context that extend beyond this contribution should be viewed with skepticism.
The examination o f complexity produced a fundamentally different conclusion.
Complexity, considered as a condition rather than a theory or paradigm, could provide a
foundation for further development o f useful methodologies.
Despite a wide range o f academic backgrounds and viewpoints, the cited authors
concur that complexity studies are nascent. Nevertheless, attempts to advance beyond
mere recognition of complexity should be taken at this time, and not await maturation of
existing theories o f nonlinearity. Supporting this view, Cederman contends,
100. Roseneau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 92.
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“Policymakers cannot afford the luxury o f a wait-and-see attitude, and neither can
theorists. Conceptual innovation is needed now and not after the action has already taken
place.” 101
Nonlinear approaches, and particularly complexity, have potential for
exploitation. However, they have not yet advanced to a stage where they provide any
immediately useful tools to the decision-maker. Rosenau contends, “We do not have
techniques for analyzing the simultaneity of events such that the full array o f the
interconnections and feedback loops are identified.” 102 This statement of existing
limitations does not mandate the discarding in their entirety ideas emerging from studies
o f complexity. The essential tasks are to take advantage o f the existing immature
conceptual principles and to attempt to discover the requisite skills and techniques.
Waltz succinctly describes the problem facing the decision-maker: “The same
causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects sometimes follow from
different causes. We are led to suspect that reductionist explanations o f international
politics are insufficient and that analytic approaches must give way to systemic ones.”
Arguing for new methodologies, Jervis states, “When we are dealing with systems .. .we
have to understand complex interactions, and these present a series o f challenges to
standard comparative methods.” 104

101. Cederman, Em ergent A ctors in W orld Politics, 4. A worthwhile goal is to develop “new heuristic
devices that deal directly with complexity and change in world politics” (ibid., 5).
102. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 89. “For despite the strides, there are severe
limits to the extent to which such theory [complexity] can generate concrete polices they lessen the
uncertainties o f a fragmegrative world” (ibid., 7).
103. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 39. A systems approach will be needed “if outcomes are
affected not only by the properties and interconnections o f variables but also by the way in which they are
organized.”
104. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 582. He also offers, “Actions
often interact to produce results that cannot be comprehended by linear m odels” (ibid., 574).
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Herein resides a potential course for further exploration. The system emerges as
the key ingredient for enhanced understanding; for as Byrne contends, chaos-complexity
is “inherently systematic.” 105 While other potential solutions may have merit, the
integration o f perspectives on complexity with a systems approach appears to be a
promising path toward enabling advancement beyond mere acceptance o f complexity as a
nearly universal condition.
The existing work regarding nonlinearity and complexity described in this chapter
provides the underpinning for continuation o f the search for an effective methodology.
However, further progress toward this objective requires additional resources. Systems
theory can supply the framework to build upon this foundation. At its center is the
concept of a complex adaptive system, an approach that affords the structure required for
the proposition. However, adaptation o f systems theory to the objective o f this
proposition requires further development. Therefore, an examination o f the potential of
the complex adaptive system to serve as a basis for a methodology that can lead to
understanding o f secondary effects of actions is the subject o f Chapter IV.

105. Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the Social Sciences, 51.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SYSTEMS APPROACH

Preceding chapters examined the impact o f nonlinearity when considering system
behavior. I determined that when dealing with systems with multiple interrelated parts,
linear approaches were not adequate for the task o f developing an understanding o f the
effects o f coercive actions. Two o f the more frequently studied approaches to
nonlinearity were selected for more detailed examination, and a conclusion was reached
that one o f these, Chaos Theory, provides little potential for practical application in this
context. However, complexity treated as a condition rather than a theory, and teamed
with another approach, offers some promise.
Systems have been described as “instances of organized complexity.’’'’1 Hence, the
linkage o f systems to complexity does not represent a radically new pairing. However,
further development requires a firmer theoretical underpinning. A premise essential to
exploitation is that the potential for the enhanced understanding o f the effects o f actions
emerges when complexity is coupled with the framework of systems theory. Recently,
significant effort has been made in this area, resulting in a complex adaptive system
(CAS) model that provides this necessary connection. Consequently, the complex
adaptive system may provide an appropriate structure for further development o f the
proposed methodology. I will expand on this supposition later in this chapter.
Earlier sections captured the essential elements o f complexity; however, the
defining and establishing of boundaries o f systems require some additional examination

1.
John W. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, Administration an d Architecture (N ew York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Company, 1975), 7. Italics in original.
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to support arguments for the application o f a systems approach. A notable advocate o f the
systems approach argues: “Although we all know that social life and politics constitute
systems and that many outcomes are the unintended consequences o f complex
interactions, the basic ideas o f systems do not come readily to mind and are often
ignored.”2 Therefore, an essential step in the development of this proposition and
methodology is the rectification o f this condition through the establishment o f systems as
the core o f further analysis.
This chapter initially will examine the concept of systems and the associated
terminology. This will be followed by an appraisal o f some o f the relevant elements of
systems theory. Since the field is expansive, the focus will be on the central theme o f the
proposition, i.e., the interaction o f units (actors) within and across systems. Since the
complex adaptive system has been selected as the model, a review o f the most insightful
and directly applicable studies on CAS will be conducted. Concentration will be on the
principles that are relevant to an examination o f the effects o f the application o f national
power. The concluding argument is that national power may be properly described
through utilization o f a complex adaptive systems model.
Three key questions were presented in the Introduction to the dissertation. The
objective o f this chapter is to present additional evidence with which to respond to the
first of these: Can the sources o f national power be examined and understood through
utilization o f a systems approach? Moving beyond that query, the system o f systems
construct will be introduced and shown to be an effective way o f portraying interactions
of elements across system boundaries. That is, how a holistic approach can help to
overcome the analytical problems associated with reducing large complex systems into
2. Jervis, “Complex Systems,” 45.
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manageable parts. The goal is to begin to respond to the second vital question: Can the
interaction between elements (actors or entities) within a system be determined using a
system o f systems model? While steps leading to an answer will be taken, a complete
response to this query must be deferred until the presentation o f the methodology in
Chapter V.

Elements of a Systems Approach
Although the term system appeared in earlier chapters, it was used in a very
generic context, as a regularly interacting or interdependent group o f items form ing a
unified whole, under the influence o f related forces. While that portrayal was adequate
for those excursions, further development o f the utility o f the complex adaptive system
model requires more rigor and specificity in terminology. Therefore, prior to embarking
upon a discussion o f the application o f systems theory, boundaries must be established
and a set of adequate definitions must be provided.
Waltz supplies a simple yet practical characterization o f a system as “a set of
interacting units.” However, more importantly, he observes that the system also includes
structure, which makes it more than simply a collection o f units and the interaction
between these units. The aim o f systems theory is to show how the levels operate and
-j

t

interact, and that requires marking them off from each other.” Similar definitions are
provided: Williams, “an assemblage of interacting parts;” Atkins, “the interaction
between two or more units and the functions o f that interaction;” and, Lorenz, “collection
3.
Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 40. Although the focus o f this seminal work is the
international system, not specifically national systems o f power, his insights on system theory are
particularly useful to this examination. He further expands on this distinction between structure and
interaction o f units: “Any approach or theory, if it is rightly termed “system ic” must show how the systems
level, or structure, is distinct from the level o f interacting unit.” An important element is how structure
affects unit interactions, and vice versa.
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of parts along with some recipe for how those parts move and change.”4 Raymond
DeCarlo describes systems as “some physical process which generates outputs, finished
products, desired behaviors, etc. in response to input stimuli.”5
Other attempts at defining a system include a “set of objects together with the
relationships between the objects and between their attributes.”6 Dictionary entries
provide, “a functionally related group of elements; a set o f objects or phenomena grouped
together for classification or analysis.”7 Morton Kaplan offers: “A system consists o f a
set of variables related by one or more functions.”8 While even a cursory investigation of
the concept o f systems will reveal an abundance o f characterizations, the terms that
appear most consistently in definitions o f systems, and those that are most important to
this analysis—structure and function.
While there is a range o f acceptable definitions o f the term, this examination of
the elements o f national power will expand on the generic definition and regard a system
as a set o f interacting parts with a common function, purpose or utility. That
characterization represents a good place to start; however, as with attempts to grasp what
is meant by complexity, it is useful to look at when a system is extant as a means o f better
understanding the concept.

4. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 3. Atkins, Latin Am erica in the International P olitical System, 4.
Definition attributed to Meteorologist Edward Lorenz in James, Chaos Theory, 28.
5. Raymond A. DeCarlo, Linear Systems (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), 2. These
stimuli “activate the operation o f some process to produce some result or response.” p. 1.
6. David Berlinski, On Systems A nalysis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1976), 3, crediting A.D.
Hall and R.E. Fagen with the view that objects are “parts or components o f the system;” attributes are
“properties o f objects;” and relationships are those things that “tie the system together.”
7. The Am erican H eritage Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “system.”
8. Morton A. Kaplan, M acropolitics (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 26.
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Determination o f when a system exists is not precise. Indeed, as J. David Singer
argues, “a system exists largely in the eye o f the beholder.”9 Although perhaps accurate,
this characterization is not particularly conducive to further development. Jervis provides
useful input: “We are dealing with a system when a set o f units or elements are
interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in
other parts o f the system, and the entirety exhibits properties and behaviors that are
different from those o f the parts.” 10 A Sociologist, Daniel Metlay, offers, “Two
components are part o f the same system if they are involved in reciprocal exchanges o f
resources.” 11
Most depictions concur that a system may be viewed as a collection of interacting
parts that share common characteristics. However, the important common theme in the
criteria for determining the existence of a system is that it must be more than merely a
collection o f interacting units. The key element is that the whole is different than the sum
o f the parts. In earlier discussions this was observed to be an essential element of
nonlinearity. Since most systems, almost by definition, are nonlinear, an understanding of
the principles o f nonlinearity is critical to any employment of a systems model. This is
the rationale for the brief introduction to nonlinearity provided in Chapter III. Having
briefly described a system, identified means for determination o f its presence, and
restated the connection between systems and nonlinearity, it is now possible to attach
some theoretical vigor to this concept o f systems.

9. Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems,” 22. Singer contends that when examining a
cluster o f groups or individuals and determining patterns o f interaction between these, “the researcher may
legitimately label as a system that which he observes.”
10. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 570.
11. Daniel Metlay, “Social Systems,” in O rganized Social Complexity, ed. Todd R. La Porte (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press), 1975), 27.
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Systems Theory
A basic tenet o f systems theory is the existence o f a set o f near universal
conditions that provide a framework for explanatory thought. That is, there are common
characteristics in systems across a wide range of disciplines, and that explanatory models
may be derived from these. As Sutherland argues, “Certain concepts, principles, and
methods have been shown not to depend on the specific nature o f the phenomenon
involved. These can be applied, without any modification to quite diverse areas of
science.” 12 The implication is that the systems model need not be the exclusive domain o f
the mathematician, physicist, and engineer.
If, as Weltman contends, system theory is “an approach to an underlying structure
of reality,” 13 then the potential emerges to apply the work accomplished and ongoing in
mathematics, the physical sciences, and biology, to other disciplines. The supposition is
that models derived from the hard sciences may be useful in other fields.
The connection, and potential for application to this methodology, is that if we
can understand systems in a mathematical context, and if national power may be viewed
as a system, then there may be extant models that can provide enhanced understanding o f
political, social, and economic systems. These must include the key components o f the
systems and their interactions within and across categories. Hence, the search for a
general theory o f systems, elements o f which may be applied to the problem of
determination o f the effects o f actions, becomes a meaningful quest and an endeavor
worth undertaking.

12. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 4.
13. John J. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1973), 14.
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Ludwig von Bertalanffy is one o f the earliest, and among the most often cited,
proponents o f the existence of general systems laws that apply regardless o f system type
or elements. An advocate of a wide-ranging theory, he argues that some abstract
generalizations that are applicable to all systems may be made, and asserts:
“Independently o f each other, similar problems and conceptions have evolved in widely
different areas.” 14 Therefore, a “basic re-orientation of scientific thinking,” represented
by adoption o f a systems approach becomes necessary. This requires integration o f a
more expansive and inclusive range o f sources. He observes that academic disciplines
tend to become inwardly focused and are often protected by “cocoons” that provide
impenetrable membranes that stifle intellectual progress. This protective sheath must be
removed so that knowledge may be shared, synthesized, and advanced.15
Bertalanffy’s search is not necessarily for direct application o f mathematical
models to social and political systems, but rather he seeks certain paradigms, principles,
and laws, “which apply to generalized systems irrespective o f their particular kind,
elements, and the ‘forces’ involved.” 16 He views systems as “complexes o f elements
standing in interaction,” and refers to these common structural similarities between
systems as isomorphisms. If properly understood, these similarities may be exploited and
potentially applied to fields beyond those in which they were discovered.

14. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, G eneral Systems Theory, Revised ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1969),
30.
15. Richards, P olitical Complexity, 339-40, opines, “Just as early political science could not be
understood without incorporating both politics and econom ics, a political science based on dynamic
complexity arising from interaction and learning would need to rely on close association with fields such as
cognitive science or biology and from computational tools from fields such as computer science.”
16. Bertalanffy, G eneral Systems Theory, 33. Recognizing the extreme difficulty o f this task, he readily
admits the limits o f current models. However, “A verbal model is better than no model at all” (ibid., 24).
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The essential principle, and that which is critical to this study, is that systems are
•

•

•

“not understandable by investigation o f their component parts in isolation.”

17

Rather,

insight and understanding may be better achieved through looking at the interactions
between elements and the wholeness o f the system. This strategy is applicable across a
wide range o f scientific endeavors. A cross-matrixed, interdisciplinary approach can
provide an opportunity to incorporate the work conducted in one field into the problems
of another. To pursue the validity o f this assumption, it is necessary to briefly expand on
the use o f systems as a model.

The Systems Model
A system may be seen as causal sequence, which finds a stream o f inputs being
transformed by some process into a flow o f outputs. Therefore, we can view a system as
1X

“an ordered combination o f inputs, outputs and process.” A characteristic common to
all systems is that they include some level of input, which undergoes a process, and
subsequently provide output. The exact nature o f this process may vary significantly and
is not always precisely understood. Indeed, it is often described and depicted as a “black
box” suggesting the mystery o f the process contained within. The Figure 2 provides a
simplified depiction o f this relationship. This simplified diagram, common to all systems,
displays the progression from inputs, through a process, and subsequently to outputs. The
environment is the domain in which the system operates.

17. Ibid., 37. He rejects the notion that we can reduce social elements down to the lowest levels o f the
construct o f physics, but contends that w e “can find constructs, and possibly laws within the individual
levels” (ibid., 49).
18. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 24.
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Inputs

Process

Outputs

Environment

Figure 2. A Generic Systems Model

In a closed system, such as the energy generation component o f a simple steam
engine, the input is heat. In the process (boiler) this water in transformed into steam, and
the output is energy. Since the boiler can receive inputs from one source, and the only
output is the steam, this may be described as a closed system. In the closed system model,
there are no interactions external to the boundaries o f the system; outputs are isolated
from and have no influence on inputs. Noting o f course that closed is a relative term. No
engine has achieved 100% efficiency, and total isolation from the environment is not
possible.
In a classical closed system, the Second Law of Thermodynamics prevails. That
is, increased movement toward a state of positive entropy where equilibrium is achieved
and movement would stop. Another example o f a closed system are stable atoms, which
normally do not exchange energy with their environments; “they arrest entropy within
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their own structure.” 19 A simple depiction o f a closed system is provided for illustration
in Figure 3.20

X1 ___„ 01
INPUT

------------------------

OUTPUT

Figure 3. A Closed System Model

The obvious advantage o f a closed system is that it may be controlled precisely or
regulated through manipulation o f the input. The output o f a closed system becomes very
predictable since, “In any closed system, the final state is unequivocally determined by
the initial conditions.”21 Again using the exceedingly simple steam engine analogy, the

19. Ervin Lazio, The Systems View o f the World: A H olistic View fo r Our Time (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton
Press, Inc., 1996), 33. Although the atoms may be affected by high energies and heat, in this type o f
system, the degradation o f energy predicted by the Second Law o f Thermodynamics is effectively
withstood. See Bertalanffy, G eneral Systems Theory, 124-32, for additional examples and illustrations.
“Entropy: derives from second law o f thermodynamics in a closed system, entropy increases until a
maximum state o f equilibrium is reached. Eventually a closed system reaches a state where there is no
organization, just randomness or some other variant o f chaos.” Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 43.
20. Diagram adapted from Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 42. Readers with an engineering background
may find this analogy overly simplified and a poor explanation o f the true operation o f a steam engine. I
acknowledge that limitation, however, the importance is in the model, not in the engine design. See Pierre
Faurre and M ichel Depeyrot, Elements o f Systems Theory (N ew York: North Holland Publishing Company,
1977). Chapter 1 provides an introduction, which includes the basic mathematics for those seeking a more
precise technical exposure to systems theory.
21. Bertalanffy, G eneral Systems Theory, 40. He refers to this principle as equifinality.
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primary input is heat. As it increases, the level of output (steam) should show a
commensurate change. Here we have a predictable and controllable linear system.
However, this model provides little utility to this study in that the systems that comprise
national power are never closed. Even systems and societies that are sometimes referred
to as closed, e.g., North Korea, are in fact forced to deal with outside inputs. Despite its
inward focus the DPRK must deal with and respond to neighbors, e.g., China and Japan,
and international organizations such as nuclear regulatory regimes. Hence, a better
paradigm is required.
Open systems take in, as well as release, energy into the environment. Figure 4
provides a simple depiction o f an open system.

INPUTS

x.

O ,

o u tpu ts

Figure 4. An Open System Model

22. Diagram adapted from ibid., 99.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

Such a system may be defined as one that displays “exchanges of matter with its
environment, presenting import and export, building up and breaking-down o f its
material components.”23 Most natural systems fall into this category. The openness lies in
their need to absorb energy in order to maintain their steady state or stability. In the world
in which coercive power is employed the system is open and dependent on interchanges
with the environment. Indeed, the environment is a critical element in understanding the
functioning o f the system 24
As shown, the open system is influenced by multiple inputs, and these affect the
process, resulting in multiple and indeterminate outcomes. “The study o f open systems
becomes the study o f interactions, resonations, concatenations, and complex causal
sequences”25 Since the system is open to the environment; any ability to control or to
regulate the input is diminished. It follows that even if the process is fully understood,
development o f an ability to manage or to predict the nature of multiple outputs becomes
exceptionally problematic. Returning to the discussion o f Chapter III, the open system
displays nonlinearity and presents the same challenges to effective analysis and
prediction. Hence, open systems are, by their definition and nature, complex. With this
basic premise established, the next issue for consideration is how these complex systems
respond to stimuli from their environment.
The principle means by which systems retain their stability is through feedback.
Although a system may be properly described as open, it may have a closed loop
feedback system for regulation. The governor or regulator on a steam engine is a readily

23. Ibid., 141.
24. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 41. Since open systems are highly dependent upon external events,
w e are unable to regulate interfaces with precision.
25. Ibid., 46.
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understood means o f effecting control on a system. 26 Figure 5 provides a depiction o f a
simple feedback scheme.

STIMULUS

MESSAGE

RECEPTOR

MESSAGE

CONTROL
APPARATUS

RESPONSE

EFFECTOR

FEEDBACK

Figure 5. A Simple Feedback Model

A common example of an open system with a closed-loop feedback mechanism is
the thermostat, where the system becomes self-regulating by making adjustments based
on inputs (feedback) from the environment. The sensor (receptor) detects a change in
temperature (stimulus) and sends a signal (message) to the regulating device (control
apparatus), which adjusts the system by sending a voltage (message) to alter the output to
26.
In Thomas Watt’s steam engine regulator, two pendulums with balls on the end rotate around an
axle attached to the engine. As engine speed increases so does the speed o f the balls, which move upward
due to the centripetal force. This in turn reduces the supply o f water, which results in the engine slowing
down. This provides the classic example o f self-regulation. Attempts at transference o f this principle and
making political and econom ic systems self-regulating have met with varied degrees o f success. The
Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission are examples o f regulators o f
economic systems.
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the heating or cooling equipment (effector). This provides feedback to the receptor in the
form of altered room temperature and the process starts or stops heating or cooling based
on this feedback.27
Feedback may be negative, i.e., the system detects a shortfall or anomaly and
forces some type of change; or positive, in the sense that it supports a self-reinforcing
process. This implies some type o f internal, and in some cases naturally occurring,
effective organization. If a system is able to maintain stability through time, it is
considered to be homeostatic or one that “allows a constant feedback between system and
environment.”28 Discovery o f any self-regulating mechanisms within systems would be
of immense value to their understanding, and perhaps to prediction or even control. One
effort at applying this principle across a wide-range of disciplines that emerged in the
latter half of the twentieth century is cybernetics.
The new science of cybernetics attempts to show that feedback is the basis for
purposeful behavior in natural as well as social systems, and it may be utilized to explain
internal organization. Cybernetics presupposes a mechanism o f self-regulation that results
in equilibrium. This form o f automatic control that occurs within natural systems, e.g.,
perspiration as a temperature regulating process in humans, may also be applied to
economic, political, and social issues.

90

System theory looks more at structure;

cybernetics is focused primarily on function.

27. Illustration adopted from Bertanlanffy, G eneral Systems Theory, 43.
28. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 69.
29. Cybernetics, first articulated in 1948 by mathematician Norbert Wiener, has experienced cycles o f
popularity and neglect. More recently, elements o f cybernetics, notably automatic control, have been
extended to the development o f artificial intelligence. See Oskar Lange, Introduction to Economic
Cybernetics (N ew York: Pergamon Press, 1970), 1-10, for a brief tracing o f the antecedents and early
applications o f cybernetics. Written in then communist Poland, the critique o f bourgeois econom ics and
comparison o f it to scientific socialism provide an interesting perspective on how politics can influence
science.
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While interest in cybernetics ebbed and flowed, it fell short o f being regarded by
most as a new science. Examples o f practical applications are not abundant; effective
thermostat-like devices for complex social systems have evaded development. However,
the notion that at least some level o f automatic control may exist in social, economic and
political systems should not be totally disregarded. Therefore, any analysis o f these
systems should include an assessment of any internal regulating mechanisms.
A contribution from the field o f management that dates back to the early 1960’s is
System Dynamics, which its most noted proponent, Jay W. Forrester, describes as “the
study of information-feedback characteristics o f industrial activity to show how
organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and time delays (in decisions and
actions) interact to influence the success of an enterprise.”30 Its applications are
widespread, and its adherents have applied concepts developed in engineering to social
systems. System Dynamics emphasizes the study o f the whole system and its feedback
loops. Feedback, where output becomes an input, is the critical element in System
Dynamics. This feedback may be positive or negative, and the internal structure
determines the manifestation of changes in the system. Importantly, System Dynamics
acknowledges that an action taken to influence A, may have an effect on B, which will in
turn have an effect on A. Hence, both influences must be considered. This is the complex
relationship described in earlier chapters, and the dilemma that provides the major
challenge to an understanding o f system behavior.

30.
Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1961). The approach
initially used this title, but in later writings, Forrester introduced the more expansive, System Dynamics,
which is the com m only accepted term to describe this model. His Chapter 1 provides an excellent
introduction to systems and the importance o f feedback. See also, Jay W. Forrester, The C ollected Papers
o f Jay W. Forrester (Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen Press, Inc., 1975) for a more detailed appreciation o f
the evolution o f the model and some o f its practical applications.
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A more recent endeavor is the agent-based modeling approach. Less developed
and more loosely defined than System Dynamics, agent-based models focus on the
individual parts that comprise the whole. This perspective also has also described as
bottom-up modeling. Its basis is that understanding o f the parts and their interactions can
provide insights into global behavior. Macro-level system behavior is the result o f the
interactions o f the individual agents. Hence, comprehensive knowledge o f relationships at
the global aggregate level is not necessary. This results in models that are easier to
maintain. Some exploration of the use of agent-based modeling in the social sciences is
evident. Robert Axelrod, uses it to overcome some limitations o f his prisoners ’ dilemma
model, and explains that the purpose of agent-based models is “to understand the
*5 1

properties o f complex social systems through the analysis o f simulations.”

The

principles o f agent-based modeling, and its focus on the individual elements (agents) as a
tool to understand the whole, provide an intellectual foundation for the assessment
methodology that follows in Chapter V.
This cursory examination provided the necessary foundation for further analysis.
While critical to this discussion, a basic understanding o f systems does not in itself
adequately respond to the essential question: Can a systems model, that may be
appropriate for engineers and physicists, provide any advantages to the understanding of
political, economic, and social systems? Any response is dependent upon the level o f
acceptance o f the principles o f general systems theory.
There is no universal acknowledgement o f the existence o f a general theory of
systems suitable for application across multiple disciplines. In a highly critical essay on
31. Robert Axelrod, The Com plexity o f Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997),
3. He argues that agent-based approach is neither induction nor deduction, but rather a third-way o f doing
science, and that its purpose is to aid intuition.
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what he believes to be erroneous extensions o f mathematical principles, David Berlinksi
finds “fundamental obscurities in its overall conception,” describes this approach as a
“triviality,” and contends that the theory is so inclusive that it becomes little more than
extension o f the laws o f logic.32 Weltman cautions that the operation o f systems “cannot
be explained solely through consideration o f the interrelation o f its elements,” for it is the
extrasystemic environment and the interactions with the system that are critical to
understanding.33 Even advocates, such as Kaplan, caution against overextension and
assert that there is no general theory o f all systems and that “different kinds o f systems
require different theories for explanatory purposes.”34
While many o f the arguments that question the very existence, or much less the
potential for effective utilization, of a general theory o f systems are intellectually sound,
they represent more o f a case for the appropriate use o f the relevant principles of the
premise than they do a denial of the soundness o f a general system theory. Critics such as
Berlinski fall into the trap that Bertalanffy, Weltman, Jervis, and others warn against, that
is taking an overly parochial and purest approach to systems. Clearly, there exists a lack
of precision in our understanding o f social systems. However, it does not follow that the
lack o f a mathematical formulation precludes adoption and adaptation o f a useful model.
Hence, utilization o f the systems model in the pursuit of understanding o f secondary
effects remains a valid scheme. However, a paradigm being valid does not necessarily
presage usefulness.

32. Berlinski, On Systems A nalysis, 4. In a particularly pointed comment, he contends: “General
Systems Theory marks what Scientologists, I believe, call a point o f minimal adequacy. This is a movement
that is all craving without content” (ibid., 179).
33. Weltman, System s Theory in International Relations, 3.
34. Kaplan, M acropolitics, 62, contends that a “completely general theory would lack explanatory
power,” and advocates “movement away from general to comparative theory.”
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This is not a theoretical treatise. Rather, the objective is to consider the previous
work done in this area and to exploit the tenets of apposite theory in order to provide
some practical applications. John Weltman concludes that if system theory means nothing
more than interrelations between elements, then as a method o f analysis o f social events
the concept o f system is “both irrefutable and useless.”

An essential premise o f this

study is that application o f principles o f system theory goes beyond the mere acceptance
o f interconnections, and that the wisdom o f the adoption of a systems approach is
constructive as well as indisputable. However, further exploitation requires that this
assertion be supported.

Why a Systems Approach?
If the application o f systems theory is to move beyond the acknowledgement of
interrelated elements, then it is important to accept the other critical premise, i.e., systems
have structure, pattern and function, and that there are structural as well as functional
relations between units.36 The conduct of a proper analysis o f systems requires
simultaneous consideration of both structural and behavioral properties. While the
previously presented definitions o f systems theory included references to examinations o f
structure and function, the discussion must proceed beyond mere description and attempt
to focus on the process and the behavior of the system as a whole.

However, this

35. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations, 80. Taking a minimalist view o f systems
theory, which he describes as a “framework for explanatory thought,” he view s systems thinking as
essentially the acknowledgement o f interrelationship between components. He considers this statement o f
interrelationships is a matter o f faith that students o f system theory must subscribe to before conducting
further investigations.
36. Michael Pidwirny, “Fundamentals o f Physical Geography," http://www.physicalgeography.net/
fundamentals/4b.html (accessed 16 November 2004).
37. Structure is an essential part o f Bertanlanffy’s theory and se t o f interacting p a rts with a common
function, purpose or utility has been established as a working definition o f a system. Weltman, Systems
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requires moving beyond the confines and valid debates o f systems theory and toward
examination o f practical applications. Therefore, it is useful to consider the utilization of
a systems approach that incorporates the appropriate principles of systems theory.
This is not the first consideration o f such an approach. The intellectual foundation
for a practical application of systems theory as an organizing device responds to three
essential questions:
What is it? “An approach, paradigm, or quasi-theory; a conceptual or analytic
framework... A grouping o f organized assemblies of resources, methods, and procedures
regulated by interaction or interdependence”
What does it do? Enables the analyst to present methodically the selected data in a
coherent and logical manner
Why should an analyst use it? A systems approach facilitates the orderly comparison of
•JO

related sets o f phenomena.
Coherent, logical, orderly and organized: If a systems approach can bring these benefits
to the analysis, then it clearly is worth adoption.
A basic premise o f a systems approach is the presence o f a set o f characteristics
and properties that are common to all systems regardless of the specific domain.
Additionally, the existence of some level of organization in the world, with patterns
concepts and principles, must be accepted if the approach is to be applied to political and

Theory in International Relations, provides an excellent tutorial on the basic elements o f systems theory in
the IR context in Chapter 1.
38.
Atkins, Latin Am erica in the International P olitical System, 3. He prefers analytic fram ew ork to
organizing device. A systems approach would conform to either term.
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social processes. If so, then, “A systems analysis promises a more expansive, inclusive
and flexible theoretical structure.”39
Conducting an analysis o f national power from a systems perspective provides
several specific advantages. Advocates o f such a stratagem contend, “The systems
approach to political theory amounts to an attempt to theorize about political bodies and
political events in terms of precisely specifiable structural and dynamic characteristics.”40
A systems approach emphasizes not only the interactions between elements, but also how
the interconnections between units define the whole. Through a systems approach
examination o f interrelated variables and their response to environmental disturbances
may be achieved. With the potential value o f a system approach established, further
concentration on national power from a systems perspective may now be undertaken.
This first requires confirmation that we are, in fact, dealing with systems in assessments
o f national power.

Sources o f National Power as Systems
Anatol Rapoport provides the following criteria for the determination of the
existence o f a system: (1) a set o f identifiable elements; (2) among at least some o f these
are identifiable relations; (3) certain relations imply others; and, (4) a complex of
relations at one time implies complex o f relations at another time.41 This provides a
useful guide to test the premise that national power may be considered to exist and be
employed as systems. While seemingly intuitive, provision o f some brief examples is

39. Anatol Rapoport, G eneral Systems Theory: Essential Concepts an d Applications (Cambridge, MA:
Abacus Press, 1986). Cited in David Easton, Varieties o f P olitical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1996), 47.
40. Easton, Varieties o f P olitical Theory, 141.
41. Ibid., 129-130.
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warranted. Table 1 provides an illustrative depiction o f the U.S. system at the macro
level.

Table 1. Sample Elements
System

Identifiable Elements

Political

President
Secretary o f Defense
Secretary o f State
Cabinet level agencies
Congress
State and local governments
National political parties

Economic

Transportation infrastructure
Financial institutions
Labor Unions
Securities Exchanges
Manufacturing industries
Service industries

Military

Armed Services
Defense industries
Bases
National Guard and Reserves
Intelligence Agencies

Social

General population
Media
Racial minorities
Religious groups
Ethnic minorities

(1) A set o f identifiable elements. Using the systems o f power o f the United States as an
example, the existence o f identifiable elements within the systems is apparent. In the
discussion o f the elements o f power in Chapter II, four categories were identified:
political, economic, military, and social. I noted that this classification is somewhat
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arbitrary and the number o f systems may be greater.42 However, for purposes o f this
analysis and the proposed methodology, the number o f categories is less important than
the framework they provide. If the overall system o f power is segregated into these four
broad categories, determination o f identifiable elements within each o f these groupings is
not a difficult task.
In an observation that I will expand upon later, the categorization is somewhat
arbitrary, and entities could be included in multiple systems. For example, defense
industries could reasonably be placed in the Economic or Military blocks. While some of
these, e.g., the President, represent an element that is not amenable to additional
reduction, others such as Congress may be further broken down into party and regional
blocs, committees (and subcommittees), and eventually to individual members. Hence,
the first criterion for a system has been met.
(2) Among at least some o f these, are identifiable relations. Again, meeting this
requirement is not problematic. Although the President, in his role as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, may employ military power, he acts through his Secretary o f
Defense, who will in turn task the regional commanders, who then will task their Service
component forces. However, the power of the President is not unlimited. Through the
constitutional powers to declare war, and more practically their ability to appropriate or
withhold funding, the Congress clearly interacts with the Executive Branch.
(3) Certain relations imply others. Assuming the existence of this President-Congress
relationship within the political domain, and if a relationship between the Congress and

42.
The concept development and experimentation efforts o f the U.S. Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) and N A TO ’s Allied Command Transformation use these four, but add Infrastructure and
Information. Most infrastructure elements could also be categorized as military or economic; and
information is a broad area that can be included in social or political. This study will limit the numbers to
four in order to simplify the illustration.
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the defense industries has been established (normally through defense related activity
within the districts o f members), then a relationship between defense industries and the
President exists.
So based on Rapoport’s criteria, the structure and function o f power within the
United States may be regarded as a system. Using the conclusions reached in earlier
sections o f this chapter, this may be best described as an open system, i.e., multiple inputs
and outputs from and into the environment, including some ability to respond to
feedback. These inputs and outputs are broadly defined. The former include “any event
external to the system that alters, modifies, or affects the system in any way.”43 In the
case of political systems, outputs may be in the form o f decisions or actions. While
critical to this proposition, this conclusion is hardly momentous. Therefore, this premise
requires further development to become more than a blinding flash o f the obvious.
Having established that sources o f national power operate as systems, the next step is to
consider structure and function in more detail and to provide more granularity to the
model. This may be achieved through consideration o f the sources o f power as complex
adaptive systems.

The Complex Adaptive System
Prior to an examination and assessment of its potential, the concept o f the
complex adaptive system (CAS) must be defined. This requires a return to some o f the
principles of complexity and nonlinearity provided in Chapter III. Sanders describes
complex adaptive systems as “Open nonlinear systems that are constantly processing and

43.
Easton, Varieties o f P olitical Theory, 151. Effects transmitted across a boundary are outputs o f one
system and inputs to the other.
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incorporating information.”44 This means that CASs change and evolve in reaction to
external stimuli, as well as to feedback within the system. Gell-Mann offers that a CAS
“acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that
environment.”45 These are not isolated entities. “A complex adaptive system (CAS) may
be an integral part o f another CAS, or it may be a loose aggregation o f complex adaptive
systems, forming a composite CAS.”46
Most o f the essential components o f modem societies may be depicted as systems.
Sophisticated communications, transportation infrastructure, information management,
manufacturing, distribution of resources, and health systems are but a few. An example is
warranted to reinforce the premise that elements of national power display the
characteristics o f a CAS outlined above.
CASs change and evolve in reaction to external stimuli. In capitalist economic
systems the law o f supply and demand predominates; securities prices reflect this
condition. The environment provides the primary stimulus to the system. In order to
preclude the system from descending into chaos, control mechanisms have been
incorporated to suspend trading in specific circumstances.
A CAS is constantly processing and incorporating information. Due to advances
in information systems technology, transactions in large stock exchanges occur near
instantaneously and prices fluctuate at the same rate.

44. Sanders, Strategic Thinking an d the New Science, 69. These systems “exist at the boundary between
chaos and order.” Waldrop, Complexity, 330, observes that in a CAS “agents are constantly adapting to
each other and things are always in flux.”
45. Gell-Mann, Quark an d the Jaguar, 17. The result is the determination o f regularities in that
information that condensed into a “schema” or model that influences actions. C A S’s are not static, or
limited to a specific purpose. “Complex adaptive systems ...have a general tendency to generate other such
systems” (ibid., 19).
46. Gell-Mann, “Simple and the Complex,” 10.
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A CAS may be an integral part o f another CAS. The economic system, as are the
political, social, and military systems, is one o f the fundamental elements o f the larger
complex adaptive system that represents the overall system o f power. Accordingly, based
at least on the criteria established above, sources o f power may be regarded as operating
as a CAS. However, additional outlooks should be considered.
Czerwinski identifies several basic attributes o f the CAS. Among these are
properties: aggregation, nonlinearity, flows and diversity; and, mechanisms: tagging,
internal models, and building blocks47 Rihani assigns the following traits to CAS:
(1) Active internal elements that furnish sufficient local variety to enable the system to
survive as it adapts to unforeseen circumstances
(2) System’s elements are lightly but not sparsely connected, and
(3) Elements interact according to simple rules to provide the energy needed to maintain
•

•

stable global patterns, as opposed to rigid order or chaos

48

Again, fulfillment o f these criteria may be provided by an example, this time using the
U.S. military system. Using the above-delineated traits:
(1) The doctrine o f centralized control and decentralized execution is fundamental to the
U.S. military and provides the individual assigned on scene leadership, from squad and
platoon leader to battalion commander, with guidance; but, also delegates to them the
authority to make decisions based on evolving local conditions.

47. Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on N onlinearity in M ilitary Affairs
(Washington, DC: The National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 14.
48. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 81. He later adds, “The process by
which CAS evolve, survive, and gather information is a slow activity that involves the gradual assembly o f
successive layers o f elaboration” (ibid., 87).
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(2) The American military’s adoption o f jointness, i.e., the full integration o f Service
combat capabilities, while maintaining autonomy for personnel and procurement, is an
example o f this type o f connectivity.
(3) Joint doctrine is purposefully kept at a low enough level to avoid deleterious rigidity,
and a sufficiently high level to prevent unnecessary disorder, confusion, and battlefield
anarchy.49
Based on these traits, we may characterize national power as being exercised
through complex adaptive systems. However, that recognition, while useful for
understanding, does not reveal universal truths, or in itself provide tangible benefit to the
decision-maker. Several issues remain unaddressed.
Sanders provides: “CAS are open nonlinear systems that are constantly processing and
incorporating information and exist at the boundary between chaos and order.”50 Any
new patterns that emerge in a CAS do so because of adaptation. Variations in prevailing
conditions result in many minor changes and a few mutations, but it is not possible to
predict the outcome in advance. The complex and dynamic environment in which
systems o f power operate rules out a precise control function. Therefore, acceptance of
the CAS model may enhance understanding; however, it cannot completely solve the
problem o f the prediction of effects o f actions. So if the potential for accurate prediction
is remote, what benefits can the adoption of the o f the CAS model provide?

49.
D efense Technical Information Center, “Joint Publication 3-1, Doctrine for Joint Operations, ”
http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/ new_pubs/jpl_ 0 1 _ l.p d f (accessed 22 March 2005) provides the
essentials o f joint doctrine for the U .S Armed Services. “It addresses the translation o f national strategy
into assigned m issions and military objectives, capabilities, and concepts o f employment for component
forces in joint operations. It also details the principles o f command organization for all aspects o f joint
force operations.”
50. Sanders, Strategic Thinking an d the New Science, 69.
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Advocates of the CAS model suggest a paradigm shift that “treats nations and
their evolution as CASs.”51 They contend that we need devices and models that can
contend with complexity and change in international affairs. While not elegant, the CAS
provides a suitable model or metaphor upon which to base assessments. Support for its
adoption includes the argument that “the flexibility o f the CAS approach facilitates
•

•

•

modeling states and nations as emergent phenomena rather than reified entities.”

59

Some observe that a CAS can have lever points and can exhibit coherence under
change. Knowledge o f these critical points could produce guidelines for development o f
applications that can enhance the understanding o f systems operation.

Mitleton-Kelly

views theories of complexity as providing a conceptual framework and a thought process
and prefers the term Complex Evolving Systems (CES), which she describes as broader
than the common understanding of CAS.54 While the operation o f the system at all levels
may not be possible, “globally the system exhibits an orderly pattern.”55 The common
theme is that the CAS model is the best available depiction of the manner in which
organizations operate and respond to their environment. However, designation as best
available does not necessarily connote that the use of CAS principles is appropriate. Even
those who are strong advocates o f the use o f CAS as an analytical model acknowledge its
limitations.

51. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and D evelopm ent Practice, 234.
52. Cederman, Em ergent Actors in World Politics, 7. He contends that the CAS provides a suitable
model or metaphor upon which to base assessments.
53. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, 13.
54. Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems an d Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, 23-26. This CES
includes additional characteristics o f com plex systems and emphasizes interrelationships and
interdependence. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory an d Developm ent Practice, 7, believes that this ability
to evolve is an inherent characteristic and when systems are capable o f evolution, they become CAS. This
is a slow and iterative activity.
55. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and D evelopm ent Practice, 7.
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Rihani accepts that evolution, constant adaptation, and accumulation o f
regularities represent the causes o f the chronic state o f unpredictable flux that
characterizes all CASs. He identifies critical factors that conspire to make
unpredictability a standard component of CASs: “even infinitesimal disturbances in
initial conditions can be magnified by positive feedback to induce large global
changes.”56 He does not conclude that these phenomena would, in theory, be
unpredictable, but massive computing power is necessary to provide the knowledge upon
which to base any viable prognostications. The conclusion must be that while the CAS
concept does not in itself resolve the problem o f predictability o f outcomes, it may
provide a useful model for understanding the employment of national power.
This exceedingly condensed and restricted examination o f systems was necessary
to respond to the key question: Can the sources o f national power be examined and
understood through utilization o f a systems approach? By any accepted definition and
criteria, power may be viewed as being employed as a system with inputs, processes and
outputs. While the specific processes may vary between systems, the structure and
function o f these systems have many characteristics in common. Although feedback may
be provided thorough a closed loop system, these open systems interact and respond to
stimuli from the environment. Therefore, examination through a systems approach can
contribute to enhanced understanding o f both the structure and function o f national
power. That said, every model has its limitations.
It may be that a systems approach may be no more than a tool for examination of
a large number or interrelated entities. However, if it can achieve this objective, systems
theory can make significant contributions to the understanding o f the effects o f actions. If
56. Ibid.
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a systems approach and the complex adaptive system model can provide only partial
progress along this path, then additional means must be devised in order to reach the
objective. The key is to drill deeper into one o f the fundamental characteristics o f
systems, i.e., the interrelationships between entities, and to explore the possibilities for
understanding the whole through study o f its elements. Accordingly, a system o f systems
approach may be able to provide this essential holistic methodology. The section that
follows, therefore, will begin to respond to the second key question presented in the
introduction to this chapter: Can the interaction between elements (actors or entities)
within a system be determined using a system o f systems model?

Assessment through a System of Systems
Further progress toward understanding requires an organized and effective
analytic framework for examination o f the elements o f national power. The nonlinear
nature of relationships between elements within the overall system o f power mandates
this type o f approach. The task becomes more daunting, since these interrelationships
occur within and across system boundaries. However, adopting a different perspective
can mitigate the degree o f difficulty.
A statement on terminology must be made for clarity. Although the political,
economic, military, and social categories could be designated as sub-systems of the larger
system o f national power, the term system will continue to be applied to them since they
display all the previously identified characteristics of systems and should not be
considered merely as parts o f the larger system.57 The critical issue here is not the number

57.
The analogy is to the human body. Although the endocrine, circulatory and respiratory systems
cannot function independently o f the larger human system, they are commonly referred to as system s due to
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or limits o f these systems; it is the fact that the systems overlap and elements in one
system interact with elements in others. Consequently, actions can alter the behavior o f
those systems as well as the overall system as a whole. Hence, the proper depiction of
national power is a system o f systems.
If national power is viewed as a collection o f subsystems, then a decomposition of
these into smaller parts, which are more amenable to comprehension, emerges as an
option. In a reductionist approach, these sections would be examined independently and
the results would be brought together to form the entirety of the system. The following
illustration depicts the overall system o f power as being comprised o f independent
subsystems. The barriers between these are rigid and impermeable. Figure 6 depicts
system from a reductionist approach.

Political

Military

Economic

Social

Figure 6. Reductionist Approach

their structure, function, and interconnectedness o f elements. Hence, the human body is an ideal example o f
a system o f systems. The methodology that I provide in Chapter V will use this convention, and refer to
divisions below the level o f political, military, social, and econom ic systems as subsystems.
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The oval represents the overall system of power; the rectangles, the four sub-systems
described earlier. Predicting the effects o f actions that are designed to influence this
system would be possible, since the whole is merely the sum o f the parts. An action, for
example, against a military entity, would not be expected to have an effect on a social or
economic element. However, this type o f linear model is not representative o f the
existing geo-political environment.

A more accurate depiction follows in Figure 7.

Political
Economic,

Military

Social

Figure 7. Systems Approach

Since these systems float and overlap, and the relationships are nonlinear and multiple,
prediction o f the effects o f actions becomes exceptionally difficult, since an action taken
to influence one system will have an impact on the others. Herein resides the critical
dilemma.
Chapter II examined how nations, alone or as part o f alliances, attempt to
influence the behavior of other nations. While the defeat, or deterrence, of the military
forces o f an adversary is the principal and most visible manifestation o f coercive power,
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other entities may also be targeted. An embargo or blockade, with the intent of
influencing the economic or social systems, was shown to be a common instance o f this
strategy. Part of the rationale for the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign against
Germany in World War II was to damage the factories providing material support for the
Wermacht, as well as to diminish civilian morale in the attacked cities. Hence, this
interrelationship across systems is not a totally new concept. While the existence o f these
linkages between elements has been recognized previously, exploitation o f this condition
has been irregular and disjointed and has lacked practical tools and doctrine for
employment.58
An earlier discussion ascertained that the placement o f an entity within a specific
system o f national power was relatively arbitrary. That is, an individual, organization, or
physical element could reside within several systems. For example, in a theocracy a
religious leader could be an element o f the social, political and/or economic systems.
Indeed the number and boundaries of these systems themselves may vary. Four systems
were utilized in earlier illustrations. However, it was noted that there could be more or
less. A lack o f precision in placement is not fatal to the analysis because it is the
interaction between elements and their impact on the system o f power as a whole that is
most critical.
Singer advocates a systemic and holistic approach and warns against
inappropriate segmentation and rigid boundaries between systems. Additionally he
provides the rationale for concentrating on the interactions between entities. “We observe

58.
See Edward J. Felker, Airpower, Chaos an d Infrastructure: Lords o f the Rings (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 3. In the m id-1980’s U.S. Air Force Checkmate group studied
Soviet fuel systems, and the link between these systems and Soviet military doctrine. Examining these
linkages, he contends, “The vulnerability o f an entire system (the adversary’s operational and doctrinal
culture) is determined by the vulnerability o f nodes linking the system together.”
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structural, cultural and physical properties o f a system in order to describe it in being; we
observe the rates and direction o f change o f such properties in order to describe or predict
what it is becoming; and we observe their propensities to interact with each other and to
respond to external inputs in order to predict, and partially explain, the system’s modes of
behaving.”59 Hence, the objective continues to be the elusive ability to anticipate system
behavior in response to external stimuli and the environment.
The limited predictive capability o f the CAS model has been established. Since
there do not appear to be technological solutions in the near term to provide the requisite
level o f knowledge to greatly alter this condition, a remaining option is to look at the
elements of these systems as a source of information about effects o f actions. Again, an
illustration is useful. Table 2 provides some examples o f various high level entities that
could be included within the four selected systems.
The existence of connections between entities within each system was briefly
introduced in Chapter II and is both readily evident and o f great importance to this
approach. Linkages between the media and the political leadership; factories and the
military forces; and, universities and political parties are common in most societies
(although the nature of these relationships will vary greatly). Earlier arguments
established that nations employ power through systems that are complex, adaptive, and
open. The basic open system model depicts multiple inputs being processed by the
system with multiple outputs produced. Any ability to predict the nature o f these outputs
requires near perfect knowledge o f the inputs and the processes o f the system. A degree
o f knowledge o f the operation o f a complex system is a requirement for prediction o f

59.
Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems,” 7, warns against “Horizon-narrowing,
rigidifying mechanistic reductionism.”
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future behavior. Since that level o f information is not currently available, an alternative
means must be employed. Linkages between entities may provide some utility.

Table 2. Entities within Systems
System

Generic Elements

Political

Elected officials
Career government employees
Political parties
Local and regional government

Economic

Banks
Stock exchanges
Factories
Seaports
Airports
Railroads
Roads
Electrical power grid

Military

Ships
Aircraft
M issiles
Senior leadership
Command and Control

Social

Media
Ethnic groups
Tribes
Religious groups
Artists
Universities

An example directly related to the application o f coercive power from the Balkans
follows. A stated U.N. objective was to prevent the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the
ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If described from a systems perspective, specific
elements and nodes could be categorized as in Table 3.60

60.
Specific military objectives included forcing the withdrawal o f Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from
the 20-kilomenter total exclusion zone around Sarajevo. See Robert C. Owen, D eliberate Force: A Case
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Table 3. Categorization of Elements
Generic Element

Targeted Node

Political

Elected officials

Slobodan M ilosevic

Economic

Seaports

Port o f Dubrovnik

Military

Air Forces

MIG-21 interceptors

Social

Media

Yugoslav Television

System

U.N. sanctioned actions targeted each o f these, whether through the actual downing of
aircraft, to enforcement o f embargoes, to implementation of information campaigns.
Clearly there are connections within systems, e.g., rail lines to seaports used for export;
radar facilities for fighter aircraft; and, between political parties and the elected officials.
However, due to the connections between the President, the military forces, economic
interests, and the press, actions taken against one o f these also resulted in effects within
the other systems. As Jervis observes, “We can never do merely one thing.” 61 That is, an
action taken is likely to have effects that are either unanticipated, undesired or both.
For example, while the NATO bombing o f Bosnian Serb military forces may have
had the desired effect o f disrupting their ethnic cleansing campaign, the result was also
that the Yugoslav press resented this intervention and worked to influence public opinion
to back the political leadership. Similarly, the UN imposed economic embargo served for

Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (M axwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, 2000), for an excellent collection o f studies related to the employment o f air power as a coercive
force.
61.
Jervis, Systems Effects, 10. He attributes the statement to Garret Hardin, “The Cybernetics o f
Competition,” P erspectives in Biology and M edicine 7 (Autumn 1963), 79, who argues that there is not “a
highly specific agent which w ill do only one thing.”
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a time to enhance the popular support for the political regime.62 Optimization o f these
coercive acts required near perfect information; hence, any prediction as to the change in
behavior o f the political leadership resulting from the embargo was at best informed
conjecture. This resulted from the multiple linkages o f entities within and across system
borders.
There is a need for an approach that can provide some insight into this
phenomenon o f secondary effects. This requires a means of employment of the complex
adaptive systems model, one that focuses on elements within and across systems. A
methodology based on the system o f systems construct, with concentration on linkages
within and across system boundaries can fulfill this requirement.

Summation
This chapter evaluated the potential for a systems model to contribute to an
understanding o f the sources of national power. Since the term is broadly utilized, this
initially required synthesis o f definitions o f systems to establish one that is best suited to
this task. This effort produced a set o f interacting parts with a common function, purpose
or utility. An examination of indicators o f when a system exists concluded that a system
must be more than interconnected parts; it must also produce a whole that is different
than the sum of its elements.
The rationale for the excursion into the principles o f nonlinearity conducted in
Chapter III was that systems, in the context o f this study of national power, are nonlinear.
Hence, an understanding of the principles of nonlinearity is critical to any analysis of

62.
These examples are utilized for establishing familiarity with the potential for unintended effects. I
will examine the secondary effects o f actions in significantly more detail in the cases studies.
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systems. Some systems were shown to be capable o f self-regulation, and study o f these
systems should include an assessment of any internal controlling mechanisms.
A basic tenet of general system theory is that there is a set o f near universal
conditions that can provide a framework for understanding across a wide range of
disciplines. Through a systems approach, examination o f interrelated variables and their
response to environmental disturbances may be achieved. Despite the limitation inherent
in any paradigm, utilization of the systems model in the pursuit o f comprehension of
secondary effects remains a legitimate design.
Upon establishment of the requisite theoretical foundation, the analysis turned to
focus on the potential for exploitation o f systems theory to determine if examination
through a systems approach can contribute to enhanced understanding o f both the
structure and function o f systems o f national power. When compared to previously
established criteria, sources of national power were recognized to operate as systems.
Investigations in pursuit o f a more directly applicable model determined that
national power may be characterized more accurately as being exercised through
complex adaptive systems, and that the CAS model is the best available depiction o f the
manner in which organizations function and respond to their environment. Therefore, the
response to the first question is yes. The sources o f national power can be examined and
understood through utilization o f a systems approach.
An objective o f this chapter was to confirm that systems could be the core o f
further analysis related to development o f this proposition and methodology. To this end,
the complex adaptive system emerged as a likely model. Although the CAS may provide
a constructive model for insight into the effects resulting from the employment of
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national power, it in itself does not resolve the dilemma o f predictability o f outcomes. An
ability to predict the behavior o f a complex adaptive system requires near perfect
knowledge of the initial conditions, the structure and functioning o f the system, and the
environment. That degree o f information is not currently available, nor is it likely to be in
the near term. Therefore, additional methods o f analysis must be employed.
I determined that systems of national power overlap and that an individual entity
could be properly placed within different categories. The assignment o f elements within a
particular system is not critical, since the connections between entities and the impact on
the entire system o f power are most important. Finally, I explained how the system o f
systems construct provides an appropriate basis for a methodology that can contribute to
the understanding o f the secondary effects o f actions.
The introduction to this chapter stated that I could provide only a partial response
to the question: Can the interaction between elements (actors or entities) within a system
be determined using a system o f systems model? While the theoretical underpinnings and
assessment of the complex adaptive system model and the system o f systems construct
support this contention, I have not yet provided sufficient evidence that these may be
exploited and transformed into some useful tools for the decision-maker.
The discussions contained in the two previous chapters framed the problem of
secondary effects and examined some intellectual efforts that may contribute to its
mitigation. Since the dilemma inherent in determination of the ancillary consequences of
actions does not fit neatly into any one existing academic domain, I selected the concepts
that may offer elucidation from multiple disciplines. The next tasks are to draw upon
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these ideas, propose a practicable methodology, and illustrate its potential in a series o f
case studies. Those are the objectives o f the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER V
A METHODOLOGY FOR ANTICIPATION OF SECONDARY EFFECTS

I asserted in Chapter II that employment o f coercive power was likely to continue
as an element o f foreign policy and that these coercive actions would produce ancillary as
well as the desired primary effects. This is due to the linkages between elements within
and across the systems o f power and the nonlinear nature of the relationships between
them. The lack o f an adequate means o f determining the nature o f the consequences of
actions led to the conclusion that an investigation into various approaches to nonlinearity
in multiple academic disciplines was fundamental to further analysis.
This was accomplished through the examination o f nonlinearity that was
presented in Chapter III. Complexity, if viewed as a condition and not a theory, emerged
as the most appropriate model to pursue. However, the mere acceptance o f a condition
lacks sufficient structure for fruitful examination. This situation severely limits practical
applications. Hence, a linkage o f complexity to another approach, i.e., systems theory,
was determined to be a rational path. After the subsequent discussions related to the
systems approach in Chapter IV, I contended that the complex adaptive system provides a
satisfactory model for future analysis and that a system o f systems construct affords a
means for the assessment of power.
Since an ability to predict system behavior requires near perfect knowledge, and
that level of information is not likely to be available, then attainment o f a total
understanding of system operation and behavior is not a realistically achievable goal.
While the potential for the secondary effects o f actions is not contentious, workable
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methods to contend with this phenomenon have not yet been provided. Therefore, some
means to overcome the predicament generated by the existence o f complexity is required.
The linkages between entities (actors) with the systems that comprise a nation’s overall
system of power surfaced as a likely foundation upon which to base a methodology.
With the requisite intellectual groundwork and a basic understanding o f the
theoretical underpinnings now provided, the proposal o f a workable scheme with which
to confront the challenges provided by the phenomenon o f secondary effects o f actions
may now be undertaken.
This chapter initially will restate and strengthen the rationale for development o f
such a capacity. Next, I will address the goals and objectives, i.e., what capabilities a tool
should provide. Following that presentation, I will describe the expected outcomes o f the
process and explain how these can contribute the identified goals and objectives. This
will segue into a delineation of the steps required to produce this increased awareness of
ancillary effects. Since there is no pretense that this methodology can precisely meet all
the needs o f the decision-maker in this environment, I will also address its limitations.
Richards succinctly delineates the rationale for this effort: “Nonlinear models will
get nowhere by merely presenting more and more complex information. The challenge is
drawing inferences from the complex dynamic output.” 1 The overall purpose o f the
aforementioned steps is to provide additional evidence to support the contention that the
interaction between elements, actors, or entities within a system can be determined using
a system o f systems construct; and, that this effort can provide a metaphor for increased
understanding of the secondary effects resulting from coercive actions. Moving beyond

1.
Richards, P olitical Com plexity, 16. She adds: “The challenge is to think about how one m oves from
merely presenting an example to actual scientific inference.”
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the consequential goal of developing increased understanding o f system behavior, this
chapter will propose a practicable scheme for the assessment o f power and anticipation of
secondary effects through a system o f systems construct.

Rationale and Objectives
Nations have long been engaged in the quest for effective means with which to
examine and assess the power resources o f potential adversaries. I argued in Chapter II
that there are no practical models currently available to decision-makers that focus on the
unintended, unexpected, or undesired effects resulting from actions designed to influence
the behavior o f other actors. This is because existing methodologies cannot provide the
requisite holistic knowledge o f the relationship between elements within and across
complex systems. Traditionally, assessments are based on treating the sources of power,
independently, and consequently do not provide an accurate portrayal o f the adversary. If
employing an attrition-based model, this shortcoming is manageable. However, if the
focus is on effects, rather than targets, a holistic view o f the adversary is required. This is
the key shortfall that this methodology is intended to meet.
Observing shortfalls in the Kosovo operation, Joseph Nye contends that American
foreign policy should “Develop potential rules that allow the United States to meld its
strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests into an effective foreign policy.” While
that is a laudable and probably uncontroversial proposition, the execution o f such a policy
requires knowledge o f the systems upon which those power assets will be employed.
Historically, the focus has been on military capabilities, with other areas considered only

2. Joseph S. Jr. N ye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999):
35.
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for their contributions to military operations, e.g., the industrial might o f Krupp industries
in Wilhelmian Germany. However, the nature o f conflict in the twenty-first century
suggests that this approach is no longer appropriate. As a former senior U.S. military
commander observes, “Future military operations will be overlaid with political,
humanitarian and economic considerations.”
Nations behave and operate as complex adaptive systems, with interconnected,
and at times interdependent, elements. The number and nature of these connections can
be immense and the knowledge management task, insurmountable. Hence, the problems
facing the decision-maker related to the determination o f effects are considerable.
Robert Jervis identified a most important reason for the inability to formulate
policy effectively. That is, any attempt to alter one element o f a system will result in
changes in the other components with which it interacts. Consequently, it is extremely
difficult to distinguish between “causes” and “effects,” since initial behaviors influence
subsequent ones. Therefore, outcomes do not always conform to intentions.4 The
resultant quandary is that even if we can predict with an exceptionally high degree of
certainty that action A, will result in effect B, the problem of what other events will occur
remains unaddressed. As affirmed earlier, we can never do only one thing.
In conditions o f linearity, if an action is taken against a component in the system,
the effect o f that action could be understood and possible secondary effects predicted.
Because systems of national power are complex adaptive systems, and relationships
between elements are nonlinear, we can recognize only that one element is related to

3. Anthony Zinni, “A Commander’s Reflections,” Proceedings 126, no. 7 (July 2000): 34.
4. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 582. He notes, “in a system,
actions have unintended effects on the actor, others, and the system as a whole, which means that one
cannot infer results from desires and expectations, and vice versa” (ibid., 578).
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another, that interactions are likely, and that secondary effects may emerge; even if their
nature is not determinable.5 Hence, prediction of every effect that may result from an
action is not possible. That condition is accepted. However, the premise that recognition
o f this situation must lead to the conclusion that there is no feasible way to generate
insight into secondary effects is not.
The stratagem is to attack this condition of complexity with simplicity, i.e., to
present the dilemma and a possible contribution to resolution in an uncomplicated
manner, using a readily understandable and generally applicable technique. This is not an
unprecedented approach; decomposition o f the complex into smaller and more reasonably
understood segments is central to scientific methods. However, the danger o f regressing
into a reductionist approach described in Chapter II is apparent. Therefore, care will be
taken to abide by Rapoporf s admonition, “Embrace simplicity, but distrust it.”6 With that
warning firmly in mind, I will turn to a more detailed explanation o f the extant situation
facing the decision-maker. The objective is to identify the most critical shortfalls that
currently confound analysis. Only then may I move on to presentation o f a process that
may provide a contribution to the resolution of the problems o f secondary effects.

5. Axelrod, Com plexity o f Cooperation, 1997), 3. Complexity theory involves the interactions o f
multiple actors. Acknowledging that managing the interactions between numerous actors and interactions is
too difficult for mathematical solutions, he advocates use o f computer simulation as a primary research
tool.
6. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 23, credits Rapoport with the warning. Sutherland adds: “Abstractions
properly applied, become engines o f stability.” Supporting this approach, Cohen and Stewart, Collapse o f
Chaos, 3, contend, “com plexity may be unpredictable in detail, but its general course may be
comprehensible and foreseeable. Simplicity o f form, function or behavior emerge from com plexities at
lower levels because o f the action o f external constraints.” They have introduced the term simplexity, or the
“tendency o f simple rules to emerge from underlying disorder and complexity, in systems whose large
scale structure is independent o f the fine details o f their substructure.”
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The Need for Enhanced Understanding
This is an appropriate time to introduce the use o f the term node, which will serve
as an inclusive term for elements, actors, and entities o f the system. Hence, nodes are
fundamental to the process. Nodes are tangible, and represent persons, places, or things
upon which actions may be taken in order to influence system behavior. Examples
include government officials, religious leaders, transportation infrastructure, financial
institutions, and military command and control facilities. A point that is important to the
proposed methodology is that not all elements, actors, and entities are nodes.
Consequently, determination o f when an entity is to be designated as a node is vital to the
process; and I will expand on the term and its utility later. However, this initial level of
detail is sufficient for the immediately ensuing discussions. The following illustrations
provide a simplified view o f the problem facing the development o f an understanding o f
secondary effects of actions.
In a simple linear relationship, as depicted in Figure 8, an action taken against a
node can be expected to produce an effect. As with all linear relationships, the effect is
projected to be directly proportional to the intensity of the action.
However, this type o f simple linear relationship is rarely exhibited in systems of
national power. This is because it is exceptionally difficult to identify an element o f a
system that is not is some way connected to another. Attempts to segregate any individual
actor within the political system, for example, would meet with frustration, and most
likely with failure. Similarly, a completely isolated economic, military, or social node
defies unearthing. Figure 9 provides a case where two nodes are interrelated. For
example, a military action that is designed to degrade an electrical power production
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facility may be successful in that aim, but if that facility also is related to a hospital, as
the only electricity to it, then there will be a deleterious effect on that medical facility.

Effect 1

Action
Node

Simple linear: An action applied to Node A will
produce an effect

Figure 8. Simple Linear Relationship

Effect 2
Interrelated

Effect 1

Action
Node

Simple nonlinear: I f there is a direct relationship
between Node A and Node B, then an action applied
against Node A may produce an effect on Node B

Figure 9. Simple Nonlinear Relationship
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Adding additional complications to the analysis, if a third node-to-node
relationship exists, the effects produced by the original action may influence the
interrelated nodes, which in turn produces effects that may further influence the
interrelated nodes in other ways. The result is a set of effects that is beyond determination
or prediction. Although the use o f computers may permit an enhanced ability to display
the relationships, even as few o f three objects makes the number o f permutations
unmanageable. Figure 10 provides a simplified illustration o f this phenomenon.

Effect 2
Effects 3, 4, ...
Effect 1

Action
Node

Complex Nonlinear: If there is a direct relationship between
Node A and Node B, and between Node B and Node C, then an
action applied against Node A may produce effects that
influence Nodes B and C, which results in influences on Nodes
A and B, and ultimately results in an indeterminate succession of
effects
Figure 10. Complex Nonlinear Relationship

As illustrated, the interactions between as few as three entities are nonlinear, and
therefore are not disposed to precise prediction. This is the central problem that is the
object o f this analysis and the main rationale for development o f the methodology, and is
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likely to have scores or hundreds o f nodes, and the ability to maintain awareness of their
interactions becomes exceptionally difficult.
Following on from the previous example, assume that the hospital is linked to a
certain ethnic group by virtue o f being the major provider of essential medical services
for an ethnic minority. Also assume that an action, e.g., destroying an electrical power
station, is taken that has an effect on the hospital. The level o f support o f that group for
the objectives of the nation or nations taking that action is likely to change.
Murray Gell-Mann provided the following illustrations o f the many possible
patterns o f connections.7 In View A o f Figure 11, the dots represent a collection o f eight
nodes; View B displays a few instances o f connections between nodes. At this point, with
very few connections, expectations o f secondary effects are relatively easily managed.

A

B

Figure 11. Few Interconnections between Nodes

In view C, presented in Figure 12, the number of connections and possible
secondary effects is increased. View D displays all possible connections between nodes.
The secondary effects o f a single action upon a single node become indeterminable.

7. Gell-Mann, Quark an d the Jaguar, 31.
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C

D

Figure 12. Multiple Connections Between Nodes

The purpose of the above discussion and examples was to reinforce the assertion
that accurate prognostication of ancillary effects resulting from actions intended to
influence a complex adaptive system is not feasible. Although precise prediction of
secondary effects may not be possible, this does not mean that confronting the problem
cannot provide benefits. There is a valid requirement for methods to assist the decision
maker in dealing with this condition. Determination o f what they should provide, i.e.,
what information can be useful to the analyst, should precede development o f such tools.

Capability Needs
Confronting the issue o f the effects of actions, a senior military analyst offers that
an effective strategy must incorporate an understanding o f the interests and incentives of
the political leadership and knowledge o f the decision process within that structure. He
cautions, “efforts to map out the structure of an organization or system are an essential
precursor to any attempt to exert influence on that system.”8 Rosenau adds, “We do not
have techniques for analyzing the simultaneity o f events such that the full array o f the
8.
Spencer Abbot, “Airpower Strategy and the Problem o f Coercion,” in Immaculate Warfare, ed.
Stephen D. Wrange (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 34.
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interconnections and feedback loops are identified.”9 Byrne observes, “we need
descriptions o f system characteristics which consist of something more that the mere
addition o f the properties o f the elements that compose the system.” 10 Demchak contends
“the goal is to seek out the minimal set o f underlying rules that govern the surprising
outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines o f likely
outcomes—the “trends”— in advance.11 Therefore, based on these assertions, any selected
methodology should be able to provide: (1) a view o f the structure and functioning o f the
system; (2) an ability to identify key connections between elements; and most
importantly, (3) a means to do all this while maintaining a holistic perspective.
These are not necessarily mutually supporting tasks. Focus on structure and
element interrelationships can result in a loss o f concentration on the overall systems
perspective that has been determined to be essential to understanding. Therefore, an
essential question emerges: Can an intellectual grasp of system structure and functions be
combined with identification of the interconnections between nodes to provide the
holistic knowledge that has been identified as the key to a system o f systems construct?
Structure and Function
An organization’s structure may be depicted through the use o f charts and
graphics that display the hierarchy of elements. This type of a display is a hallmark of
most any government or commercial bureaucracy. However, formal organization wiring
9. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 82. He believes that the focus should be on
determining the long-term transitions.
10. Byrne, Com plexity Theory an d the S ocial Sciences, 68. He continues, “The world does consist o f
things which contain things and we need to know both about the properties o f the things contained and the
things containing, and how the one set relates to the other.”
11. Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 224. She considers unintended
secondary effects as “surprises,” and briefly discusses a branch o f complexity studies known as “surprise
theory.” An important characteristic o f complexity is that it produces surprise. Surprise is greatest in
complex systems. Her discussion o f surprise and “rogue outcomes” is o f significant value to intellectual
excursions into this area.
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diagrams rarely provide the total picture. Rather, the informal relationships and networks
oftentimes surpass the official configuration in importance. As noted earlier, structure is
normally easier to depict and understand than is function. In addition, as Zeng asserts,
“the exact functional forms o f social and political relationships are rarely, if ever,
known.” 12 However, despite these qualifiers, it is still possible to make some
determinations about structure and function; hence, determination o f these characteristics
normally represents the initial steps in most assessments.
Analysis o f the structure and functioning o f a system is a common task in the
intelligence community. Indeed, recent comments regarding the employment of coercive
power include: “Any effort to target decision-making processes with air power, however,
requires a fundamental understanding of not only the characteristics of the targeted actor,
but of the structure and dynamics o f organizations.” 13 There is nothing new or
transformational in recognition o f the requirement.
Although an essential part of the analysis, the development o f an understanding of
the structure and function of the systems is an embedded part o f current assessments.
Included in these are determinations of system inputs and outputs as well as organization
and role. Even the most basic and unclassified assessments o f power, such as those
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, provide this basic data.14 These appraisals
have an existing set o f processes and methodologies; however, there is no need to

12. Langche Zeng, “Neural Network Models for Political Analysis,” in P olitical Complexity: Nonlinear
M odels o f Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000), 239.
13. Spencer Abbot, “Airpower Strategy and the Problem o f Coercion,” 33. He later adds, “A detailed
analysis o f the means by which an opposing leadership structure seeks to accomplish its political, strategic
ands personal objectives should be made in advance o f air campaign planning” (ibid., 44).
14. The CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.gov (accessed 1 April 2005), provides this type o f information
on essentially every nation. Similar information is available on multiple government and commercial sites.
Clearly, this is not adequate for a sophisticated assessment as evidenced by the large and expensive
intelligence agencies in existence throughout the world.
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elaborate on these further. The less developed, but more innovative and important aspect
o f the analysis is the identification o f nodes and the connections between them.

Nodal Relationships
It is time to elaborate more expansively on the use of nodes as the basic element
of analysis. As with many other terms used in this treatise, node has a variety of
meanings dependent upon context. For purposes o f this analysis, a node is a nexus; a
point o f connection or a link, at which subsidiary points originate or center. Nodes are
junctions, intersections and leverage points, and are important due to their connections to
other nodes and their potential to affect system behavior.
Earlier I asserted that nodes are tangible entities, elements, or actors, but that not
all of these would always be identified as nodes. Decisions regarding inclusion o f an
entity in the listing of nodes are not totally objective; their basis must be the expertise,
experience, and judgment o f the analyst. While it is possible to promulgate criteria for
designation as a node, the most useful guidance for discrimination is as follows: Consider
an entity a node when a change in it can be expected to significantly influence the system.
While useful, this criterion is still relatively broad and requires additional explanation.
The decision calculus becomes somewhat less daunting when we consider elements
individually.
For example, a member o f congress is clearly an entity within the U.S. political
system. However, removal or a change in an individual representative’s conduct may not
produce any substantial impact on the political system. If this were the case, this
particular representative probably would not be characterized as a node. In an economic
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illustration, it was possible for the vast commercial entity, Enron, to evaporate without
causing the collapse, or even seriously endangering the overall U.S. economic system.
Hence, sheer size or occupying a seemingly crucial position within the organizational
structure in itself does not provide sufficient grounds for classification as a node.
Conversely, a minor cleric in a theocracy may not at first glance appear to be a
node, but further examination may reveal considerable power within the political and
social systems. His influence may far exceed his apparent position in the system;
therefore, he could meet the criteria for a node. Similarly, a small pumping station within
a complex crude oil distribution system may seem insignificant. However, an action
taken against it could cause serious degradation o f product flow with ensuing impact on
the economic system. Again, the potential for influence on the system is the principal
criterion for status as a node.
It should be apparent that the determination o f when to characterize an entity as a
node is rather inexact, subjective, and context dependent. This is the art o f the analysis,
and it provides advantages as well as complications to the assessment. Even with
sophisticated information processing capabilities, available knowledge o f systems of
power is not unlimited. Hence, the number o f nodes will vary with the quality and
capacity o f information gathering, analysis, and retrieval capabilities. Additionally, the
nature o f the objectives will necessitate varied depths o f assessments. The knowledge
requirements for a localized humanitarian assistance mission would be less intensive than
situations where the aspiration was to collapse, or make ineffective, a nation’s entire
military system.
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The critical issue is not the number of nodes or the criteria for designation.
Instead, it is the recognition that system entities are interrelated. The number o f potential
individual elements is unbounded. However, information collection, analysis, and
promulgation assets are finite, so a focus must be on those elements that can appreciably
influence the behavior o f the system. Those elements are best described as nodes, and
these become the basis for further development o f the methodology. However, noting the
cautions against regression to an inappropriate reductionist approach, the focus must
return to the holistic perspective.

The Holistic Perspective
The tasks related to merging the examination o f systems structure and function
with identification of nodal interconnections may not directly support concurrently
maintaining a holistic perspective. However, that does not entail that they are mutually
exclusive. Rapoport observes, “Investigation o f a system is frequently directed at
uncovering the identities of the elements, the nature o f the relations, and the dynamic
laws governing the behavior or evolution of the system in time.” 15 Providing further
support for this contention, Byrne asserts, “we can describe the character o f the system as
a whole and seek to identify what key changes in controlling variables led to changes in
that character.” 16 The premise upon which to base further effort is that the nodes
represent these controlling variables.
The advantage o f focusing on nodes as an essential part o f the assessment of
power is that as tangible entities they are more amenable to analysis than are esoteric
15. Rapoport, G eneral Systems Theory. Cited in Sutherland, Systems Analysis, Administration and
Architecture, 130.
16. Byrne, Com plexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 72.
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conditions and phenomena such as complexity and systems behavior. Processes that
concentrate on system elements and their interrelationships are not abundant and most
have been limited to the military sector. As early as the 1930’s some proponents o f air
warfare argued for a focus on key strategic nodes, which were often described in terms of
military centers of gravity. The calculus was relatively simple. If an entity was
determined to be essential to the functioning o f an adversary’s military strategy, then
destroying or incapacitating that target was likely to force capitulation. These nodes
could be traditional military targets, such as fortresses, or vital industries that propel the
war machine.
While this level of application may be adequate for a traditional force-on-force
conflict between relatively comparable militaries, the long-established center o f gravity
model is less useful in other types o f conflicts. Contentions that are more recent include
that strategists must “replace the assumption o f pure rationality with sensitivity to the
psychological, cultural, and political variables that may influence the adversary’s
behavior” 17 Hence, assessments o f the totality o f the system must consider nodes from all
o f the systems that comprise national power.
Due to their nature as tangible entities, nodes are conducive to scrutiny. Their
position and function in the system may be determined. Similarly, any connections to
other nodes are possible through research and examination. The challenge is to ensure
that the analysis does not fall into a reductionist trap. However, the behavior of
components and the system are linked. As Singer observes, “system attributes and sub
system interaction patterns can never be too dissonant from one another;” and that

17.
Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in The Limits o f
Coercive D iplom acy, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1994), 20.
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“innovative behavior on the part o f one entity or actor can induce changes in the
reciprocal behavior o f others, producing modified interactions in due course.” 18
The key to solving this dilemma is development o f satisfactory models that
present the relationships while continuing to take a systems perspective. As noted earlier,
this is not a challenge-free undertaking, for “actions often interact to produce results that
cannot be comprehended by linear models.” 19 Adding to the predicament, as Richards
notes, there is “no template in nonlinear modeling.”20 However, some endeavors in a
variety o f academic fields may present insights.
Since systems of power involve the connections o f multiple nodes, the system
may be described as a network (an interrelated set, group, or chain). Examination of
ongoing work in network analysis may provide some benefits. Zeng offers, “neural
network models are potentially better suited for the analysis o f typical political data than
simple linear models.”21 He advocates development o f models that are appropriate for
handling data with complex functions and from unknown sources. However, he
acknowledges that these have not received much attention from political scientists and
their potential has not been exploited. Others see the value in being able to look at
elements and to determine the functionally important interdependencies among them, but
noting, “as we move away from the physical systems the conceptualizations become
progressively less rigorous.”

99

18. Singer, “Global System and its Sub-Systems,” 40.
19. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f Political and Social Life,” 574.
20. Richards, P olitical Complexity, 10. However, she also contends, “nonlinearity can be combined
with both rigorous formal analysis and traditional empirical techniques.”
21. Zeng, “Neural Network M odels for Political Analysis,” 240. He describes neural networks as, “a
particular class o f nonlinear input-output models and as such are applicable to any problem o f pattern
recognition, prediction or classification.”
22. Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 231.
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Although the network model works so well in physiology and electrical
engineering, it is not directly applicable to interactions between nodes, since these
relationships are far less precise in nature, direction, and intensity. The minute electrical
charge between synapses in the central nervous system may be described and predicted
with much more certainty than the relationship between political and religious leaders.
Therefore, while there are parallels between networks and nodal interactions within a
system o f systems, the network model is not amenable to direct application to this task.
Hence, there remains a need for a more appropriate process that considers the special
challenge of secondary effects.
This section has stated the problem in more detail and has focused on the key
objective, i.e., merging of examinations of systems structure and function with
identification o f nodal interconnections, while maintaining a holistic perspective. It is
now possible to provide a proposed methodology for commencing to address these
challenges.

A Proposed Process
As I previously argued, an understanding o f structure and functioning is critical to
the system o f systems construct. However, this is not the part of the analysis in the
greatest need o f improvement. Rather, the ability to respond to the second challenge, i.e.,
determination o f the linkages between components is lacking. Consequently, the
interconnections between elements, and how these may have potential for exploitation,
will be the principal focus o f this section.
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National systems of power represent an immense field for study. Hence, a useable
assessment demands a mix o f area expertise, e.g., economics, sociology, military, etc.,
and a structure that allows for efficient collection and analysis o f information. For
organizational purposes, the proposed process divides the sources o f national power into
the four categories introduced in Chapter IV: Political, Economic, Military, and Social
(PEMS).23 However, this sorting is conducted primarily for organizational purposes; the
objective is to structure the analysis, take advantage o f specialist skills and experience,
and ensure that all elements o f power are considered.
The boundaries between the PEMS areas are flexible and permeable. A basic
assumption is that very few components must reside exclusively within one grouping. For
example, a governmental agency may be primarily political, but its responsibilities are
likely also to have economic and social implications. For that reason, the segregation of
elements into categories is relatively arbitrary; the essence o f the task is determination of
relationships between elements, not the placement o f the components themselves. These
are critical aspects that are essential to avoiding a purely reductionist approach.
The division into categories, while a necessary step, does not provide the basis for
the analysis. Rosenau offers a similar perspective in his advocacy o f the aggregation of
micro parts in understanding the relationship between the components and the whole: “It
is only for analytic purposes that we separate them out to trace and assess their
consequences.”24 Establishment o f the relationship between elements, within and across

23. As stated earlier, the number o f categories is relatively unimportant, as long as a provision is made
for inclusion o f all possible nodes.
24. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990),
157. “Macro structures and collectives may have a perceived existence o f their own, but they draw their
sustenance from their micro components, and, like the system, they eventually have to adapt to the sources
o f support if they are to persist.” See pp. 141-77 for his discussion o f the micro (element) macro (system)
linkages. See also Axelrod, Com plexity o f Cooperation, 3. Complexity theory involves the interactions o f
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political, economic, military, and social (PEMS) areas is the key task o f those conducting
a system o f systems analysis.
The principal function o f the system o f systems analysis is first to establish the
key elements of the systems, then to determine the key components within those
elements, and finally to identify nodes and the connections between them. While the
process is continuous and seamless, for simplicity I describe it as a series o f steps.
Sutherland provides a valuable and adaptable framework.
1. Isolate system boundaries and identify the major components o f the system.
2. Develop a (spatial) distribution that illustrates where each component resides relative
to the others.
3. Represent prevailing relationships between components, which potentially interact
with the others.25
Each o f these requires some elaboration:
Isolate boundaries and identify component. The principal rationale for this step is
to provide guidance for the assignment o f nodes to a particular area. Focus will be on
structure, and this activity will be the basis for subsequent analysis, since the “structural
analysis o f a system is roughly equivalent to a geographical map.”26 As stated previously,
boundaries o f the Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) systems are flexible.
The goal is to draw the borders between PEMS systems to best suit the analysis
objectives and the available resources.

multiple actors. Acknowledging that managing the interactions between multiple actors and interactions is
too difficult for mathematical solutions, he advocates use o f computer simulation as a primary research
tool.
25. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 25.
26. Ibid., 25. He adds, “Every system has properties that serve to distinguish it as a unique entity.”
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Develop a distribution'. This task involves placement o f nodes within one o f the
PEMS systems. While multiple systems potentially could be the primary locus o f an
individual element, for organizational purposes a decision on placement is required. For
example, The Federal Reserve Board may be considered primarily either as an economic
or a political node. Similarly, a religious leader may have political as well as social
aspects and could reasonably be assigned to either area. While the analysis related to
making this decision will be useful to ensuing steps, the question o f the optimum PEMS
system to which an element is assigned may have multiple correct answers.
Represent relationships between components. Herein lies the essential element o f
the analysis, i.e., determination o f the interconnections between nodes within and across
PEMS systems. Through knowledge of these interconnections we can begin to address
the problems presented by secondary effects. Returning to the earlier depictions o f node
connections, if we know that two nodes are related, and we determine that we want to
take an action against one o f these, then it follows that there may be a derivative effect on
the second node. Hence, knowledge o f the nature, strength, and stability o f these
interconnections becomes a primary focus.
Sutherland provides the basis for a methodology; however, a more precise
delineation o f the steps is required to describe properly the assessment process. The
progression is depicted in Figure 13. For clarity, I will expand on each o f these
individually:
Step 1. Identification o f the essential elements within each system. With the broad
categories that comprise the system of systems (PEMS) already identified, the next step
in the process is to determine the critical components o f each o f these. The identification
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of a person, organization, or segment of infrastructure as an essential element is
subjective and will vary based on the system o f power under assessment.

Identify the essential
elements within each
system
Step 2

Determine the essential
sub-elements

Step 3

Designate nodes
Step 4

Examine nodes for nodeto-node linkages

Step 5

Assign linkages between
nodes

Figure 13. The Assessment Process

For example, a highly developed industrial nation is likely to have a different set of
essential elements within its PEMS systems than in the case o f a developing nation. Some
elements were introduced in Chapter IV. Table 4 provides additional refinement.

97

Step 2. Determination o f the essential sub-elements o f each o f these. Since the essential
elements are too broad for a comprehensive analysis, further decomposition is required.
As with the elements, the number and character o f these sub-elements will not be the

27.
This listing is neither exhaustive nor universally applicable, and is provided only for illustration.
While a generic listing could be developed that would apply to the majority o f sovereign nations, the
essential elements listing requires adaptation based on the objective o f the assessment and its environment.
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same universally and the assessment should use those that are appropriate for the ongoing
assessment.

Table 4. Illustrative Essential Elements
System
Political

Economic

Military

Social

Essential Elements
National executive leadership
Political parties
Judicial Branch
Parliaments/Congresses
Local and regional government officials
Natural resources
Transportation infrastructure
Communications infrastructure
Essential utilities
Critical imports
Capital reserves
Means o f production
Uniformed Personnel
Air, land and maritime Forces
Logistics
Senior leadership
Command and Control
Media
Ethnic groups
Religious groups
Universities
Cultural elites

An illustration will contribute to understanding. If a Persian Gulf nation is the
object o f the analysis and the economic system is being investigated, determination o f the
essential elements may not be particularly challenging. Natural resources become an
obvious essential element o f its economic system. Other elements, such as transportation
and communications infrastructure, would also exist; however, their relative importance
would be dwarfed.28 Within natural resources, crude oil reserves and the means of

28.
These essential elements would also be subject to analysis and deconstructed further. Since natural
resources, and especially crude oil, are so important in this specific Persian G ulf scenario, they were
singled out for illustration.
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production are likely to be essential sub-elements. Within the means o f production are
multiple entities. Among these are drilling platforms, storage and distribution facilities,
and refining complexes. While this brings us closer to a practicable methodology, further
refinement is mandated.
Step 3. Determination o f junctions, intersections, and leverage points (Nodes).
Previous discussions concluded that an entity could be considered to be a node when a
change in it is expected to significantly affect the system. Hence, the analyst again is
faced with somewhat imprecise criteria. An effective determination o f status as a node
requires extensive knowledge o f the system as well as o f the component under
consideration. Here is an instance where the effort in examining the structure and
functioning o f the system can have a synergistic effect on the efforts related to
determination of node interactions. The research and analysis that examines the systems
will also contribute to the identification o f nodal linkages and vice versa.
Following on from the previous example, if distribution facilities represent the
segment o f the sub-element being examined, then the multiple components that comprise
it provide the set of candidate nodes. Among these are multiple pipeline intersections,
pumping facilities, oil terminals, and transfer stations. In this case, determination o f the
nodes would require considerable specialized skills and expertise. However, even a
knowledgeable petroleum engineer also would require additional information on the
specific distribution system to complete this task. Consequently, identification o f nodes is
a highly complex and information intensive task.
Step 4. Examination o f nodes both within and across PEMS areas fo r
determination o f node-to-node linkages. This step requires adoption o f the system of
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systems construct. For as already established, nodes may interact with other nodes within
and across Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) system boundaries. Due to
the flexibility and permeability of the edges of the PEMS systems, interactions may occur
anywhere within the overall system o f power. Continuing with the illustration string, if
pumping stations are being considered as candidate nodes, then the objective o f the
detailed analysis is to determine which individual stations, when acted upon could be
expected to significantly influence the oil production element of the economic system.
That is, can actions that would destroy or degrade that specific facility have a
considerable impact on the system? It is important to note, that a selected action need not
always be destructive or harmful. If the objective is to preclude disruption o f the
economic system, and if a node is determined to be critical to the functioning o f that
system, then the appropriate action may not be to degrade or destroy, but instead to
protect that facility.
Step 5. Assigning linkages between nodes when a significant relationship exists.
These node-to-node linkages provide the basis for determination o f possible secondary
effects of actions. This in turn will provide insights for further understanding of the
system as a whole. Concluding the string o f examples, if crude oil pumping station A is
determined to be dependent upon electrical production facility B, then an action against A
is likely to influence B. Figure 14 illustrates these examples inserted into the sequence of
tasks outlined in Figure 13.
If a particular official in a government petroleum agency controls the supply of
critical parts for that pumping station, then that political node is connected to the
economic node
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Identify the essential
elements within each
system

N atural resources
Means o f production

Determine the essential
sub-elements

Distribution
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I
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P ow er F acility B

Examine nodes for nodeto-node linkages

J
Assign linkages between
nodes

Figure 14. Sample Elements and Nodes

. And if that official is a member o f a particular religious or ethnic minority, a
religious leader may also be a node to which it is connected. Additional connections are
likely. As displayed earlier in Figure 15, the number o f permutations is indeterminable.
From a systems perspective the inputs are information about the system o f power.
The analytical process provides outputs in the form o f an overview o f the PEMS systems
that comprise an overall system of power, as well as a set of node-to-node linkages that
can provide an indicator o f secondary effects. The question that remains to be addressed
is: Can these outputs be o f any value to the decision-maker whose current inventory o f
analytical tools is lacking?
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Benefits
There is no pretense that mere recognition o f the linkages between nodes can
provide precise predictions o f system behavior or of the ancillary effects o f coercive
actions. However, awareness o f the connections, combined with an understanding of
system structure and functions, is a powerful tool if it can allow analysts to focus their
efforts on a fraction o f the immense number o f potential secondary effects, which are
currently beyond comprehension. Even if a full understanding o f the behavior o f the
system is not obtainable, an ability to narrow the set o f probable outcomes and to focus
more clearly the search for potential secondary effects is o f substantial utility to the
decision-maker.
Figure 15 reproduces the system of systems depiction used in Chapter IV. Added
to it is a set of nodes {PI, M l, M2, E l, E2, SI, S2), showing the interrelationships
between nodes within and across the PEMS system boundaries. Hence, an action taken
against any o f the interconnected nodes has the potential to produce secondary effects. In
this example, assume that analysis determined that military nodes, M l and M2 are
related. If so, then an action taken to influence M l can reasonably be expected to also
have an effect on M2. The nature and severity o f this secondary effect is dependent upon
the character and strength o f the relationship between M l and M2.
Recognition o f this situation provides a number o f possible advantages. I offer
three as the most valuable to the decision-maker.
1.

Amplification o f the effects o f actions. An action designed to influence a

specific node also is likely to have an effect on any nodes connected to it. This can result
in extension o f the effects of actions.
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Political

Economic

Social

Figure 15. Nodes within Systems

Continuing the illustration with the use of military nodes, if a particular air
defense radar is determined to be connected to a specific air interceptor command and
control facility, that facility may be degraded by destruction o f the radar site.
Furthermore, if that same radar site is connected to additional command and control
facilities, then the action to influence it may have cascading effects on those facilities.
Hence, a single action may produce multiple desired effects. However, in a complex
adaptive system, the equation is rarely so simple. The final analysis and decision also
must consider factors such as redundancies in the overall system, e.g., back-up radars or
other detection capabilities. Nevertheless, the potential for expanding the impact o f the
action due to knowledge o f the connections is readily apparent.
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2. Indication o f possible undesired effects.

It is conceivable that an action taken

against a node in one Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) system will have
an undesired effect on another. This is the phenomenon o f surprise and rogue outcomes.
Using another military example, the destruction of a bridge that is being used by
insurgents to transit to and from a specific geographic area also may be on the primary
route for the provision of humanitarian supplies to refugees within and beyond that area.
If that bridge is destroyed, the intended military effect may be achieved. However, the
unintended reduction in the ability to sustain the refugees could have a deleterious
influence on the social, economic, and political systems, and run counter to the overall
objectives o f the mission. The recognition o f this possible outcome does not rule out the
destruction of the bridge, but it does provide the decision-maker with additional
information upon which to select or reject that action. As Demchak contends, “Only
greater knowledge lessens the effects o f rogue outcomes.”

90

3. Recognition o f alternative actions. In the application o f coercive power there
are likely to be situations where the analysis indicates that an action taken to influence a
specific node has a high probability o f generating the desired effect. However, that action
may not be possible for a variety o f reasons, e.g., proximity to critical civilian
infrastructure, political considerations, lack o f resources, etc. In these cases, knowledge
o f the connections between nodes may allow a node to be influenced indirectly, i.e.,
through exploitation of a secondary effect. Using the illustration in Figure 19, assume
that node P I is determined the primary node to be influenced, but actions against that
person are proscribed. Since the analysis indicates that node E l is linked to that node, it

29.
Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f Networked Militaries,” 227. Rogue outcomes are those
unintended, unexpected and unanticipated results o f actions.
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may be possible to influence P I though actions taken against E l. For example, if the
owner o f a commercial facility (E l in this illustration) has close ties with a senior
government official (PI), and action against PI is prohibited, then an alternative course
may be to take an action against the economic node (El) with the objective o f influencing
the political node (PI).
These illustrations describe three potential benefits o f the methodology: (1)
identification of opportunities for extension of the effects of actions; (2) indications of
likely undesired effects; and, (3) recognition of secondary effects to mitigate targeting
dilemmas. Even if partially available, such insights can be of immense value to those who
must consider options in the application o f coercive power. However, the limits on
application of the process must be recognized so that expectations are managed and to
preclude its inappropriate use.

Limitations
The ability to perform these tasks and to produce the desired outputs is directly
related to the degree o f comprehension o f the system and its nodal linkages. The depth
and breadth o f this knowledge is the principal limitation of the methodology since
“Knowing all the possible outcomes of a dynamic system is theoretically impossible, and
thus there remains a final subset o f unknowns that are simply unknowable.”
Some argue that attainment of even a rudimentary knowledge o f the behavior o f a
complex system is a daunting task. King contends: “Parts or elements or individuals
within a complex system are not isolatable or discrete phenomena,” and “a purely

30. Ibid., 26. She contends that every system has a set o f “unknowable unknowns.”
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objectivist, mechanistic-reductionist scientific stance is literally impossible.”31 Other
relevant observations include that causality is holistically relational, and that there are
“no clear cut dependent and independent variables as such.”32 By extension, this implies
that precise determination of cause and effect, and an ability to discriminate between
primary and secondary effects, is not attainable.
While these views should be considered, acceptance o f their arguments does not
preclude utilization of the proposed methodology. Instead, their impact is to limit the
applications of this model and construct. While not providing a panacea for
understanding or predicting effects within complex adaptive systems, if used
appropriately, the insights attained can be o f considerable value when decisions regarding
application of power are undertaken.
The discussions of nonlinearity, complexity, and system effects provided in
earlier chapters contained one consistent message, i.e., understanding the behavior of
complex adaptive systems is a most intricate and demanding task. The lack o f a
capability to provide an appreciable level o f knowledge and comprehension supports that
conclusion. However, if the desired complete solution is not possible, a process that can
satisfy a portion o f that requirement remains worthwhile. The nuclear physicist cannot
claim to understand completely all aspects of subatomic structure. However, the model o f
electrons in orbit around a set o f protons and neutrons, while not perfect and never
directly observed, was sufficient to lead to the development o f nuclear power.
The shortfall in suitable tools for the decision-maker in this context is partially
due to the unrequited aspiration for a model that can withstand the rigor o f empirical

31. King, S ocial Science and Complexity, 91.
32. Ibid., 90.
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proof used in the physical sciences. This is not an attainable goal. Models in the social
sciences rarely attain precision. However, “A complex, highly relational system is no less
•

ordered just because raw empiricism cannot appraise it.”

. .

.

The geo-political environment

provides no laboratory for experimentation and there are no means for providing a
control set with which to test the hypothesis. Therefore, more restricted applications must
be the objective. We cannot change the nature of the system o f systems that comprise
national power. Nor can the environment in which they exist be significantly altered.
Therefore, the objective should be for tools that can enhance decision-making and
anticipation o f secondary effects under those conditions.
Czerwinski asserts that a worthwhile goal is to command and manage complexity
rather than to predict or control.34 Singer adds, “Explanation may not be possible;
description is a more modest goal.”351 concur with these observations. This proposition
is designed to provide utility, not paradigmatic exactness. Thus, the desired product of
this process and methodology is not precise prediction; instead, it is the less ambitious
objective of providing the decision-maker with a practical, albeit limited, tool.

Summation
This chapter provided a practicable scheme for the assessment o f power and
anticipation o f secondary effects through a system o f systems construct. The rationale for
development of such a design is: (1) actions taken to influence one element o f a system
will result in changes in the other components with which it is connected; and, (2)

33. King, S ocial Science and Complexity, 89. He adds, “Contingency, systematic error, ambiguity,
openness, and indeterminacy are therefore, inherent in non-linear holistic system s.”
34. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, 2.
35. Singer, “Global System and its Subsystems,” 32. He advocates, “developing operational
descriptions” and “producing data-based empirical solutions.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167

existing methodologies do not provide an understanding o f the relationships between
elements or the requisite holistic knowledge o f the system to allow for anticipation of
secondary effects.
The source o f the dilemma is that when more than two entities interact, the
number o f possible resultant effects of an action becomes indeterminable. Since systems
o f national power are comprised of hundreds o f possible nodes, precise prediction of
secondary effects is not possible. However, I rejected the deduction that this condition
entails that there can be no feasible ways to generate insight into secondary effects.
Development of a means to confront this situation requires a methodology that
provides a view o f the structure and functioning o f the system as well as an ability to
identify key connections between elements while maintaining a holistic perspective. O f
these, the ability to understand structure and function currently is the most developed.
Therefore, subsequent discussion focused on the other requirements, particularly the
interaction between nodes within and across systems.
Although operating as a continuous and seamless process, the proposed
methodology was presented as a series of steps that: (1) identify the essential elements
within each system; (2) determine the essential sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4)
examine nodes for linkages; and, (5) assign linkages between nodes. This provides a plot
o f the connections that could be exploited by the analyst and decision-maker.
Accepting that complete understanding of system behavior and prediction of
secondary effects was not possible, I presented three potential benefits o f the
methodology: (1) identification o f opportunities for extension o f the effects of actions;
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(2) indication o f likely undesired effects; and, (3) recognition o f alternative nodes and
actions.
I acknowledge that the accrued benefits are limited. However, since the nature of
the systems of power and the environment in which they exist is not alterable, the
objective should be for tools that enhance decision-making and anticipation o f secondary
effects under those conditions. This methodology provides the foundation for
development o f that limited but valuable capability.
The lack of a suitable experimentation milieu and mechanisms for controlling the
behavior of the actors results in an inability to provide empirical data to support the
hypotheses that interactions between elements within a system can be determined using a
system o f systems construct. Likewise, it is not possible to prove that awareness o f these
interactions can lead to an enhanced ability to anticipate the secondary effects o f actions.
The quandary is that since this is a proposed methodology that has never been overtly
employed, there are no examples of its utilization that can provide indications of its
worth. However, there may be occasions where the fundamentals o f this process were
utilized, and these scenarios may provide some insight into the possibilities for future
applications. Herein is an avenue for further illustration and examination o f the proposal.
The objective is to transform analyses o f past applications o f coercive power into
the language and process o f the system o f systems construct to determine if there are
parallels and lessons to be accrued. The means o f accomplishment is a set of three ex post
case studies of attempts to achieve national or alliance objectives. These endeavors were
conducted by means o f coercive actions designed to influence systems o f power. Through
these examples, which experienced varying degrees o f success in the attainment of
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objectives, the potential for the methodology may be better understood. These studies—
Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan— are the focus o f the following three chapters.
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CHAPTER VI
SOMALIA 1992-1995

The methodology presented in Chapter V provides the framework o f a process for
assessments of national power that allows some ability to anticipate the primary and
secondary effects of actions. Since there are no clear examples o f overt applications of
this type o f approach, evaluation o f its effectiveness is problematic. However, recent
history may provide illustrations o f the application o f the basic principles and
assumptions o f the methodology.
The premise of this contention is that although planners may not have overtly
employed a systems approach to the planning and execution o f their campaign, they did
adopt and utilize many of the aspects of the systems approach. In some o f these instances,
the selected actions supported the attainment o f goals. In other cases, measures designed
to provide the intended effects produced secondary consequences that ran counter to
stated objectives. In both circumstances, however, the utilization o f a systems approach
may have been useful in understanding the primary and secondary effects that resulted
from these actions. The framework methodology presented in Chapter V, combined with
identification o f a number o f primary and secondary effects ex post facto, provides the
structure for the analysis contained in this chapter.
As will the two that follow, this chapter provides a very brief narrative that sets
the stage for the conflict. I study the major protagonists to show cases where their
objectives were conflicting— and where they were compatible. From these, the intended
effects that were designed to accomplish objectives will be postulated. Following that
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necessary activity, I utilize the process presented in Chapter V to illustrate with actual
data the potential for employment of the process. I then extract a set o f representational
nodes from available sources and delineate the actions taken against those nodes in order
to identify instances where knowledge o f node-to-node relationships may have served as
an indicator o f subsequent secondary effects.
The United Nations intervention in Somalia during the period from December
1992 to March 1995 provides an appropriate and relevant scenario upon which to test the
supposition that the elements and principles o f a system o f systems construct were
utilized by decision-makers who wished to influence behavior within that collapsed state
at the Horn of Africa. This mission was unique in several ways. The United Nations (UN)
embarked upon a military action without the specific invitation o f the host nation, it
represented one o f the first cases of a multinational response to a humanitarian crisis in
the post-cold war era, and it explored various models o f international actions in response
to failed states. Additionally, the intervention, which began as a humanitarian relief
mission, transitioned to the multifaceted aspects o f peace operations— from peacekeeping
to nation building.
In order to provide a clear depiction within the space available, I will focus on the
period o f the most intense interactions, i.e., from the deployment o f the U.S.-led
multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF), in December 1992, through the extraction
o f the follow-on second United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in March
1995. However, the crisis that generated the intervention did not begin in 1992; therefore,
any assessment must consider the environment in which the coercive actions were taken.
Hence, a brief outline o f recent history o f the region is appropriate.
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As are most African nations, Somalia is an entity created by colonial powers.
Independent since 1961, the current borders were established when the former British
Somaliland and the Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland were merged into the Somali
Republic. The newly independent state established a parliamentary form o f government
based on European models, with political power concentrated in the former Italian
occupied area of southern Somalia and the capital o f Mogadishu. Despite an
exceptionally low level of modernization and economic development, Somalia’s initial
decade o f autonomy represented one o f the few examples o f a successful transition from
colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. This condition was to be short-lived.
Uniting all Somali peoples under a single nation-state initially was a
preoccupation o f the Somali government. This quest produced friction with its neighbors,
particularly its ancient adversary, Ethiopia. With little hope o f achieving this goal through
peaceful means, and not possessing the military power to do so by force, Prime Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal moderated Pan-Somali nationalism in the late 1960’s.
Partly as a response to the rejection o f a Greater-Somali state, a revolt o f military
officers led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre ended in a bloodless coup in October
1969. Political and military power resided within the 20-member Supreme Revolutionary
Council (SRC) that proclaimed the Somali Democratic Republic. The basis o f the newly
established government was a Somali adaptation o f Soviet style communism known as
“scientific socialism.” Barre became President o f the Republic and Secretary General of
the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. An absolute and dictatorial ruler, Barre
succeeded in establishing a cult o f personality around himself and centralizing power on
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his Marehan clan.1 The regime had close military, economic, and political ties to the
Soviet Union.
The previously repressed tensions with Ethiopia reemerged in the mid-1970s.
Taking advantage o f the instability resulting from the overthrow o f the Ethiopian
Emperor in 1975, Somalia invaded the contested Ogaden area. Soviet support shifted to
the Ethiopians, and the two-year Ogaden War resulted in multiple military setbacks for
the Somali forces and their eventual withdrawal from the region. Somalia turned to the
West for support and entered into agreements with the United States that granted limited
access to military facilities in Somalia. By the end o f the decade, internal support for
Barre began to wane.
Although the government mounted a serious effort to discourage and deemphasize
clan and tribal identities, opposition to Barre was linked to clan association.
Dissatisfaction with the regime emerged, especially in the north where the Issaq clan was
foremost. An all-out civil war developed during thel980’s between Barre’s forces and
those of the Issaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) with its power base in
the former British Somaliland capital of Hargeisa.
Armed opposition to the Barre regime spread from the north to the central and
southern regions, and he remained in control only in the Mogadishu area. The anti-regime
forces continued to grow in strength and support, and in January 1991 Barre, fled into

1.
For a more detailed examination o f the massive human rights abuses o f the Barre regime see Africa
Watch Committee, Somalia: A Government a t War with It Own People, (New York: Africa Watch
Committee, 1990).
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exile, leaving Somalia without a functioning government.2 The stage for a humanitarian
crisis was set.
These few paragraphs provide the background necessary to enable a better
understanding o f the systemic conditions in Somalia post 1991. However, any
examinations o f a system must consider the environment and existing state o f the system.
Hence, prior to an examination o f actions and their effects, I will address the conditions,
specifically the systems o f power within Somalia.

A Representational System of Systems Analysis
I contend that during the Somalia operation the United Nations and United States,
in some instances, utilized the principles of a system o f systems analysis in the selection
of actions. In order to support this supposition, and to illustrate the methodology further, I
will present the framework for a system of systems analysis in 1992-1995 Somalia. The
steps presented in Chapter V are: (1) Identify the essential elements within each system;
(2) determine the essential sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4) examine nodes for
node-to-node linkages; and, (5) assign linkages between nodes. Again, a complete
analysis is beyond the scope o f this effort and I will provide no more than illustrative
examples. I will present only a brief representation o f the analysis for each of the
Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) Areas, and narrow the focus to the
selection o f only a very few nodes.

2.
See U.S. Department o f State, “Background Note: Somalia,” April 2005,
http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (accessed 5 April 2005) for a condensed recent political history
o f Somalia. For a description o f the evolution o f Somalia through the pre- and post-colonial periods to its
collapse into a stateless society, see Maria H. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty an d the State in
Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness? (Utrecht, Netherlands: International Books, 2001), 2439-42,
provides a more detailed introductory survey with a good depiction o f the political movements and their
clan linkages.
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A fully developed analysis would be an immense effort requiring myriad research
assets, people, sources, and knowledge management tools. Hence, the objective here is to
provide only the minimum amount of information to “fill in the blanks” with actual data
into the framework presented in Chapter V. Consequently, the nodes selected for further
analysis and development will be limited to those that were actually acted upon during
the conflict.
Somalia presents a challenge to conducting analysis from a systems perspective.
As will be illustrated in this section, only the social system was relatively well developed
and it was unstable due to the pressures the Barre regime placed upon it and years of
internal warfare. However, if the construct is applicable, even to a limited extent, to a
collapsed state such as Somalia, then its relevance to assessments o f more structured and
developed systems becomes evident. With that premise established, I will now present
the representational system of systems analysis.

Essential Elements of the Systems
Political. A U.S. Department o f State study provides a severe but illuminating
analysis o f the Somali political system in 1992. Under the heading o f “Government,” the
assessment states “None,” and continues, “Somalia has had no functioning national
government since the United Somali Conference (USC) ousted the regime o f Maj. Gen.
Mohamed Siad “Barre” in January 1991.”3 What once was the Somali state no longer
existed— Somalia had simply collapsed. This condition is more severe than the common
depiction o f a failed state, where a central government is functioning but is exceptionally

3.
U.S. Department o f State, “Background Note: Somalia,” 2. Additionally, under the headings o f
“Political Parties and Legal System,” the evaluation is “none functioning.”
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weak and ineffective. Lyons and Samatar contend, “State collapse occurs when structure,
authority, legitimate power, law and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil
society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum.”4 This vacuum must somehow
be filled. In the case o f Somalia, in the absence of any legitimate authority, power went to
those with the weapons. While there was some minimal organization based on clan
affiliation, the contending factions were in many cases little more than armed thugs, who
were bereft of a cause beyond their own financial gain.
The connections between the clans, regions, and weakly structured political
movements are important to any analysis o f the political system. The clans, which had
coexisted in relative harmony for centuries, but whose influence was undermined during
the period o f scientific socialism, emerged as the nucleus of the major armed struggles.
Opposition to the Barre regime had been based on three political groups that had clan
identification as their foundation: Issaq, the Somali National Movement (SNM); Hawiye,
the United Somali Congress (USC); and, Ogadeni, the Somali Patriotic Movement
(SPM). Although temporarily allied against a common foe, “These three movements
loathed each other almost as they did Barre.”5 Alice Bettis Hashim contends that a key to
understanding the system is that the alliances are formed “between clans and sub-clans
especially as they are required by the weaker groups.”6 Hence, the means to

4. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, M ultilateral Intervention, and
Strategies f o r P olitical Reconstruction (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995)., 1.
5. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking P eace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 1993), 13, contends that while clan rivalry was important, the presence
o f large quantities o f arms— a legacy o f the cold war rivalries between the U.S. and U .S.S.R.— exacerbated
the situation.
6. A lice Bettis Hashim, The Fallen State: Dissonance, D ictatorship an d D eath in Somalia (New York:
University Press o f America, 1997), 36. Important to the study o f this crisis is that the elements o f these
alliances most com m only band together in order to meet an external threat.
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understanding the political system o f Somalia resides in knowledge o f the political
movements and their relationship to the clans.
By 1992, the United Somali Congress (USC), which had seized control of
Mogadishu the year earlier, had split into two major factions: the Aideed led Somali
National Alliance (SNA); and the Somali Salvation Alliance, headed by Ali Mahdi. The
struggle for power between these two factions was to represent the principal source o f
armed conflict in Somalia.
The connections between the clans, the geographic regions where its members are
concentrated, the predominant associated political movements, and the key individuals
are important to the analysis. For example, rival political movement leaders (nodes) may
share allegiance to the same clan. Knowledge of these relationships enhances the ability
to determine the possible effects o f actions. Table 5 presents some o f the clan, region,
political movement, and node relationships.
The clans themselves are not unified and homogenous; rather they are comprised
o f multiple subdivisions down to the tribe and family level, and conflicts can arise within
the clans. Although they were members o f the same Hawiye clan, Aideed’s militias were
primarily from the Ahabir Gedir sub-clan, while Mahdi’s were from the Abgal sub-clan.
Hence, awareness o f identity must go beyond mere clan affiliation.
Assessments o f the political systems o f most nations would include the structure
and functioning o f organizations within that system. The lack o f a functioning political
system in Somalia during the period under examination results in the need to consider the
leadership of the armed bands, commonly referred to as warlords, as the most important
political nodes.
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Table 5. Somali Clan Relationship Examples
Clan
Hawiye

Region
Mogadishu

Movement
Somali National
Alliance
Somali Salvation
Alliance

N ode
Ali Mahdi Mohamed
Mohamed Farah Aideed

Rahanwein

South

Somali Democratic
Alliance

Mohamed Farah
Abdullah

Ogadeni

West

Somali Patriotic
Movement

Omar Jess

Issaq

Northwest

Somali National
Movement
United Somali Front

Central/Northeast

Somali Salvation
Democratic Front

General Siad “Morgan”
Abdi Warsemeh Isar
Abd ar-Rahman Dualeh
Ali
Mohamed Abshir Musse

Economic. Somalia in 1992 possessed a basic subsistence economy with minimal
foreign trade. Historically, its principal exports have been agricultural products, primarily
livestock. Due to natural and man-made disasters, its primary import remained food.
Most European trade was with the former colonial power, Italy, while Yemen and the
United Arab Emirates were its major partners in limited regional trade. During the cold
war years both the U.S. and USSR improved deepwater port facilities at Berbera,
although these fell into disrepair in the ensuing period. There is no railroad system, and
the 2,600 kilometers o f all-weather roads had deteriorated due to lack o f maintenance.7
By 1992, Somalia was almost completely dependent upon foreign assistance.
Internally, the looting and resale o f food shipments became a primary element o f the
economy. Militias and gangs o f drug-hyped teenagers, mooryan, roamed the country in

7. Europa World Yearbook 1992, (London: Europa Publications, Inc. 1993), 2439-47.
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armed trucks known as technicals.8 Protection became a service industry, with gangs
hiring themselves out to relief agencies to preclude the “defenders” from confiscating the
supplies.
Without the means to provide even a basic level o f subsistence for the population,
the single-most important element in the Somali economy in 1992 was the internationally
donated relief supplies and the non-governmental and private volunteer organizations that
provided them. The nodes were the port and storage facilities and the lines of
communication to those desperately in need o f the supplies. These are nodes because an
action taken to influence them is likely to have an impact on the overall system. For
example, warlord control of the port facilities severely degraded the flow o f relief
supplies with the consequence o f severe disruptions to the economic system.
Military \ During the early years o f independence, Somalia possessed one o f the
stronger militaries in the region. The Somali National Army combined British and Italian
training and traditions with modem Soviet equipment. However, its defeat in the Ogaden
War with Ethiopia weakened its support among the general Somali populace. With the
overthrow o f Barre, the Somali National Army disintegrated into multiple independent
bands and for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. By late 1992, there were no state
controlled Somali armed forces. Without a state apparatus possessing a monopoly on
violence, individual militias became the de facto military force of Somalia.
Although loose allegiance to the leadership existed, the paramilitary units in many
instances were no more than undisciplined gangs o f roving bandits. This condition
complicates the identification o f specific nodes. While estimates are inaccurate and the

8.
The name derived from the status o f the gangs as “technical assistants” to the relief efforts. Heavy
weapons were fitted to jeeps, land rovers and small trucks, which became primitive fighting vehicles.
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numbers wide-ranging, General Morgan reportedly could employ over 1,000 former
Somali National Army troops in his militia. Estimates o f the forces loyal to Omar Jess
were “several thousand strong.”9 An illustration of some of the connections between clan
affiliation, political movements, and the major belligerents is provided in Figure 16.

Somali Patriotic
Movement

Omar Jess

Said Barre
Ogadeni
Clan

Support

Allies

“Morgan1

Somali Salvation
Alliance

Aideed
Ahabir Gedir
Subclan

CONFLICT
Ali Mahdi

Somali National
Alliance

Somali Democratic
Movement

Allies

Abgal Subclan

Rahawein Tribal
Group

Southern Somali
National Movement

Abdi Warsame

Figure 16. Key Belligerents’ Clan and Political Movement Linkages

The UN and coalition commanders considered Aideed himself, who claimed more
than 30,000 troops, to be a primary node and went to exceptional lengths to kill or
capture him. Ali Mahdi, as a powerful militia leader and principal antagonist o f Aideed,
would also be considered a node within the military system.

9.
John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia an d O peration Restore Hope: Reflections on
Peacem aking an d Peacekeeping (Washington: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), 76.
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The principal protagonists were Aideed, Abdi Warsame, and Ali Mahdi. Morgan
was connected to Jess through a previous military and political relationship; Morgan and
Jess were related due to their Ogadeni clan allegiance; hence, the second order
connection to Aideed. The relationships become complex because Aideed opposes Barre,
who supports Morgan. Even in this simplified illustration the difficulty in predicting the
secondary effects of actions is significant.
Social. The people who have occupied Somalia since the first century A.D. are
ethnically homogeneous. Unique to that part o f the continent, Somalia is the only nation
in sub-Saharan Africa with a solitary ethnic group. Adherence to Islam and a common
language are the primary forces that join the inhabitants; the vast majority (85 per cent)
being Somali and Sunni Muslim. Traditionally, this has been a relatively benign brand of
Islam. Exceptions are radical Islamic groups such as the al-Tabliq and A1 Ittihad who are
among the main non-clan based groups in Somalia.10 The Somali Nationalist Islamic
Front (NIF) reportedly received support, including funding and weapons, from Iran and
Sudan, but their impact proved minimal.11
Most inhabitants are pastoral nomads, with perceptible distinctions between the
majority rural population and the urban dwellers. Overall literacy is 24 per cent,
concentrated mainly in Mogadishu. Although relatively uniform, Somali society is not
static and has been described as “flexible and rich in variety.” 12 The social formations are
characterized by “the intermeshing o f economic, production, political life, and culture.” 13

10. U.S. Department o f State, “Background Note: Somalia,” 26. Al-Itthad was the more vocal o f the
two in advocating the use o f violence to achieve their common goal o f the establishment o f an Islamic state.
11. Hirsch and Oakley, Som alia an d Operation Restore Hope, 84. Religious links between northern
Somalia and Sudan have existed for centuries. 85.
12. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty an d the State in Somalia, 33.
13. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182

In Somalia, the boundaries between the systems of power are exceptionally porous. “Clan
affiliation is interwoven with social, economic, and political life o f the Somali.” 14 Hence,
isolation o f the political from the social is not possible.
“For generations, the single-most important factor in Somali society has been the
clan.” 15 Stevenson asserts, that clans “are not for the most part, religiously or ethnically
based,” and that they “would only band together if the equilibrium among nomadic
enclaves was disrupted.” 16 The clans make up the largest element o f categorization;
however, the multiple sub-clans, tribes, and families are the primary groups that define
one’s identity. Another important element of Somali society is the pan-Somali code of
heer, which is a binding influence that emphasizes “the values o f interdependence and
inclusiveness and thus formed the basis for social order.” 17 The clan/sub-clan/tribe family
connections are complex. Figure 17 depicts the clan relationships and connections extant
in 1992.
Since the social interactions in Somalia are so closely linked to clan, sub-clan and
tribal identity, an understanding of these relationships is critical to any assessment. It is
this complex and intricate set o f clan, tribe, and family relationships that makes an
understanding of Somali so difficult, and so necessary. Nodes that could be included in
the social system would be clan and religious leaders such as Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and
Mohamed Abshir Musse. I have discussed the first two earlier. Musse is a node due to his
earlier anti-communist stance. As “a leader in the northeast part o f the country, he headed

14, Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty an d the State in Somalia, 98
15, Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos, 18.
16. Jonathon Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia,” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 93), 142.
17. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 10, contend that heer did not eliminate strife but provided a means o f
dealing with disputes and conflicts. Hashim, Fallen State, 35, describes heer as “social order arranged
through social contracts,” and that its meaning equates to “agreement, compact, contract or bilateral treaty.”
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armed forces against Islamic fundamentalists in factional fighting there more than a
decade ago and worked with U.S. officials in setting up nonpolitical police forces in his
region and in Mogadishu in 1992 and 1993.” 18
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Figure 17. Genealogical Chart o f Somalia

19

Due to the extent to which clan relationships affect all o f the systems o f power in
Somalia, the analysis must include consideration o f interactions across system
boundaries. These linkages are a key element o f the system o f systems construct.

18. George Jr. Lardner, “Former Somali General Told to Leave U .S.,” Washington Post, March 17,
2003.
19. Chart reproduced from ibid., 9.
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Node Linkages - The System o f Systems
The diagrams that depict the overlap between the systems presented earlier used
ovals of equal size to illustrate the overall system relationships. However, in the case o f
Somalia, the economic and military systems are relatively weak and undeveloped, and the
political and social systems are nearly identical. Therefore, Figure 18 provides a more
accurate portrayal of the relative importance and overlap of the four systems o f power.

Political

Economic

Social

Military

Figure 18. Systems of Power in Somalia 1992

While all four systems are interrelated, the nearly non-existent economic aspect and the
diffuse and unstructured military are less of a factor in the analysis than the closely
intertwined political and social systems. However, it is equally important to consider the
linkages across systems. This is complicated in Somalia due to the lack o f an economic
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infrastructure, and an organized government with a loyal military. Additionally,
individual nodes, such as Aideed, could reside in multiple areas
A principal task o f the analyst is to determine these linkages across systems. For
example, militias routinely hired themselves out to private volunteer organizations to
protect the relief supplies. In this case, a warlord, such as Omar Jess, could be linked to a
relief organization, like Medecins sans Frontiere. Many o f the warlords had connections
to political movements, e.g., Mahdi and the Northern Somali Alliance.
The intent of this very brief excursion is to present only some illustrative
examples of a system o f systems analysis to enhance understanding o f the principles of
the construct. As a further step toward this objective, I will present additional examples
from the intervention. This first requires establishing the proximate causes for the crisis
and the decision to intervene.

The Impetus for Intervention
The collapse of the Barre regime “created a vacuum of legitimate institutions that
was filled in different ways in different regions.”20 Gangs of armed teenagers, whose
primary motivation was looting and banditry rather than allegiance to any political dogma
or charismatic leader, filled this void. The competition between groups seeking the
limited booty available in this impoverished collapsed state resulted in armed conflicts,
primarily between factions of the United Somali Congress (USC). Faction leaders
reemerged and exploited the previously repressed clan linkages and rivalries.
Followers of Ali Mahdi Mohamed battled with those o f General Mohamed Farah
Aideed in Mogadishu where a de facto boundary between their areas o f influence
20. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 21.
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materialized despite the lack o f a formal agreement on a line o f demarcation. Between
November 1991 and the following February, battles virtually destroyed the remaining
infrastructure o f Mogadishu and produced the human tragedy o f thousands o f civilian
deaths and many more refugees. Outside the capital city, conflicts erupted between two
factions within the Ogandeni Somali Patriotic Movement, one led by Colonel Omar Jess,
and the other by General Siad Hersi “Morgan.” Although fighting was less evident in the
north, armed elements o f the Somali National Movement (SNM) supported the
establishment o f a secessionist Republic o f Somaliland in the territory o f the former
British Somaliland.
Aideed’s forces progressively gained the upper hand by late 1991. The near
continuous fighting and the resulting inability to distribute relief supplies had been
responsible for civilian deaths and injuries in the tens o f thousands. Recognizing his
inferior military position, Ali Mahdi appealed to the United Nations, which imposed an
arms embargo in January 1992 and dispatched an envoy. However, the primary objective
o f establishing an agreement for a ceasefire was not attained.
Subsequently, delegates to a conference convened by the Organization o f African
Unity, the League o f Arab States, and the Organization o f the Islamic Conferences
appealed for an armistice in order to contend with the increasing humanitarian crisis. The
principal rival factions eventually joined the conference and agreed to the terms o f the
ceasefire in March. The following month, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
directed the establishment o f a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to
monitor the agreement.21

21.
This UN presence was manifested in a 50-strong observer mission. The UNSC (Resolution 751, 24
April 1992) also agreed in principle to send a security force to protect UN personnel and supplies at the
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UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dispatched Algerian diplomat
Mohamed Sahnoun as his Special Representative. Through proactive engagement with
the warring parties and an excellent understanding o f the Somali culture and political
concerns and aspirations, Sahnoun was able to broker an agreement to deploy a 500 man
security force to protect the relief supplies that were arriving in Somalia but were not
being delivered to their intended recipients due to continuous looting by armed gangs.
Despite these notable successes, his criticism o f UN and national efforts resulted in
Sahnoun’s replacement with Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani. It was not until September that
500 lightly armed Pakistani troops who represented the military component o f UNOSOM
arrived in Somalia. Aideed successfully prevented this force from conducting its mission;
the Pakistani troops essentially never ventured from their barracks while the human
tragedy around them grew. By November nearly 350,000 (out o f an estimated total
population of six million) Somalis had perished due to malnutrition during that year.

00

In late 1992, Barre reemerged from exile and attempted to retake the capital.
Aideeds’ forces successfully countered this offensive and eventually drove Barre’s forces
from the country. The cost o f this conflict was an ever-increasing level o f human
suffering, exacerbated by disease and famine, described by one U.S. official as “the
greatest humanitarian emergency in the world.”23 The heartrending images o f starving
children and an international community apparently powerless to alleviate the suffering

port o f Mogadishu and to escort supplies to their planned eventual destinations. This required the
agreement o f both parties; however, Aideed subsequently refused to accept the presence o f additional
foreign military personnel. See Makinda, Seeking P eace from Chaos, 13, esp. 59-82, and Europa Yearbook
1992, (London: Europa Publications, 1993), 2440-42 for more detailed presentation o f the events leading to
the UN actions.
22. Precise figures are elusive. The International Committee o f the Red Cross estimated that by the end
o f 1992 over one million Somalis had perished since the beginnings o f the conflict. See Stevenson, “Hope
Restored in Somalia,” 138-39.
23. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188

was ubiquitous in the Western media and served to awaken the consciences o f the
audiences. This awareness generated appeals to “do something.”
Although he had recently lost his bid for reelection, U.S. President George H.W.
Bush met with his National Security Council to explore means o f dealing with the
increasingly visible crisis. This resulted in an American proposal to Boutros-Ghali that
became the key provision of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794.
The important specification was the authorization to use “all necessary means to establish
as soon as possible a secure environment for relief operations in Somalia.”24 The manner
in which these actions were undertaken provides the foundation o f this case study.
This examination continues from the brief history provided earlier in the chapter
and will commence with the adoption o f UNSCR 794 on 3 December 1992. The
resolution expressed alarm at the deterioration o f the humanitarian situation in Somalia
and responded to urgent calls “for the international community to take measures to ensure
the delivery o f humanitarian assistance to Somalia.”25 John Hirsch and Robert Oakley
contend that the impetus for additional U.S. involvement came from three major sources:
(1) the media; (2) international humanitarian relief organizations; and, (3) Congress.

26

Somalia had become an issue during the 1992 presidential campaign, with the
Democrats denouncing the failure o f the Bush administration to take effective action.
Direct U.S. involvement had begun in August during Operation Provide Relief, which
supported humanitarian assistance efforts with logistics assets, primarily airlift.

24. Action authorized under provisions o f Chapter VII (Enforcement) o f the UN Charter. Text o f
Resolution provided in Appendix A o f Hirsch and Oakley, Som alia and O peration Restore H ope, 180.
25. U.S. Congress, House o f Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Markup on S.J. Res. 45
Authorizing the Use o f Force in Somalia, 23 May 1993, Appendix 3.
26. Hirsh and Oakley, Somalia and O peration Restore Hope, 35. See Chapter 3, esp. 35-47 for a more
detailed examination o f the events leading to the decision to intervene militarily. The authors observe a
near complete turnaround o f the DOD position in the last months o f the year.
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Lamentably, due to the interception o f the food and medicine by the warlords and
bandits, this effort was not successful in getting the supplies to the starving masses that
needed it. Jeffrey Clark contends that by November, “80 percent o f relief goods in
Somalia were being looted and famine was claiming in excess o f a thousand victims a
day.”27 Hence, security for the movement o f these supplies became a primary objective
requiring a significantly different force, one that would be combat-capable.
Despite the overwhelming conventional military victory in Iraq in 1991, the
senior Department of Defense leadership was reluctant to become engaged in operations
without a clear objective, an overwhelming force, and a strategy for withdrawal.
However, with pressure on the administration for action steadily increasing, these
concerns were overcome, and Operation Restore Hope began on 8 December 1992 under
the organizational structure of a multinational, but U.S. led, Unified Task Force
(UNITAF).
The critical lesson, which UN and American decision-makers understood by
varied degrees, is that the military conflict could not be adequately addressed without an
understanding o f the social systems at play. The section that follows will examine the
events that directly led to the intervention and how those who implemented the policies
used the knowledge o f the interaction of systems in planning and executing the operation.

U.S. Objectives
The U.S. view of the mission was to establish a secure environment to enable the
safe and efficient movement o f relief supplies to the intended areas o f Somalia. The
longer-term objective was an eventual handover to UN forces. Boustros-Ghali had a more
27. Jeffrey Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1993): 114.
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extensive mission in mind for the UNITAF, including disarmament o f the belligerents.
These dissimilar views o f overall objectives between the UN and U.S. were never
completely resolved and led to multiple difficulties with the operation.
UNSCR 794 called for establishment o f “a secure environment for relief
operations in Somalia.” The wording was sufficiently vague to allow for multiple
interpretations of the limits o f the authorized activities. Brune observes three points of
cardinal importance in the objectives: (1) place Somalia’s heavy weapons under
international control and disarm the irregular forces; (2) establish a secure environment
throughout Somalia; and, (3) assure “close cooperation between UN and UNITAF before
the U.S. transferred responsibility to UN peacekeepers.”

28

In the U.S. view, American participation would be temporary, with the role o f
U.S. combat forces to establish this safe environment so that the relieving UN elements
could continue the protection of the relief efforts. These limited objectives were attained.
However, the inability to continue the protection throughout the country once the
UNITAF was withdrawn led to the overall failures o f the mission. Cooperation may have
existed, but was proven insufficient.

Somali Political Objectives
A general long-term objective was the quest for a greater Somalia, i.e., unification
of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa.

However, this goal was

deferred while the battles over who would control Somalia itself were fought. For Aideed
and Ali Mahdi, the objective was to enhance their own personal power. Aideed, a former
28.
Lester H. Brune, The United States an d P ost-C old War Interventions: Bush an d Clinton in Somalia,
H aiti an d Bosnia 1992-1998 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 19 and 23.
29. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty an d the State in Somalia, 30.
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ambassador to India who had been instrumental in the overthrow o f Barre, believed that
he had a legitimate claim to the leading role in the future of Somalia. Aideed held the
greatest power, but not enough to dominate his opponents. For him, international military
involvement, which could alter the balance, was not desirable.
The reverse held true for Ali Mahdi who needed foreign troops to keep Aideed’s
forces from crushing his own. The lesser warlords, e.g., Jess, Morgan, Abdi Warsame, et
al, were not powerful enough on their own, but would attach themselves through
alliances to one side or the other depending upon how the fortunes o f battle evolved.
While the objectives o f the various belligerents varied, personal aggrandizement o f
political and economic power for their factions remained the key objectives.

Effects o f the Coercive Actions
The initial U.S. forces landed on 9 December with larger contingents arriving by
both air and sea within a few weeks. The landings were unopposed largely due to UN
brokered agreements between Aideed and Ali Mahdi who seemed to welcome an
opportunity for a hiatus in the near continuous fighting between their followers in
Mogadishu. The U.S. achieved its precept of overwhelming force. The American Army
contingent o f the UNITAF alone included nearly 10,000 troops o f the 10th Mountain
Division, including infantry, aviation, artillery, and support units. Coalition elements
brought the total force available to 38,000 representing 23 different nations.30 This force
quickly achieved mission success with Somali heavy weapons moved into cantonment
areas or removed from the city.
30.
Richard W. Stewart, The U nited States Army in Somalia, Center o f M ilitary H istory Pub 70-81-1
(Washington: U.S. Army Center o f Military History, 1994), 10. This included large contingents from Italy,
France, Canada, Belgium, Morocco, Australia, and Pakistan.
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The military was effectively conducting their operations, which included
psychological and civil affairs activities aimed at influencing elements o f the social
system. This activity displayed the use o f knowledge o f the connections between system
elements in Somalia. That is, utilization o f alternate actions to achieve the same effect.
The psychological operations effort included publication of a newspaper (7?pyo~the truth)
and establishment o f a radio broadcast station. Concurrently, Ambassador Robert Oakley
continued to conduct negotiations with Aideed and Ali Mahdi. This coordination between
the military and diplomatic actions contributed greatly to the success o f the mission.
By late December, the military contingent, which included a U.S. Marine
Expeditionary Unit and Special Operations Forces, moved out of Mogadishu into the
countryside. Military forces effectively executed the plan and attained their primary
objectives. They also expeditiously and efficiently completed the principal humanitarian
mission. While precise measurements o f effectiveness are not possible, Brune claims that
UNITAF saved 100,000 lives between January and May 1993.31
Crocker agrees that the military mission was successfully completed and that
“UNITAF’s accomplishments far exceeded the simple, publicly discussed goal o f
creating a ‘secure environment for humanitarian relief.’” A U.S. Army history claims:
“Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in its goal
o f bringing an end to mass starvation.”33 However, at the end of the UNITAF mandate
there was still no effectively operating government, police, or national military in
Somalia. Although reduced in number and scope, incidents o f violence continued, as well

31. Brune, U nited States an d P ost-C old War Interventions, 23.
32. Chester A Crocker, “The Lessons o f Somalia: N ot Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs
(May/June 1995), 4. The author is a former assistant secretary o f state.
33. Stewart, United States Army in Somalia, 14. Capitalization o f operation in original.
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as the threats to the international assistance efforts. Despite these dangerous conditions,
the goal o f a transition to a UN force became politically imperative and establishment of
the relieving force, designated United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II),
became the most urgent task.
On 26 March 1993, the Security Council approved Resolution 814, which
broadened the mandate o f the previous efforts. In addition to the tasking to establish a
safe and secure environment, UNSCR 814 called for disarmament o f the warring militias,
seizing unauthorized small arms, continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation
of refugees in Somalia.34 The plan was for an operation in four phases: (1) the transition
of operational control from UNITAF; (2) the effective deployment and consolidation of
UN operational control throughout Somalia and the border regions; (3) the reduction of
UNOSOM II military activity and assistance to civil authorities in exercising greater
responsibility; and, (4) the redeployment or reduction o f UNOSOM force.35 Retired U.S.
Navy Admiral Jonathon Howe was appointed the new Special Representative for
Somalia, and Turkish Lieutenant-General Cervik Bir assumed command o f UNOSOM II.
The coercive actions were employed in multiple areas. In an attempt to disrupt
incitement of the population against the UN forces, the military carried out operations to
preclude propaganda broadcasts from the Aideed controlled Radio Mogadishu. Again,
UN planners employed alternative actions to achieve the effect o f weakening Aideed. In
addition to the military activities, diplomatic efforts continued.

34. United Nations Department o f Public Information, “United Nations Operation in Somalia II,”
Updated 21 March 1997, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKP/Missions/unosom2b.htm (accessed 5 April
2005). The resolution text includes a mandate to “maintain control o f the heavy weapons o f the organized
factions which would have been brought under international control,” and “seizing the small arms o f all
unauthorized armed elem ents.” The paper acknowledges that “UNITAF had a positive impact on the
security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery o f humanitarian assistance” (ibid., 2).
35. United Nations, “United Nation Operations in Somalia II,” 3.
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A Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, which included
representatives o f 15 Somali political movements, produced an agreement on
disarmament, reconstruction, settlement o f disputes and mechanisms for transition to a
Somali controlled authority.36 However, in the Somali culture, agreements are not
necessarily considered to be permanent arrangements, and incidents o f violence
increased. The most serious of these was on 5 June, when 26 Pakistani troops were killed
in urban battles with forces, which were allegedly controlled by Aideed.
The reaction was UNSCR 837, which strongly condemned the attacks and
directed apprehension o f the perpetrators.37 After an investigation that implicated Aideed
in the killings o f 5 June, Howe directed the UNOSOM commander to capture Aideed,
offering a $25,000 reward. These incidents resulted in an alteration o f the interpretation
of UNOSOM’s objectives. The protection o f humanitarian assistance mission had now
evolved into a manhunt.
While not under the command of UNOSOM, the U.S. maintained a Quick
Reaction Force to support the UN operation as needed. In August, the U.S. established a
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), designated Task Force Ranger, with the
mission of capturing Aideed. American military actions, which included the use o f attack
helicopters, resulted in civilian casualties and increasing popular support for Aideed.
After one incident, crowds angered by the U.S. actions killed four western journalists.
On 3 October, Task Force Ranger elements commenced an operation intended to
capture two o f Aideed’s key lieutenants. This resulted in the capture o f twenty-four

36. At the core o f the agreement was a 74-member Transitional National Council (TNC) that “would be
the bridge to a long term political solution.” Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and O peration Restore Hope, 98.
37. The resolution directed a more aggressive stance toward those responsible for the attacks and a
request for more personnel and equipment. See ibid., Appendix F for the complete text o f the resolution.
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Somalis, and as preparations were being made to move them via truck convoy, a rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) downed a MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. In the ensuing rescue
attempt, 18 American soldiers were killed, and television audiences across the world
watched in horror as the soldiers’ bodies were mutilated and dragged through the streets
of Mogadishu. This event was to be “a watershed in U.S. involvement in Somalia.”38
Three days later President Clinton directed the cessation o f all military
operations, except those required for self-defense, and the withdrawal o f U.S. forces from
Somalia no later than 31 March 1994.39 Additionally, he dispatched Ambassador Oakley
to broker a peace settlement. On 9 October, the United Somali Congress/Somali National
Alliance (Aideed’s faction) announced its intention to cease military operations against
UNOSOM. Even though, tensions remained, the situation became generally quiet.
Security Council resolutions in October and November established a Commission
of Inquiry to investigate the attacks on UNOSOM personnel and extended the mandate
for UNOSOM II until 31 May 1994.40 Despite some achievements in humanitarian relief,
Somalia remained without a functioning government, national army, police force, or
judiciary. Diplomatic efforts continued, and Aideed and a diverse Group o f 12 agreed to a
Declaration o f National Resolution in March 1994.41
UNOSOM forces subsequently reduced to approximately 22,000, and the
mandate further extended to October 1994. However, it became apparent that only the
38. See Stewart, U nited States Army in Som alia, esp. 15-23 for a more detailed account o f the military
operations and command relationships. The following two chapters will address how this event influenced
the reaction to subsequent interventions.
39. Bill Clinton, “Somalia: Our Troops Will Leave by March 31, 1994,” Vital Speeches o f the D ay, 1
November 1993. Speech delivered over national television on 7 October 1993.
40. UNSCRs 885, 814 and 837. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future o f
Humanitarian Intervention,” in Learning from Somalia, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, CO:
W estview Press, 1995), Appendix A, for an extensive compilation o f UN resolutions related to the Somalia
intervention.
41. The Group o f 12 included the smaller factions and generally supported Ali Mahdi against Aideed.
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Somalis could resolve the situation. UNSCR 954 extended UNOSOM for a final period
until 31 March 1995. This had a positive effect on getting the warring Somali factions to
negotiate, and on 21 February 1995, Aideed and Ali Mahdi signed a peace agreement. As
the date for UN troop withdrawal approached, relief agencies were advised to evacuate
their staffs, and UNOSOM officially ended on 28 March 1995. Initially deployed to
preclude a humanitarian disaster, the safe extraction o f the UN force had become its
primary goal.
Were the overall objectives o f the intervention attained? James L. Woods
contends that the UNITAF phase at least, “ended famine within a few weeks, saved
hundreds o f thousands of lives” and “constituted an incredible achievement.”42
Additionally, Woods argues that the intervention brought to Somalia some limited hope
for a future where the factions could work together to rebuild the nation. A less optimistic
commentator observed, “After the deaths of more than 100 UN peacekeepers here—
including 36 Americans— Somalia is as unstable and devoid o f hope as at any time since
it collapsed into anarchy in January 1991.”43
While even the most generous and positively biased observers do not assign a
high degree of success to the Somalia intervention, the debate over why it failed is an
engrossing topic, and it has been and will continue to be a topic for discussion and
debate. However, the numerous issues o f international humanitarian interventions and
nation building are beyond the scope of this project. Hence, the focus will remain on the
effects of actions.

42. James L Woods, “Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia,” in Learning from Somalia, ed.
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1995), 166. Woods was Deputy Assistant
Secretary o f D efense for African Affairs from December 1986 to April 1994.
43. Keith B. Richburg, “Somalia Slips Back into Bloodshed,” Washington Post, 4 September 1994.
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The Secondary Effects
With the deployment of the UNITAF, the humanitarian relief situation improved
dramatically. The military actions achieved the planned effects and attained the primary
objectives. However, UN and U.S. actions taken during this period, as well as during the
UNOSOM missions, inevitably produced multiple secondary effects. Some of these
supported the overall objectives. Croker asserts that Somalia is better off than it was prior
to the intervention in that it “knocked a hideously costly stalemated clan war o ff dead
center and opened the field for local initiatives.44 The intervention also contributed to the
ability o f the smaller factions to emerge as a political entity as evidenced in the
establishment of the Transitional National Conference. Although cessation o f fighting
was a primary objective, the inclusive nature of the UN sponsored talks in Addis Ababa
in December 1993 also provided at least the structure for participation by non-militia
groups.
Despite the best of intentions, the secondary effects o f actions at times ran counter
to the overall objectives. Although projected as a purely humanitarian mission, Aideed
and others portrayed the international mandate as a quasi-UN trusteeship and the military
forces as an occupation army. This perception reawakened Somali pride as an
independent nation.45 The relative ease with which UNITAF completed it missions
“helped produce a slide toward a modem version o f trusteeship over an ex-colonial
territory, triggering a violent backlash by a powerful Somali faction.”46

44. Crocker, “Lessons o f Somalia,” 3.
45. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, 235, contends that the “overall
record o f the UN is poor,” and that the UN forces provoked additional violence and added another
dimension to the conflict. She also cites criticisms that the UN did not adequately use the advice and
counsel o f the Somali population.
46. Crocker, “Lessons o f Somalia,” 4.
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The key nodes in the conflict were the dominant clan leaders. The establishment
o f negotiations and cooperation were the aim o f the initial actions. This later turned into a
hostile relationship. The focus on the two major belligerents, Aideed and Ali Mahdi,
bestowed on them the aura of Somalia’s internationally recognized and legitimate rulers.
The result was that efforts to control and manipulate their behavior had the unintended
effect o f strengthening their position relative to the other factions. When UN officials
treated the leaders of gangs of criminals as rightful representatives o f the people of
Somalia, it enhanced the prestige o f the warlords at the expense o f legitimate political
and social entities.
The food and medical supplies at staging sites in Mogadishu were nodes. This is
because they represented the major economic activity in the country during this period as
well as the major factor in preventing an even more acute humanitarian disaster. One
supposition was that giving the provisions to those who were stealing them anyway
would cause the commodities to become so plentiful that the value would drop and
consequently reduce the incentive to steal the supplies. This method proved to be
ineffective when the roving bandits merely hoarded the supplies and kept their value at a
high level.
The unstructured conduct o f much of the disarmament activity resulted in
“perverse and unintended consequences” [that] “reduced the ability o f individuals to
defend themselves without offering them an alternative means to defend themselves.”47
Hence, the weaker factions and non-militia figures were incapable or wary o f asserting
their authority. The disarming of factions loyal to Jess also caused the strengthening of
the forces o f Morgan and led to the fall o f Kismayu. Lyons and Samatar contend, “All
47. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 42.
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parties agreed that an institutionalized Somali order was needed, but they differed on the
AO

roles the militia leaders would play.”
Finally, and most importantly, the intervention itself altered the systems of
Somalia. Clarke and Herbst observe, “When U.S. troops intervened in December 1992 to
stop the theft of food, they immediately disrupted the entire political economy of
Somalia.”49 The system became dependent upon the UN troops for it to operate. With the
removal o f the now essential element o f the system, the system again collapsed. The
ancillary consequences o f actions are a key element o f this study. Table 6 provides some
examples o f unintended secondary effects that ran counter to stated U.S. objectives.

Table 6. Unintended Secondary Effects
Node

Intended Effect

Comment

Secondary Effect

Radio
Mogadishu

Disrupted anti-UNOSOM
propaganda

Attack on U N troops

24 Pakistanis killed

Aideed HQ

Captured fighters

Killing on non-combatants

Mob murders four
journalists

Aideed

Captured

Inceased popular support

Omar Jess

Disarmed

Morgan’s forces strengthened

Kismayu falls

R elief supplies

Reduced value

Bandits rewarded

Food supplies hoarded

48. Ibid., 54.
49. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future o f Humanitarian Intervention, in Learning from
Som alia,” 242. Patrick Gilkes, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Somalia Precedent,”
M iddle East Report, November-December 1993, 23, cites a report that “increasingly, Somalis regarded
UNOSOM as another faction and Admiral Howe as another warlord.”
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Summation
In this chapter, I inserted examples o f the systems, subsystems, elements, and
nodes o f Somalia in the early 1990’s into the structure o f the methodology presented in
Chapter V. The objective was not to provide a full system of systems analysis, but rather
to illustrate further the steps presented earlier with examples as a means o f enhanced
understanding o f the construct. However, it is clear that this intervention was not planned
and executed using a system effects approach.
The Somalia operation was not replete with notable successes. The intervention
provides examples o f some utilization o f various elements of the proposed system of
systems construct. Examination of the record of the intercession indicates that there were
instances o f the use o f principles o f the overall approach. Additionally, there were several
occurrences where an understanding o f the systems enabled amplification o f the effects
of actions, discovery o f alternative actions, or recognition of potential secondary effects.
However, it is clear that uses of the principles o f the construct were infrequent,
unstructured, and incidental.
However, the few examples of the utilization o f an understanding o f the political,
economic, military, and social systems, their elements, and the connections between
entities, contributed to the more effective and efficient achievement of the stated
objectives of the operation. There is not sufficient empirical evidence to prove this
contention or to establish causation as well as correlation. However, the record indicates
that more progress toward attainment of objectives occurred when those with the best
understanding o f the system and it elements were responsible for the key decisions. I will
provide a few illustrative examples.
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Due to their familiarity with Somali culture and history extensive, experience in
the region, and remarkable diplomatic skills, Robert Oakley and Mohamed Sahnoun were
particularly adept and exploiting this knowledge. Sahnoun understood the importance of
the clans and their ability to dilute national power, and he “aimed to put the clan system
to work for Somalia.”50 Oakley also recognized the need for alternative security
structures. He wanted U.S. forces to become “more deeply engaged in assisting the
reestablishing o f the police, prisons, and judiciary” and believed that unless these were in
place, a successful U.S. withdrawal would not be possible.51
Both Sahnoun and Oakley understood the importance o f the clans in Somali
society and how any attempts to alter system behavior required engagement o f clan
leadership. They were proactive in attempts to influence the key nodes, i.e., Aideed and
Ali Mahdi. However, this focus on only two factions is one o f the more common and
valid criticisms of the nature o f the engagement. Renowned anthropologist I. M. Lewis
concludes that UN and U.S. did not pay “sufficient attention to genuinely representative
local leadership.”52 The focus on these two entities, at the expense o f other elements of
the social and political systems, may have had the unintended effect o f strengthening
their position within the Somali system. When the international forces and agencies
withdrew, there were no alternatives to fill the vacuum of power.
A limited appreciation of the phenomenon o f secondary effects is also apparent.
Crocker identifies attempts to confront the major warlords without making them national
heroes, establishment o f police and government functions coincident with disarmament

50. Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia,” 146.
51. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 42.
5 2 .1. M. Lewis, “Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis,” Anthropology Today 9, no. 4 (August 1993), 2.
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and “pushing the military factions toward a locally led political process.”53An earlier
section o f this chapter provided multiple instances of when planners were not able or did
not attempt to anticipate or consider the secondary effects o f actions. However,
identification o f instances o f the successful use o f the principles o f the approach were
extremely limited, and consequently the accrued benefits were minimal. There were some
successes, particularly during the brief period o f the UNITAF deployment, the
psychological operations effort being one notable example.
The evidence leads to the conclusion that the interventions o f 1992-95 were only
marginally successful in influencing the systems o f power in Somalia to conform to
stated international objectives. At the time o f this writing, nearly ten years after the
withdrawal o f the last UNOSOM forces, the state o f the systems in Somalia remains
similar the systems in 1995. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency observes, “Numerous
warlords and factions are still fighting for control o f the capital city as well as for other
southern regions.” 54 The postulated reasons for the failures are diverse and have been the
topic o f extensive debate.
Jeffrey Clark places much o f the blame on the years o f neglect o f Somalia by the
international community and a lack o f professional capability in UN humanitarian
agencies, as well as a general ineptitude on the part o f the UN leadership.55 Oakley
concludes that the U.S. and UN “overreached when they expanded their original
mandate— without making it possible to carry out.”56 Others claim that while the overall

53. Crocker, “Lessons o f Somalia,” 4. He observes that these tasks were “undertakings o f the highest
order o f delicacy in a militarized and fragmented society like Somalia’s.”
54. CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.pdf (accessed 25 April 2005).
The assessment adds, “Suspicion o f Somali links with global terrorism further complicates the picture.”
55. Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” 3-4. Also critical o f U.S policy he describes W ashington’s response to
the crisis as “schizophrenic.”
56. Hirsch and Oakley, Som alia and Operation Restore Hope, xi.
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policy decisions were flawed, given additional time they may have succeeded. Instead, it
was the lack o f consistency and political will stay the course and help rebuild the systems
o f Somalia that were the main contributors to the calamity. Crocker argues that the
military intervention changed the local balance o f power and strengthened other elements
of Somali society, but did little to ensure that this alteration survived the departure of the
UN forces.57
While the reasons for the failures o f the intervention are multiple and myriad,
among these is the failure of the UN and U.S to understand the adversary and the
environment. Brune argues that neither Bush nor Powell understood the “vital connection
between Somalia’s political anarchy and the attainment o f success o f the ‘humanitarian’
mission.”58 Although Brune’s supposition is debatable, it is apparent that if some degree
o f understanding of the interrelationships between entities in Somali society existed, the
use of this knowledge was not optimized.
As related in the introduction to this chapter, the exceptionally weak systems in
Somalia make this a challenging scenario for application of the methodology. However, I
have used it to illustrate how the construct may be applied even in situations where the
systems are undeveloped and unstructured. I do not argue that employment o f the system
o f system construct during the UNOSOM missions in itself would have produced a
stable, self-functioning Somalia. The reasons for the failures are complex and varied and
extend far beyond the assessment of Somali systems of power in the post-Barre era. Even
the most highly developed, complete and sophisticated analysis will not compensate for
poor policy decision-making processes. Rather, the intent is to illustrate the process and

57. Crocker, “Lessons o f Somalia,” 8.
58. Brune, U nited States an d P ost-C old War Interventions, 19.
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to identify cases o f the utilization o f some elements o f the system o f systems construct in
dealing with this crisis. When employed, they enhanced the potential for successful
attainment o f the overall objectives. The extension o f that supposition is that additional
use o f the construct could improve the decision-making process. The additional case
studies that follow will support that contention.
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CHAPTER VII
KOSOVO 1999

When viewed across the broad and tragic landscape o f Balkan history, the 78 day
long aerial operation undertaken by member nations of the NATO alliance is a relatively
minor incident in the unfortunate history o f the region. The ethno-religious conflicts are
centuries old, and attempts at the establishment o f national identities and homelands have
been essentially continuous over the past several hundred years. However, this most
recent confrontation presents a case study relevant to this examination in that it can
provide several examples o f coercive actions taken to achieve alliance objectives by
influencing the systems o f national power o f an adversary.
The Kosovo intervention also is notable for multiple additional reasons. First, it
represented the initial use o f sustained military combat actions by the then 50-year-old
North Atlantic alliance. Secondly, the stated principal rationale for the action was not
self-defense o f the member nations; nor was it designed to preclude state aggression
against a third party. Lastly, it represented the use o f force against a sovereign nation to
deter alleged repression of a minority population within its own sovereign borders, i.e.,
the humanitarian crisis resulting from Serb killing and expulsion o f the majority ethnic
Albanian population in the province o f Kosovo.
Even several years after the conflict, debate abounds as to the outcome. Senior
U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials have described the
operation officially as an “overwhelming success,” while others evaluated it as “just shy
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o f a full-blown policy fiasco.” 1 While all these factors make this intervention a
fascinating case study across a wide range o f topics, the element most critical to this
demonstration is the means o f coercion utilized and the analysis o f the way in which the
planners and implementers of these actions employed a holistic, systems approach to the
adversary.
The purpose of this chapter is illustration o f the methodology— not a complete
system o f systems analysis o f the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in early 1999. I
can provide only a small sampling. Since this analysis is dependent upon unclassified
information that has been made available to the general public, the data set is limited. The
assessment relies primarily on publicly released NATO targeting data and official
Serbian claims. Most o f these were made while the conflict was ongoing, and hence, the
accuracy o f these sources is subject to challenge. This imperfect data is supplemented by
limited independent analysis. However, adequate information is available with which to
reconstruct the essential rationale for and effects resulting from the actions taken.
Although precise knowledge o f the actions employed against the selected nodes
and detailed awareness o f the influence on the target would improve the analysis, the lack
of such exactitude is not a major disadvantage to this study. Any exhaustive Battle
Damage Assessments remain classified at the time o f this writing.3 However, the
performance o f individual weapon systems, effectiveness of tactics, and the number of
1.
Success claimed in U.S Department o f Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action
Report.” Report to Congress, 31 January 2000), xvii, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf
(accessed 14 January 2005). Other official releases from the U.S. and NATO mirror this assertion. For an
opposing view, see, Ted Galen Carpenter, in NATO's Empty Victory ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington,
DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 1.
2 . 1 use the terms FRY and Yugoslavia interchangeably in the text.
3.
For example, Headquarters United States Air Force, “The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in
Operation Allied Force,” (1 April 2000) remains classified, although excerpts o f the findings have been
selectively released. The available selections suggest that the report contains more than battle damage
assessments, and that it also addresses the overall effects generated by the actions.
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tanks and bridges destroyed are only ancillary to this effort. I focus on the macro effects
o f actions.
Documentation regarding NATO objectives and, through extension, desired
effects is generally available. However, many assumptions as to the objectives o f the
Serbian side must be gleaned from official press releases and reports. Additionally, some
of the illustrations are also dependent upon press reports, the accuracy of which is
difficult to ascertain. Until the declassification of official records, these provide the best
available information and insights. Again, this condition does not seriously degrade an
analysis whose intent is to provide a demonstration o f the use o f a systems approach to
the analysis o f national power.
The degree of achievement o f objectives is important to this discussion. In some
cases, the attainment is relatively clear, even if the precise cause is less obvious. Debate
continues as to why Milosevic decided to agree to terms when he did. I will not propose
definitive answers to that question here, although the results o f detailed analysis by others
will be included where appropriate. The Kosovo intervention has been, and continues to
be, the subject o f immense interest, discussion, and debate. There is no intent to conduct
a comprehensive analysis of that campaign. Only a very few examples will be presented
with the objective o f providing illustrations of the previously presented methodology.
With the presentation o f the outline, objectives, and boundaries o f this chapter
completed, I may now conduct the presentation o f the background to the conflict and the
motivation for the subsequent intervention.
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The Impetus for Intervention
Ethnicity and history provide the principle causes of the crisis that led to the
conflict. Multiple studies have examined the complex chronicle o f the diverse peoples o f
this region, and there is no intention to reproduce those efforts here. Similarly, others
have addressed the development o f the proximate conditions for the conflict in the years
immediately preceding the operation, and this segment will include only the bare
minimum of background required to put the conflict into perspective and for the
understanding o f the sections to follow.4 My intent is to provide a foundation on the
political and social environment, which emerged from centuries o f tumultuous events,
and set the stage for the crisis in the spring of 1999.
Ethnicity is the most often cited basis for the conflict. The principal population
groupings in the area, Albanians and Serbs, differ along religious, ethnic, and language
lines. The Albanians in Kosovo are probably descended from the Illyrian tribes and are
primarily Sunni Muslims; the Serbs are Slavic and mostly eastern Orthodox.5 The
Albanians represented the indigenous population, but in the era following the fall o f the
4. N oel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short H istory (N ew York: N ew York University Press, 1998) provides an
excellent background primer. See also Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths an d Truths Started a War
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999) for an appreciation o f the complexities and impact o f
history on current events in the region. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo
Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33-64, provides a good summary o f later events. See
also Zidas Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo; Nationalism and Self-Determination,” in Understanding the
War in Kosovo, ed. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), and
Dejan Guzina, “Kosovo or Kosova - Could It Be Both,” also in Understanding the War in K osovo, ed.
Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) for a concise history o f
the region addressing both the Albanian and Serbian perspectives. Daskalovski provides a valuable
examination o f the competing claims to the territory while Guzina examines the majority-minority
relationships in Kosovo.
5. In future references, ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo will be referred to as Kosovar Albanians or
K osovars to distinguish them from their ethnic brethren living in the state o f Albania. See also Susan
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos an d Dissolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995),
esp. 47-81, for more extensive background information o f the cultural and econom ic aspects o f the region.
In 1999, the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY) was comprised o f Montenegro and Serbia, which
included the provinces o f Vojvodina and Kosovo, and included multiple nationalities. The major
protagonists were the Kosovars and the political leadership o f the province o f Serbia. I use the more
common name Kosovo to describe the province, but it is synonymous with the Albanian version, Kosova.
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Roman Empire, Slavs migrated to the area, and by the 14th century, the territory of
Kosovo became a religious and cultural center of the Balkan Slavs. Although living in
geographic proximity for centuries, the ethnic and cultural distinctions between the Serb
and Albanian populations in the region provided an unstable mixture that only needed a
catalyst to explode into violence. That force was Serbian nationalism.
The area came under Ottoman Turk control after the epic battle of Kosovo-Polje
in 1389—a defeat for the Serbs, but often described as a “mystical event” in their history.
“The story of the battle of Kosovo has become a totem or talisman o f Serbian identity, so
that this event has a status unlike that o f anything else in the history o f the Serbs.”6
Hence, the value o f the land to the Serbs cannot be determined from purely economic or
political analyses.
Due in part to the brutal Turkish administration o f the area, the many Orthodox
Serbs emigrated from present day Kosovo to more hospitable regions coincident with the
arrival o f additional Islamic Albanians into the territory. In the post-World War I
settlements, the newly created Kingdom o f Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was assigned
control o f Kosovo despite the presence o f an estimated half-million ethnic Albanians in
the region.
The immediate post World War II years and emergence o f the uniting policies o f
the Tito era saw containment of the demands for full independence by the majority
Albanians in Kosovo (hereinafter, Kosovars), reduced ethnic tensions, and a gradual
increase in self-rule for the region. An autonomous status within the Serbian Republic
was achieved in 1963, and in 1974, the official ties to Serbia were removed and Kosovo

6.
Malcolm, Kosovo, 58. It was at a rally commemorating the 600th anniversary o f the battle that
Slobodan M ilosevic achieved increased national prominence.
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became an autonomous federal republic within Yugoslavia. With the death o f Tito in
1980, and as the nation dissolved in a series o f nationalist conflicts, the Kosovars
continued their demands for full independence. By this time a combination o f a disparity
in birthrates in favor o f the Kosovars and continued emigration o f Serbs from Kosovo
resulted in additional rationale for a Kosovo free o f Serb control. However, in 1989, the
new Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status and fully
integrated Kosovo into Serbia.7
Kosovar countermoves included the establishment of a shadow government that
advocated a political settlement. However, by 1996, elements that were more radical
formed what became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army, and attacks against Serb
security forces in Kosovo ensued.8 Sporadic violence evolved into open conflict, with
official NATO sources alleging that Serb security forces killed 1,500 Kosovar Albanians
in 1998.9 The situation deteriorated, achieved increasing international attention, and
subsequently UNSCR 1160 imposed an arms embargo on the entire country. The Contact
Group for the Former Yugoslavia imposed further sanctions and threatened Milosevic

7. This step required amendments to the existing constitution. On 23 March 1989, the Assem bly o f
Kosovo voted to accept the changes, the majority o f the Albanian delegates abstained. Despite the lack o f
the required two-thirds majority, the amendments were declared to have passed. Population figures can
only be estimated due to the lack o f an inclusive census since 1981, but estimates are that in 1991 o f the
approximate 2,000,000 residents o f Kosovo 85-90% were Kosovars, and only 5-10% Serbs. See
“International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Indictment Case No. It-99-37, 24 May 1999,
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/English/mil-ii990524e.htm (accessed 13 February 2005).
8. With its roots in the Levizja Popullare e K osoves (LPK) Party, the KLA (in Albanian, Ushtria
Clirimtare E Kosoves (UCK) began as a small, poorly equipped and financed resistance movement. They
were, not surprisingly, regarded as a terrorist organization by the FRY government. References to FRY
security forces include primarily the Yugoslav Army, Vojska Jugoslavskaya (VJ); and the Interior Ministry
Forces, Ministerstvo Unuprasnif Poslava (MUP).
9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo,"
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (accessed 14 January 2005).
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with military action unless the repression o f the Kosovars receded.10 In September 1998,
UNHCR 1199 called for a cease-fire and, inter alia, the cessation o f the repression o f
civilians and the establishment of a war crime tribunal.11
The situation had deteriorated sufficiently that by the following month NATO
threatened air strikes against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY), and only last
minute personal diplomacy appeared to prevent the actual launch o f weapons. Through
discussions between Serbian government officials and representatives o f NATO and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) an agreement was reached
that provided for a partial withdrawal o f Serbian forces from Kosovo, limits on future
deployments, and establishment of a 2000 member, unarmed Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM)12
Although it is perilous to assign a specific event as the trigger for a conflict, the
killing o f 40 plus Kosovars near the village o f Racak by Serb security forces on 15
January 1999 is regarded a seminal event in the path toward military action. A direct
result was the North Atlantic Council authorizing the Secretary General to conduct air
attacks against Serbia if the Serbs continued to refuse to conduct negotiations with
representatives o f the Kosovar population. As the crisis was steadily worsening, an

10. The Contact Group was established in 1992; members were France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the
U.K., and U.S., with representatives from the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC).
Russia elected not to participate in this round o f sanctions.
11. Invoking Chapter VII o f the UN Charter the resolution restated the proscription o f external support
for the belligerents and addressed the estimated 230,000 persons who had been displaced from their homes.
12. UNSCR 1203 supported this action as w ell as N A TO ’s intention to establish an extraction force in
Macedonia to be used if KVM personnel were threatened, and an air verification mission over Kosovo to
complement the OSCE mission on the ground. United Nations Security Council, “UNSCR 1203,”
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm (accessed 21 January 2005). The KVM proved
unsuccessful as members remained powerless to prevent Serb atrocities, and the KVM was eventually
pulled out on 20 March 1999.
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international peace mission was organized in the Paris suburb o f Rambouillet. The talks
commenced on 7 February.
Milosevic’s motivation and attitude toward the Rambouillet consultations are
subject to question. Some view his participation as a means o f buying time to better
prepare for his planned intensification o f ethnic cleansing efforts (Operation Horseshoe
(Potkova).13 The initial negotiations were conducted from 6 until 23 February without
agreement, and reconvened in Paris on 15 March.14 The Kosovar representatives agreed
to the proposal; Milosevic would not. The unacceptable portions for the Serbs were the
requirements for them to accept the deployment o f a NATO-led military peacekeeping
force anywhere within the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY), and the provision that
a referendum, held within three years, would decide the province’s future sovereignty.
Milosevic viewed these as incompatible with the sovereignty o f Yugoslavia and
subsequently rejected both conditions.15
The refusal of Milosevic to sign the agreement became the proximate (sufficient)
conditions for war. Last-minute efforts to induce Milosevic to comply failed, and during

13. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO'.? Air War f o r Kosovo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 9, uses the
near simultaneous launching o f the Serb offensive, using heavy artillery and armor, in the central region
near Drenica as evidence.
14. Christopher Layne, “Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War,” in NATO's Empty Victory, ed. Ted
Galen Carpenter (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 16, disagrees with the characterization o f the
meetings as “negotiations.” In his view, “Belgrade was presented with an ultimatum and given the choice
o f signing or being bombed. See also Elizabeth Allen Dauphinee, “Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)
Assessment,” in Understanding the War in Kosovo, ed. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland,
OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003). She contends that the agreement was “fundamentally flawed from its
outset” (ibid., 117). Among its failings was its inability to reconcile the two contradictory principles o f
sovereignty and human rights
15. The preponderance o f observations tends to agree with this analysis. Stephen T. Hosner, Why
M ilosevic D ecided to Settle When He D id (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 12-15, contends that
M ilosevic believed that accepting these terms would endanger his hold on power since they would be
unacceptable to the majority o f the Serbian populace. See Annex 3 o f Independent International
Commission on Kosovo, K osovo Report, for a summary o f the proposed agreement. Full text is also
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo_rambtoc.pdf (accessed 13 February 2005).
Annex 1 provides documentation o f human rights abuses that led to the conflict.
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the evening o f 24 March, NATO commenced Operation Allied Force with the launch of
cruise missiles. Planners were told to expect a very brief air operation. This optimism was
not to be realized. It was only after the death and destruction o f a nearly three-month long
air campaign that Milosevic agreed to NATO’s demands.
The actions taken by NATO to achieve its objectives are the focus o f this
examination. Therefore, with at least a cursory description of the conditions and
environment now having been presented, the next step is to consider the objectives o f the
protagonists.

NATO Political Objectives
The condition and direction of the NATO Alliance in 1999 is important to this
discussion. The stated primary purpose of NATO is “to safeguard the freedom and
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the
principles o f the United Nations Charter.” 16 The realist rationale for establishment o f the
organization was to formalize the European-North American relationship and to establish
a mechanism for defense as a counter to any military aggression expected to come from
the Soviet Union. With the collapse o f the Soviet Union and the resulting evaporation o f
the principal threat, the political and military leadership struggled with the question o f the
rationale for continuation o f the arrangement.
As the Alliance was about to integrate three former Warsaw Pact nations as new
members, the events of March-June 1999 presented a largely unanticipated exercise of

16.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO H andbook (Brussels: NATO Office o f Information and
Press, 1998), 23.
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the experience and military doctrine developed over the 50-year history o f NATO.

17

The

stated objectives of NATO in the Kosovo crisis were only very loosely connected to the
raison d ’etre for existence o f the alliance. These were:
A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending o f violence and
repression
The withdrawal from Kosovo o f the military police and paramilitary forces
The stationing in Kosovo o f an international military presence; the unconditional and safe
return o f all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by
humanitarian aid organizations; and, the establishment o f a political framework
agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with
t

international law and the Charter o f the United Nations

t o

t

The connection to the

Rambouillet Accords suggests that this fifth objective would be unacceptable to the
Serbs.
In a post-conflict joint testimony, the senior American civilian and uniformed
military officials asserted that NATO had “strong interests at stake: (1) Serb aggression
17. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were fully incorporated into the Alliance on 12 March
1999, 12 days before the bombings commenced.
18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo. Statement
o f the Extraordinary Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held at NATO HQ on 12 April 1999 and
reaffirmed by Heads o f State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999. The US objectives were
similar. President Clinton included: 1. Demonstrate the seriousness o f N A TO ’s opposition to aggressions
and its support for peace; 2. Deter M ilosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless
civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and, 3. If necessary, damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war
against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities. See Bill Clinton, “Statement
o f President Clinton on Kosovo 24 March 1999,” White House, Office o f Press Secretary,
http://www.mthoyoke.edu/ acad/intrel/bombkos.htm (accessed 13 February 2005). A NATO press release
contended, “The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values o f democracy, human
rights and the rule o f law.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Situation in and around Kosovo,"
Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO
Headquarters,” http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1999/p99-051e.htm (accessed 14 January 2005).. A senior
U.S. officer essentially duplicated the NATO list, but added a “creation o f a Kosovar autonomy within
Yugoslavia.” U.S. Congress, House o f Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. Performance o f the
B2 Bomber in the K osovo Air Campaign, H earing before the M ilitary Procurement Subcommittee,
Statement o f Lt. Gen. Marvin R. Esmond, 106 Cong., 1st sess., 30 June 1999,
http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/ 106thcongress/99-10-19esm ond.pdf (accessed 14 January 2005).
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in Kosovo threatened peace throughout the Balkans; (2) Belgrade’s repression o f Kosovo
created a humanitarian crisis; and, (3) Milosevic’s conduct leading up to Operation Allied
Force directly challenged the credibility o f NATO.” 19 Hence, in the NATO view, the
conflict was far more than an internal Yugoslav matter; it had widespread implications
for the future, which they could not simply ignore.

Serbian Political Objectives
It is difficult to separate the personal aspirations o f Milosevic from the national
objectives o f Serbia. He was an authoritative ruler, but did not possess unconstrained
dictatorial powers. Hence, his continuation in authority was a personal objective that was
not necessarily a national aspiration. However, a trait common to most nation states is
that they will resist actions by external powers to become involved in domestic affairs.
The level of support for Milosevic notwithstanding, the perception that outside powers
were attempting to wrest away a piece o f sovereign Serb territory was reason enough to
resist.20 The preservation of Kosovo therefore was considered a legitimate national
objective.
Barry Posen argues, “Serbia had a hierarchy o f objectives.”21 Chief among these
was to preserve freedom of action to conduct unrestricted operations against the KLA, in
Kosovo. Other Serbian objectives included the maintenance o f Russian political support;

19. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Joint Statem ent on the K osovo After-Action
Review, H earing Before the Com mittee on A rm ed Services. Testimony o f William S. Cohen and General
Henry H. Shelton, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 1999, http://www.dod.mil/releases/1999/
bl0141999_bt478-99.htm l (accessed 6 January 2005).
20. Barry Posen, “The War for K osovo,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 43, observed,
“For every Serb who was w illing to fight for Kosovo for religious or historic reasons associated with the
province, there were probably several others willing to go to war on the principle that nobody takes their
land without a fight.
21. Ibid., 45.
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and gaining time for further eviction of Albanians from Kosovo. The personal objective
o f Milosevic was to maintain and enhance his own political and economic power base.
Therefore, not all the objectives of NATO and Milosevic were irreconcilable. The ending
o f the repression and violence against the Kosovars was incompatible with the Serb
objective o f freedom o f action within their own sovereign territory. An independent
Kosovo was never a stated NATO objective. However, the Serbs considered as
unacceptable the stationing in Kosovo o f an international military presence. At the onset
of the conflict, the removal of Milosevic was not a stated objective; however, his
subsequent indictment for war crimes made this an implied goal. Although, Milosevic
rejected the Rambouillet framework, most provisions were probably negotiable.
However, the stipulation for the presence of foreign forces in Kosovo was considered
incompatible with Serbian sovereignty. A change in behavior, not regime change and
establishment o f an independent state for the Kosovars, was NATO’s overall goal.
Despite the potential for a negotiated settlement, when the preferred diplomatic
efforts failed, military options became the primary vehicle to induce this desired change
in behavior. The manner in which military and other actions were applied during the
conflict is the central element in this chapter and will be addressed. However, since the
illustration o f the principles o f a system of systems analysis in the selection o f actions is
the premise o f this study, I will provide a brief depiction of such an examination.

A Representational System of Systems Analysis
I contend that in some instances during the Kosovo operation NATO utilized the
principles o f a system o f systems analysis in their selection o f actions. In order to support

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2 17

this supposition, and to illustrate further the methodology, I will present the framework
for a system o f systems analysis in Yugoslavia in 1999. The steps presented in Chapter V
are: (1) Identify the essential elements within each system; (2) determine the essential
sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4) examine nodes for node-to-node linkages; and, (5)
assign linkages between nodes. As with the previous chapter, a complete analysis is
beyond the scope o f this effort, and I provide only illustrative examples.

Essential Elements of the Systems
Political. While there is no intent here to provide more than a cursory
examination o f the political structure that existed at the time o f the intervention, a brief
overview is justified in that it provides some exposure to the complexities o f that system.
The Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed as self-proclaimed successor to
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 11 April 1992. From a structural
perspective the FRY consists of two republics, Serbia (including its two provinces
Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro. In 1999, it consisted o f three branches:
Executive—President (chief o f state), Prime Minister (head o f government), Council of
Ministers (cabinet); Legislative— Serbia and Montenegro Union Parliament; and
Judicial—Federal Court and Constitutional Court. Multiple political parties existed,
many drawn along regional and ethnic lines, e.g., Alliance o f Vojvodina Hungarians
(SVM) and Socialist People’s Party o f Montenegro. The predominant organizations were
the Serbian Radical Party (SNP), Socialist Party o f Serbia (SPS— former Communist
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Party), and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL).22 However, structure provides only a part of
the analysis, and as stated earlier, function is the critical area for consideration.
Although the constitution provides that Yugoslavia is “based on the rule o f law
and recognizes and guarantees human rights and liberties,” in reality it was an
authoritarian regime with its core within the executive branch. By 1999, Yugoslavia was
beset with poverty, ethnic violence, and an authoritarian political system, due in most part
to a decade o f warfare. Additionally, the legacy from the Tito years o f a strong central
government and power concentrated in one individual gave to the president a degree of
power far in excess o f the constitutional provisions. Therefore, the sub-element selected
for examination is the executive branch; an obvious choice for designation as a node is
the President, and member o f the SPS, Slobodan Milosevic.
The strength o f the system was the connection between the regime and intense
Serbian nationality. Milosevic had skillfully exploited the deeply rooted but suppressed
sense of Serbian identity and nationalism. However, this was insufficient to preserve his
hold on power; accordingly, he needed additional support mechanisms. This included
establishment o f ties with commercial and political entities throughout Yugoslavia. The
critical vulnerability of the system was the need for the ruling party to form coalitions to
maintain power, complicated by the existence o f quasi-independent provinces. Therefore,
the political and economic patronage o f the senior government leadership becomes an
area upon which to focus the analysis.

22. Europa World Yearbook 1999 (London: Europa Publications, Inc., 1999), 3962-65.
23. Information consolidated from multiple sources including ibid., 3956-70. Materials for an analysis
o f the political system are immense. Available analyst resources and time limit the depth o f the research,
not the amount o f information. While open sources can provide the foundation for the analysis,
determination o f node-to-node linkages will require multiple additional sources, including classified
information. Importantly, while determination o f structure may be readily attainable, function o f the system
is more difficult and complex and requires a must more intense level o f analysis.
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Economic. Many considered Yugoslavia the most reformed socialist economy,
although Serbia and Montenegro had a gross domestic product (GDP) below the
Yugoslav national average in the late 1980’s.24 However, due to a near continuous series
of armed conflicts, by 1998 the economy was a shambles, with essentially no foreign
trade and continued hyperinflation o f the dinar. Unemployment was approximately 30 per
cent, and the overall economy was operating at around half of the 1989 level. GDP was
approximately $24 billion in purchasing parity with a per capita income o f around
$2,300.25 In early 1999 only around 37 per cent o f the Yugoslav economy was produced
in the private sector, and only 31 per cent o f the population employed in the private
cooperative and mixed sector.26 The economy rated among the ten most corrupt in the
world, and estimates o f the black or gray economy ranged from 30-50 per cent o f GDP.
The post-Tito privatization effort resulted in concentration o f these financial interests in
the hands of economic and political elites.
Industry, mainly petrochemical, metallurgy, automobile manufacture, and
electronics, comprised the largest part o f the economy. Ferrous and nonferrous mining
was a significant portion o f the sector, while agriculture was primarily for internal
consumption. Major exports were machinery and transportation equipment, as well as
some raw materials. Imports included finished materials and products and some

24.
Serbia itself was one o f the more highly developed econom ies within the FRY. For perspective, the
FRY was on the level o f Turkey in purchasing power parity.
25.
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons an d Non-Lessons o f the Air an d M issile Campaign in Kosovo
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 169. Due to the current fluctuations and the gray and black econom ies, a
wide range o f econom ic figures for this period has been published.
26.
M ilica Uvalic, “Kosovo's Economy,” Southeast Europe a n d Black Sea Studies 1, no. 1 (Summer
2000), 12. He notes that “Some 75 state owned enterprises, which are among the largest and most
profitable firms and represent 35 per cent o f the econom y” were excluded from privatization or to be
privatized within a special government program.
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agricultural commodities, although Yugoslavia was a net importer o f food.

27

Hence, the

essential sub-elements would be heavy industry, metallurgy, mining, and agriculture. For
illustration, I will utilize the heavy manufacturing sector.
A strength o f the economic system related to its ability to withstand attacks was
its dispersed infrastructure and its relative self sufficiency in meeting basic needs.
Additionally, its limited production capability had ties to other fragile economies in the
region that would be affected by any strikes against facilities in Yugoslavia.

A key

vulnerability o f any industrial production is the availability o f fuel, raw materials, and
electrical power. Consequently, petroleum product refining and distribution are critical
sub-elements o f the economic system, and these will be further developed. Automobile
production was a large part o f this sector. In the search for nodes, the Zastava automobile
plant at Kragujevac would likely appear. The plant, with an estimated 24,000 employees,
produced over 14,000 cars per year.29 The concentration of wealth in the hands o f an
oligarchy also presents vulnerability appropriate for exploitation.
Military. The military forces consisted of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the
paramilitary Interior Police (MUP). The MUP were lightly armed, and under the
command o f the Ministry o f the Interior. Regular army personnel numbered over
110,000, with 1,200 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, and over 1,400 artillery pieces.

27. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 3958-61. Reliable foreign trade data is likewise elusive, but imports
were believed to significantly exceed exports. Regardless o f the lack o f precise data, most analyses indicate
a very fragile econom y that is susceptible to external influence.
28. The steel industries o f Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic all had connections to that o f
Serbia. Christian Kohl, “Cost o f War: $3 50m to Steelmakers,” American M etal Market, 20 May 1999, 2.
Steel production in the FRY was in decline prior to the NATO operation.
29. An additional 40,000 subcontractors were put out o f work. See also, Deyan Anastasijeic, “Nation
Builders: Western Leaders Want to Help Balkans Move from Self-Destruction to Reconstruction,” Time
International August 1999, 30-33.
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Anti-air systems were the primary threat to the NATO air campaign and consisted
mainly of SA-2 (S-75 Dvina or Guideline), 24 fire units, SA-3 (Perchora-M or Goa, 24
fire units), and SA-6 (2K12 Kvadrat or Gainful, 16 fire units) surface to air missiles. SA9 and SA13 tactical systems, man portable systems, and air defense guns augmented the
strategic systems.30 A redundant command and control system that included landlines
supported these. Serb air forces consisted o f an estimated 240 combat aircraft, including
MIG-21 and MIG-29 interceptors. The Serb air defense system was most effective
against targets at low altitudes, i.e., less than 15,000 feet.31
The major ground elements in and near Kosovo were the VJ Third Army,
supported by the First and Second Army units. These were primary highly mobile forces
that operated in small combined arms battle groups. The forces were coordinated through
a command and control system with multiple redundancies.

19

Led by a cadre of

professional officers, and originally designed for a mission of making a Soviet invasion
as painful as possible, Serb forces were capable o f enduring attacks from a superior force
without breaking. Their military infrastructure was hardened, camouflaged and
dispersed.
The key vulnerability o f the Serb military was the clear mismatch when compared
to the overwhelming force that the NATO Alliance could employ. The forces on the
ground in Kosovo and their ability to maneuver and conduct their operations against the
30. Cordesman, Lessons an d Non-Lessons o f the A ir an d M issile Campaign in Kosovo, 197-98.
31. Bruce R Nardulli et al., D isjointed War: M ilitary O perations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Arroyo Center, 2002), 28.
32. At the beginning o f 1999 the commander o f the 3rd Army was Colonel General Samardzic and the
Commander o f the Pristina Corps was General Nebojsa Pavkovic. Personal loyalty to M ilosevic was a
factor in promotions and obtaining senior military positions. For a more extensive listing see, “Operations
in Kosovo: Y ugoslav Order o f Battle,” Janes Defence Weekly, 1 April 1999, 5. For a more comprehensive
assessment o f FRY military forces see, Cordesman, Lessons an d Non-Lessons o f the A ir and M issile
Campaign in Kosovo, 191-241.
33. Lambeth, NATO's Air War fo r K osovo, 17-21.
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Kosovars were an essential sub-element. Additionally, the ability o f the Serb air defense
system to protect those ground forces and the command and control and logistics support
were essential sub-elements of the military system. Therefore, specific nodes were air
defense command and control facilities, air defense radars, airfields and fuel and massed
ammunition supplies.
Social. The population o f Yugoslavia in 1999 was just over 10 million, with all
but 600,000 living within Serbia or its provinces (including Kosovo). Serbs comprised 62
per cent o f the population with Albanians being the largest minority group (16.5 per
cent). The culture o f Serbia is inexorably intertwined with the complex and often tragic
history of the region.34 A displayed willingness to stand up to both the West and the
Soviet Union, and to steer its own course during the cold war was emblematic o f this
independent spirit. Serb nationalism was a primary factor and strength o f the social
system.35 Therefore, the loyalties and connections o f the general Serb populace to the
central government and the political leadership was an essential element o f the social
system. Additionally, as illustrated earlier, Serbs regarded Kosovo with an almost
mystical importance.
Religion also is a factor in Serb society. Most o f the ethnic Serbs were at least
nominally Christian, with the Eastern Orthodox Church containing the primary
denominations. The Serbian Orthodox Church has always been a major component of

34. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 3967-71. The amount o f published material on the culture and social
systems o f the FRY is immense. Among the most relevant studies is Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. She
notes the differences between the “rural culture, based on obligations to kin, intergenerational transfer o f
knowledge, and the social influence o f the clergy,” and the culture o f the cities. She contends that socialism
reinforced this cultural divide (ibid., 238).
35. “Serbian roots are in Kosovo, and everything that is connected to the Serbs throughout the past
centuries is there. Every Serb is intimately connected to it.” Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with
Commander o f the Yugoslav 3rd Army, Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html (accessed 6 January 2005).

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223

Serb society, both in a cultural and religious sense. The Church had survived Ottoman
regimes and the atheistic communism o f the Tito era. The Church top-level leadership
maintained the position that Kosovo must be an integral part o f Serbia. Milosevic was
eager to associate with the Church hierarchy, however due in part to his communist
legacy, the level of support for him personally varied.
Information, its means and manner o f distribution, and the sources from which the
general population could obtain it, were critical to nurturing and reinforcement o f this
nationalist culture. The media was largely and increasingly government controlled. The
Belgrade published newspaper Politika, represented a primary print source, and
Radiotelevizija Srbije (RTS) the primary broadcast media. Both would be considered to
be nodes. The vulnerability was the central government’s ability to broadcast its own
message, while concurrently denying the populace access to alternative versions of
conditions and events from abroad.
I have presented in a few pages a very cursory analysis o f the political, economic,
military and social (PEMS) systems, some o f their essential elements and sub-elements,
and a sampling o f nodes. A fully developed systems o f systems analysis would use this
type o f approach, but would require a far greater depth of analysis and would produce a
larger set o f nodes. Additionally, a much more highly developed and detailed knowledge
on these nodes would be required. For illustration, Table 7 presents a further depiction of
potential nodes in the 1999 FRY. Some o f these nodes will be used in subsequent
examples.
While the level of analysis provided thus far can be o f some value to the decision
maker, it falls short in providing the advantages that a completed system o f systems
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analysis could offer. More specifically, an understanding of the connections between
nodes within and across the PEMS systems could contribute to (1) amplification o f the
effects o f actions; (2) indication o f possible undesired effects; and, (3) recognition o f
alternative actions. The objectives requires examining potential linkages between nodes.

Table 7. Sampling o f Nodes by PEMS Area
Elements

PEMS System
Political

Economic

Executive

Senior leadership

Slobodan M ilosevic

Political Parties

Socialist Party o f Serbia

Belgrade Headquarters
Mila Markovic

Ministries

Yugoslav United Left
(JUL)
Ministry o f Interior

Manufacturing

Automobiles
Steel
Construction equipment

Communications
Banking

Serbia Telecom

Petroleum Refining
Utilities
Transportation
infrastructure

Electric Power
Bridges
Ports

Military

Air Defense

Anti-air missile force

Command and Control

Social

Nodes

Sub-Elements

Aviation
Logistics/Re-supply

Interceptor force
D iesel Fuel

Media

Television
Print

Religion

MUP Headquarters at Kula
Milicija
Zastava Plant Complex
Steel Works Sartid
14 Octobar factory at
Krusavec
Relay site near Srbobran
National Bank o f
Yugoslavia
Petrochemicals at Pancevo
Belgrade Transformer Yard
Danube Bridge near Novi
Sad
Fuel terminals at Bar
SA-3 Battalion near
Batajinica
Belgrade Air Defense
Center
Obvra Military airfield
Storage site at Srbobran
RTS Studios Belgrade FMTV RADREL Mt. Avala
Politika
Bishop Artemije
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Node Linkages - The System o f Systems
Many o f the linkages within military systems are readily apparent, and planners
routinely have utilized this type o f analysis. For example, ground forces must be supplied
and sustained. Therefore, provision and replacement of equipment, weapons, fuel, food,
water, and personnel are critical to military operations. Recognizing this, an adversary
will use the connections between manufacturing, storage, and transportation facilities in
their overall planning. Hence, the means o f supply, including the lines o f communication
into an area, will be attacked.
Bridges, railroad lines, road intersections, storage sites and the enablers o f
transport, e.g., diesel fuel, are often targeted as well as the forces in the field themselves.
Similarly, the effectiveness of an interceptor aircraft is severely degraded if the target
detection and command and control facilities are not functioning. For example, the
effectiveness of the SA-3 battalion near Batajinica would be affected by actions taken
against its related command and control facilities. The premise is that if the desired effect
is degrading the capability o f the surface to air missiles, then this may be achieved
through indirect attack on the related elements o f the command and control system. The
multiplier effect is that removal of the command and control may also influence other air
defense facilities. Hence, targets such the integrated air defense system (IADS) related
radar site at Urosevac were attacked with the intent of amplifying the effect o f the
weapons deployed beyond the target itself.
Similarly, in economic systems, the sources o f power and fuel for a facility may
be determined and the connections between nodes established. For example, assume that
the Zastava auto plant is dependent upon the Sartid steel works for materials. Both o f
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these are affected by any changes to the facilities that produce power e.g., the Kolubara
Power Plant, to the steel complex. Hence, any disruption of electrical power production
will be likely to produce cascading effects. Any dependence on supply presents
vulnerabilities and opportunities for indirect actions to achieve influences on another
node. Not all the nodes will be within the geographic boundaries o f the nation being
assessed. In a global economy, some of these connections will extend beyond national
borders.
The connection is not always apparent when multiple systems are involved. In the
Yugoslav political system the connections between the leadership of the
Socialist Party o f Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav United Left (JUL) are not difficult to
ascertain, since in this instance they were Slobodan Milosevic and Mila Markovic—
husband and wife. Political connections to financial interests are often intentionally
concealed and are normally difficult to establish. Political support is often a perishable
commodity, and connections between political and social nodes are often transient and
dependent upon events. Perception becomes reality, and nodes that promulgate
information are critical to influencing opinion and political support.
A depiction o f a complete set of nodes and their connections in the 1999
Yugoslavia is well beyond the scope of this effort. It also is unnecessary in order to
adequately present selected examples to demonstrate the proposed methodology. The
supposition that needs support is that the principles o f a system o f systems analysis were
utilized in the NATO operations against Yugoslavia, albeit not overtly. Therefore, an
efficient and appropriate means o f completing this objective is to select specific instances
where NATO planners utilized the existence of nodal connections. This first requires a
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revisit o f the political objectives and how the military objectives were developed to
support these goals.
Military Objectives
Not surprisingly, the U.S. and NATO objectives for the use o f force were closely
aligned. These were stated succinctly as the Three D ’s :
1. Demonstrate the seriousness o f NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the
Balkans
2. Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and
create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing, and
3. Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread war to
■
JiT

neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations.
The actions required to achieve the second and third objectives likely would result in
attainment o f the first. Therefore, the measures conducted by NATO in pursuit o f those
last two goals will be the focus o f further analysis. The military objectives o f Milosevic
were relatively simple, i.e., to withstand the limited bombing offensive and to wait for the
NATO nations to become frustrated and abandon the military strategy. This would result
in presentation o f more favorable terms during future negotiations.
Determination o f primacy among NATO’s objectives was, and continues to be, a
topic o f discussion and debate. The NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
36. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services. “Joint Statement on the Kosovo AfterAction Review. The attacks would be conducted in five phases: Phase 0 - deployment o f assets into
theater; Phase 1 - establish air superiority over Kosovo and degrade command and control over the whole
o f the FRY; Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and those FRY forces south o f 44 deg; Phase
3 would expand air operations against a wider range o f targets; and Phase 4 would redeploy as required.
U.S. Department o f Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 8, refers to a Limited
Air Response option that was later incorporated into Phase 1 o f the air campaign.
37. Hosner, Why M ilosevic D ecided to Settle When H e D id, 19-34. The author contends that M ilosevic
may have expected a much more limited campaign and that he believed that the NATO nations would not
be able to maintain cohesion through a more expanded conflict.
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(SACEUR), U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, believed that the Serb forces operating in
Kosovo were the center o f gravity and should be the primary target o f the campaign
(Objective 2 preeminent). The operational air commander of NATO air forces in the
region, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, did not share this view. He
believed that attacking critical infrastructure within Serbia itself was the preferred
strategy (Objective 3 most important). Although actions taken at times served both
objectives, they more frequently did not. The air campaign was based on the phases
depicted in Figure 19.

SET &
MAINTAIN
CONDITIONS

ISOLATE

DECIMATE
Industry
Power
Forces in the Field

Roads & Bridge Network
Petroleum Refineries, Storage & Distro
Command, Control and Communications
VJ/MUP - Leadership and Sustainment
IADS

Figure 19. Allied Force Campaign Plan38

38.
Depiction adapted from U. S. Department o f Defense, “29 April 1999 US DOD Press Briefing,”
http://www.defenselink.m il/news/Aprl999/990429-J-0000K -001.jpg (accessed 22 February 2005). Industry
and power were not included in the DOD slide. Those blocks were labeled “Classified.” Cordesman,
Lessons an d Non-Lessons o f the A ir an d M issile Campaign in Kosovo, 23, inserts these under D ecim ate in
his adaptation o f the slide. Although depicted as a timeline from left to right, there is no clear delineation
between phases, e.g., some power facilities were attacked during the initial days o f the campaign if they
were determined to be linked to military nodes.
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The Set and Maintain Conditions phase focuses on the Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS) and the ability to command and control the VJ (military) and MUP
(paramilitary) forces in the field. The isolation o f those forces required additional strikes
against command and control facilities, but also required attacks on vital infrastructure.
Since many o f these entities in the Decimate Phase were dual-use, i.e., utilized by both
the military and civilian sectors, the effect o f attacks on these nodes influenced multiple
PEMS areas.
When the air operations commenced on 24 March, engagement o f fixed targets
was limited to IAD sites and military command and control (C2) facilities. Despite the
focus on VJ/MUP related targets, the first week o f the campaign witnessed strikes against
some power transmission facilities, and other not primarily military targets such as the
civilian airfield at Batajnica.39 Attacks were concentrated on targets that could be
described as nodes within the military system, with choke points and strategic
marshalling areas getting special emphasis. These targets were engaged with great
precision and the weapons performed largely as intended. However, the successes in this
endeavor did not appear to attain the stated objective.
Despite the admitted failure to achieve the prime objective, subsequent actions
continued to focus primarily on influencing the Serb forces in the field, although this
objective included attacks on dual use infrastructure such as bridges and petroleum
refining facilities. Coincident with the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April, the
target list was enlarged to include strategic targets, including industrial, media, and
infrastructure sites. The shift was to concentrate on what had become characterized as
39.
The first day targets were classified as 42% forces on the ground; 21% air defense; and, 15%
command and control. U.S. Department o f D efense, "DOD N ew s Briefing 21 May 1999,"
http://www.defeselink.mil/news/M ayl999/990521-J0O0Ok-002.jpg (accessed 22 February 2005).
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“the four pillars o f Milosevic’s power—the political machine, the media, the security
forces, and the economic system.40 Since strikes on the dispersed VJ forces were not
successful, subsequent attacks now, “concentrated instead on second-order effects by
going after bases, supplies, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).”41 With this redirection
o f strategy, the utilization o f the principles o f a system o f systems approach was more
evident. To further support this premise, and continuing with the PEMS construct,
examples will be provided from each of the non-military systems.
Political. Since the paramount political node was Milosevic himself, and his
ability to maintain his position as President, NATO’s concentration was on him and the
nodes related to his power base. However, a direct approach was not possible. NATO
consistently and unequivocally asserted that the elimination o f Milosevic was not a
objective: “We are not targeting Milosevic,” a spokesman claimed, although he admitted
that they were “certainly targeting what makes him what he is.”42 Therefore, operations
were directed at the nodes linked to him. These would be both internal and external to
Yugoslavia.
A RAND study contends that Milosevic thought that he could exploit Russia’s
support for Yugoslavia.43 This was based on the unwavering backing that Yugoslav
delegation had receive from the Russians at Rambouillet and the historical and cultural
connections between the two Slav nations. The subsequent actions o f NATO support this
40. Lambeth, NATO's A ir War f o r K osovo, 39. These equate to the PEMS systems proposed here.
41. Ibid., 29.
42. A NATO spokesperson added: “We will go after the brain as much as w e go after the fingertips.”
Jamie Shea, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 20 April 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/
press/p990420.htm (accessed 22 February 2005).
43. Hosner, Why M ilosevic D ecided to Settle When He Did, 33. This assumption was not without
justification. Shortly after the bombing commenced the Russian Duma by a vote o f 279 to 30, demanded
that the Russian government send aid and advisors to the FRY. Posen, “The War for Kosovo,”51, adds that
Russia also was motivated by resentment over what was perceived as N A TO ’s long-term efforts to
dominate Europe.
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contention since a significant effort was made to break or weaken this relationship. The
node utilized was the Russian government and its Special Envoy Victor Chernomyrdin
who eventually convinced Milosevic that Russia would not come to its aid.44 The official
U.S. report on the conflict contends “the alliance’s continuous efforts to engage Russia in
diplomacy proved critical to achieving the settlement.”45
The political isolation o f Milosevic was made a priority. On 27 May, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia formally charged Milosevic
with “Crimes Against Humanity and Violations o f the Laws or Customs o f War.”46 This
significantly assisted in attainment o f this NATO objective. The sub-element most
influenced by this action was the general populace o f Yugoslavia upon whose support the
Milosevic regime depended. Additionally, the chance o f Milosevic obtaining any external
support, even from nations who condemned the NATO actions, was all but eliminated by
the indictment. Thus, the political system was influenced primarily through external
means, with the discrediting of Milosevic and the deterioration o f his political support.
Economic. Attacks against military targets also resulted in effects on the
economic system, since many facilities were overtly or covertly dual-use. As a result,
destruction or degradation o f these facilities produced effects on the economic and social

44. Despite anti-western sentiments over the bombings, the Russian government became the primary
intermediary between NATO and M ilosevic. See Carpenter, in N A T O ’s Empty Victory, 77-91, for
expansion on this peculiar relationship. The author contends that the Kosovo campaign resulted in a
marked deterioration in relations between Russia and the West.
45. U.S Department o f Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, “ 13. Tim Judah,
Kosovo: War an d Revenge (N ew Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 274, provides additional
insights and addresses the personal element observing that Chernomyrdin “did not like M ilosevic.”
46. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Indictment,” 4. Four others were
included in the indictment M ilosevic was identified as the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de
fa cto control o f the federal government.” Although NATO exercised no direct control over the activities o f
the tribunal, the timing o f the indictment clearly supported NATO objectives. The next day a NATO
spokesman declared: “This morning the people o f Yugoslavia have woke up to be the first people in history
to live under the rule o f an indicted war criminal.” Jamie Shea, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 28
May 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990528a.htm (accessed 22 February 2005).
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systems as well as on the military. Examples from the Kosovo campaign include the
Zastava factory in Kragujevac that reportedly produced munitions as well as cars and
trucks, the Sloboda industrial unit in Cacak that produced ammunition in addition to its
output o f vacuum cleaners, and the 14 Oktobar plant at Krusevac that reconditioned tank
engines while also producing heavy construction equipment.47
Electric power is a commodity with both civilian and military utility. Attacks on
fixed power generation infrastructure have a greater impact on the former, since many
military facilities have backup systems. By late April, the NATO target list had expanded
to include electric power transformers supplying command and control centers near
Belgrade. Although making no attempt to conceal the strikes on those targets, the official
NATO position was that their intention was to go after the transformers and “edges o f the
power system,” in a manner that would limit irreparable harm to the power infrastructure.
This desire to minimize unnecessary permanent damage also influenced the selection of
specific weapons. After extensive debate, on 3 May, United States Air Force (USAF) F117A’s deployed BLU114/B’s, a formerly highly classified weapon that uses graphite
filaments to disrupt electrical power lines, substations, and power generation plants.
Attacks on these facilities produced multiple effects, not all limited to the military
system. One analyst argues, “it seems logical that NATO attacks on power facilities must
have a political and economic impact, and an impact on public opinion.”49

47. Steven Erlanger, “Bombing Unites Serb Army as It Debilitates Economy,” The New York Times, 30
April 1999. An estimated 100,000 people were estimated to be unemployed as a result o f the NATO
bombing, 15,000 at the Zastava plant alone.
48. Bryan Bender, “US 'Soft Bombs' Prove NATO Point,” Janes Defence Weekly, 10 May 1999, 13.
Other sources refer to this weapon as the CBU-94. See also Nardulli et al., D isjointed War: M ilitary
Operations in Kosovo, 1999, 38. Most resistance came from the French who were concerned about possible
civilian casualties. The RAND analysis concluded that the effect on the civilian population was greater than
the impact on the military that had backup generators for their systems.
49. Cordesman, Lessons and Non-Lessons o f the A ir an d M issile Campaign in K osovo, 181.
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Specific connections between the political and economic nodes were at times
difficult to ascertain. However, as a NATO spokesman related, “Yugoslavia is a state
based on nepotism, as a result it is ‘almost impossible’ to strike an industrial target
without having an effect on Milosevic’s cronies or family members.”50 While during the
conflict there normally was no acknowledgement o f direct targeting o f commercial
activities connected to the friends and family o f Milosevic, some knowledgeable analysts
and observers contend that this was a key factor in the ultimate decision for his
capitulation.51 The supposition is that if NATO threatened the basis o f their wealth and
power, supporters could be turned against the regime. A later study for the U.S. Congress
concluded, “Though NATO spokesmen emphasized that all targets had military
significance, the air strikes were increasingly targeted against economic and political
infrastructure.”52
Among several economic-political connections postulated are Dragan Tomic,
Director o f Yugo Petrol; Milan Beko, director of the Zastava automobile plant and a
former Minister of Privatization; and, Zivota Kosic, who headed Duvanska Industrija Nis.
Additionally, a radio station had been linked to Milosevic’s daughter, Marija, and a
tobacco factory in Nis was connected to his son, Marko.53 All these facilities were
recipients of NATO ordnance.

50. Shea, “Press Conference, 20 April 1999.” The stated primary purpose o f attacks on utilities and
industrial facilities was to cause difficulties to the military com plex in the FRY.
51. This determination o f linkages was reportedly called “Marix” and developed by the CIA. General
Clark reportedly denied any knowledge o f the operation. Jim Mokhiber, “Why Did M ilosevic Give Up?”
Public Broadcasting Service, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/fighting/giveup.htm
(accessed 18 February 2005).
52. Paul E. Gallis, “Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force,” (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 19 November 1999). These were determined to be “targets o f value to the
regime” and intended “to force the political capitulation o f M ilosevic.”
53. Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property,” New
York Times, 19 April 1999. See also “NATO Strike Targets M ilosevic Inner Circle,” Financial Times, 21
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Social. A key element in Serb culture is nationalism. Milosevic attempted to
portray himself as the defender o f Serb territory and honor and to translate this role into
political power. The Yugoslav media was the major source o f information for the Serb
populace, and therefore became a likely source o f nodes. Both broadcast and print media
were essentially state controlled and consequently a source o f propaganda for Milosevic.
Hence, from the NATO perspective, they became justifiable targets. A notable and
contentious episode in the conflict was the 20 April attack on the Socialist Party o f Serbia
(SPS) Belgrade headquarters, which also was the site o f a radio transmitter for
Radiotelevizija Srbije (RTS). A senior NATO official, in justifying the attack, argued that
the party headquarters was “an integral part o f the strategic communications network”
that was vital to the control apparatus of the Milosevic regime.54
Public opinion in Yugoslavia was considered important enough that President
Clinton presented a video address to the Serbian people emphasizing “that the United
States and our European allies have no quarrel with the Serbian people,” and called upon
Serbs to “join with us in seeking an end to the needless and avoidable conflict.”55 In the
desire to influence the social system of Yugoslavia, nodes that could influence public
opinion became the primary focus o f alliance efforts.

April 1999. Pending any future release o f currently classified information, the accuracy o f these reports
cannot be confirmed. However, within the NATO A lliance development o f intelligence on financial
connections is a sensitive issue.
54. Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Marani, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 21 April 2001,”
http://www.nato.int/ kosovo/press/p990421a (accessed 18 February 2005).A later NATO spokesman
declared that M ilosevic used television and radio stations “to suppress the truth and are integral to his
ability to conduct his brutal campaign.” Brig. Gen. Walter Jertz, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels,
23 May 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990523a.htm (accessed 18 February 2005).
55. Cable N ew s Network, “Text o f President Clinton Videotaped Address to the Serbian People,” 26
March 1999, http://www.cnn.com/world/europe/9903/26/clinton.transcript/index.htm (accessed 13
February 2005). Determination o f the effect o f this broadcast, or even o f the number o f Serbs who may
have viewed it, is problematic. However, the demonstrations in support o f the regime immediately
following the commencement o f the bombing suggest that its impact was minimal.
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It is apparent that NATO attempted to achieve its objectives through actions
against a set o f nodes designed to influence the behavior of Slobodan Milosevic. These
ranged from high-level external entities to specific military command and control
facilities, industrial plants, and media broadcast sites. The intent was to make Milosevic
and the Serbian people change their behavior in Kosovo or to pay a strategically
significant price for not doing so. Unable to achieve its goals, NATO turned to a
campaign designed to damage Serbia’s capacity to expel the Kosovars by degrading
Yugoslavia’s ability to wage military operations. The NATO strategy is addressed next.

Effects o f the Coercive Actions
Table 8 depicts the categories of targets struck by NATO’ aircraft.56

Table 8. Categories o f Targets Engaged
Category

Total

D estroyed

D am aged

Counter-regime

7

1

6

Electrical power

19

6

9

Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL)

30

13

17

C4I

88

31

33

Bridges and Railroads

68

39

16

Military industry

17

4

10

56.
William R Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: The Most Precise Application o f Air Power in History,”
in War over Kosovo: Politics an d Strategy in a G lobal Age, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 22. Attributed to the USAF Air War Over Serbia Study
Group information that was made available to the author.
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At a post-conflict congressional hearing a senior USAF officer testified that the goal of
Allied Force was to degrade and diminish the Serb-led military. To this end, NATO
aircraft reduced oil-refining capacity to zero; destroyed almost 40% o f the FRY military’s
fuel supplies and more than two-thirds of Yugoslavia’s capability to manufacture
ammunition.57 Industrial facilities were often dual-use and therefore deemed to be
legitimate targets. The official justification for destruction of the bridges was to cause
“Delays and disruptions in delivery of military equipment, fuel distribution, and civilian
staples.58
Although many assessments are available, Stephen Hosner effectively captures
the most often stated and best-supported conclusions. He contends that the bombing
campaign generated pressure on Milosevic to compromise; and that most o f the impetus
resulted from damages to Serbia’s dual-use infrastructure. He further argues, “Attacks on
purely military targets probably did not provide a major source o f pressure.”59 Ivo
Daadler and Michael O ’ Hanlon expand on this conclusion but diverge on the
effectiveness o f the actions, asserting, “the military objectives o f the bombing campaign
were only indirectly related to the overriding political objectives o f achieving a durable
peace.”60 Although the direct attacks on Serb forces did employ some o f the elements o f
the system of systems approach, e.g., attacks on air defense C2 facilities as a means of

57. House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Congress, House o f Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services. Performance o f the B2 Bomber in the Kosovo A ir Campaign, ”32.
58. U.S. Department o f D efense, “DOD N ew s Briefing 30 April 1999,” http://www.defenselink.mil/
new s/Aprl999/990430-J-000K -004.htm l (accessed 13 February 2005). Emphasis added. This represents
one o f the few acknowledgements o f an attempt to interdict supplies to the civilian population. The stated
effect o f the attacks on these lines o f communications included “Significant impact on sustainment and
ground operations.”
59. Hosner, Why M ilosevic D ecid ed to Settle When He D id, xvii. He estimates that M ilosevic’s primary
concern was increased bombing. If the campaign lasted beyond the summer months, loss o f electric power
would have threatened heating o f 75% o f Serbian homes.
60. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 210.
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degrading the anti-air missile threat, the segment of the conflict analysis most relevant to
this study are the effects across political, economic, military, and social (PEMS)
boundaries. Once the effort shifted to indirect approaches to influence Milosevic, the use
of this construct becomes more apparent. The availability of petroleum products provides
one good example.
The limited refining capabilities o f Yugoslavia were quickly destroyed, and
storage and transport capabilities were gradually being degraded through methodical
attacks. As Table 8 indicates, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) targets were a major
component of NATO strike plans. However, two factors worked against NATO’s
objectives. First, VJ and MUP forces in the field required very little gasoline and diesel
fuel to operate. Their needs could be met with only a few truckloads per day. Secondly,
the air strikes did little to reduce the import of petroleum products into Yugoslavia by
land or by sea. The principal seaports of Yugoslavia were Bar and Kotor Bay in
Montenegro. Through diplomatic activity imports from neighboring countries were
reduced, but smuggling across borders continued. However, despite the effort to further
reduce POL supplies, a full embargo and naval blockade were never implemented.
A political node connected to these economic seaport nodes was Montenegrin
President Djukanovic. A former ally o f Milosevic, he possessed an independent nature
and successfully ran against his former mentor’s candidate. Although he condemned the
NATO bombing, he resisted Serbian pressure and criticized VJ/MUP activities in
Kosovo. Recognizing this thorn in the side of Milosevic, NATO provided Montenegro
with a temporary security guarantee.61 Some analysts contend that if NATO had been

61.
Ibid., 128. This guarantee did not protect Montenegro from air strikes. The radar sites at Podgorica
and the airfield at Golobovci were hit in the very early days o f the conflict.
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able to cut off foreign oil supplies as well as destroying the refineries and existing storage
S ')

facilities, the mobility o f FRY forces in Kosovo may have been affected.

Hence, a

combination o f diplomatic, economic, and military efforts was executed, although the
effectiveness o f the effort is arguable.
Another example related to the strategy of influencing Milosevic though an
indirect approach was the action taken against industrial facilities associated with his
family and political supporters. Additionally, the European Union took steps to freeze the
assets o f more than 300 Milosevic supporters who were believed to have funds secreted
in European banks. This action followed on to a visa ban intended to keep Milosevic’s
cronies in Yugoslavia and allowing them to share the dangers and privations resulting
from the bombing.63
Strikes against electrical power production and its associated nodes had
consequences across PEMS areas. The already addressed economic impact was
reinforced by the eventual effect on the Serb populace and their support for the regime.
While initial air strikes were met with scorn and defiance, the attacks after late April
steadily wore down civilian morale. The unemployment resulting from the damage to
electrical power facilities exacerbated the already pitiful standard o f living in Yugoslavia.
While the graphite fiber weapons were intended to minimize permanent damage, the
early May attacks knocked out power to an estimated 70 per cent o f Yugoslavia.

62. Ibid., 146. They note that SFOR troops were successful in restricting oil imports from Bosnia.
Although lasting longer than both sides had foreseen, the duration o f the 78-day conflict did not allow for
POL shortages to have a full impact.
63. “War in the Balkans— Leader's Cronies Face Loss o f 20m Pounds in A ssets,” The IndependentLondon, 31 May 1999, 6. Among those FRY government officials identified were Bogoljub Karic, a
Minister without Portfolio, and Dusan Simic, the Mayor o f Pristina.
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By late May, the U.S. claimed that public dissent against Milosevic was growing
within Serbia. “Wages are no longer being paid. Fear is mounting. People are beginning
to turn against the regime and call it to account.”64 This sampling suggests that NATO
was successful in using the knowledge o f FRY systems, and the connections between
elements within these, to amplify the effects o f their actions. However, not all secondary
effects were desired or anticipated.

The Unintended Secondary Effects
The examples cited earlier propose instances where the principles o f a system of
systems analysis allowed NATO planners to amplify the impact o f their actions and to
consider alternative actions and nodes. However, there were instances where unintended
effects also resulted. Chief among these was the increase in VJ/MUP operations during
the initial days o f the Allied Force. During the initial stages o f the bombing campaign the
degree o f ethnic cleansing activity in Kosovo accelerated. Some observers contend, “air
power had little or no impact on the Serb’s efforts to expel Kosovars from their
homeland.”65 Another independent analysis posits that the NATO actions produced a
“temporary and severe worsening o f conditions,” and that for Kosovars “atrocities were
greatly intensified during the period o f the NATO military campaign.”66 Herein is the

64. Linda D Kozaryn, “NATO Air War Stirs Serb Dissent against M ilosevic Regime” American Forces
Press Service, 20 May 1999, http://www.defenselink.m il/news/M ayl999/n05201999_9905201.htm l
(accessed 13 February 2005). These assertions by DOD spokespersons were based on “fairly large
demonstrations” in three towns in central Serbia.
65. Scott A. Cooper, “Air Power and the Coercive Use o f Force,” in Immaculate Warfare, ed. Stephen
D. Wrange (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 6.
66. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, 163-64. However, the study
asserts that the bombing did at least avert the worst fears o f ethnic cleansing. Reports suggest that the CIA
was aware o f the potential for an increase in violence upon commencement o f air operations and predicted
this outcome might result. Lambeth, NATO's A ir War f o r K osovo, 24.
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most evident and intensely debated unintended effect o f the conflict. That is, did the
actions intended to deter atrocities against the Kosovars actually promote them?
Debate continues with some analysts contending that the Serb operations were
preplanned and would have been executed with or without the commencement of Allied
Force. They argue that Milosevic expected a short conflict and postulate that Yugoslav
strategy was to quickly complete the eviction of the Kosovars and present NATO with a
fa it accompli o f a predominantly Serb province. The question o f whether NATO should
have anticipated such an outcome is valid. A vocal critic of the operation claims that the
bombing campaign was “disastrously counterproductive” and that the Clinton
administration “failed to foresee the consequence o f the initiation o f the air campaign.”

f\7

Collateral damage was an overriding concern o f NATO planners, and
extraordinary attempts were made to reduce its impact. The inadvertent casualties and
destruction inflicted on civilians in the course o f military operations was a sensitive issue
in Europe, and particularly in Germany where the Green Party held a place in the
coalition government. Milosevic was aware o f this apprehension and took advantage of
opportunities to exploit any civilian deaths or environmental damage. Maintaining
alliance unity was an overarching strategic objective; hence, any actions that were
perceived as producing an unacceptable degree o f collateral damage put achievement o f
this objective at risk.68 Despite great care and the unprecedented level of the use of
precision weapons, civilian casualties did occur.
The Human Rights Watch estimates that “some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known
to have died as a result o f NATO actions,” but its investigations “found no evidence o f

67. Christopher Layne, “Collateral Damage in Yugoslavia,” 51.
68. U.S. Department o f Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 7.
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war crimes,” i.e., the direct targeting of civilians.69 The extraordinary efforts made by
NATO to minimize collateral damage resulting from their air strikes substantiates the
supposition that planners considered secondary effects when targets were nominated, and
that the political leadership took this into account in the approval process.
Initially, NATO strike operations produced the unintended effect o f strengthening Serb
nationalism and internal support for Milosevic. Additionally, the attacks were condemned
by many nations outside the NATO sphere. Although regime change was not a stated
objective, this strengthening o f resolve certainly did not contribute to the intent of
altering Serb behavior in Kosovo. However, as the intensity o f attacks increased, this
level o f internal support waned to a point where Milosevic may have feared that his
power base was endangered.

70

A desired end state for NATO was peace and stability in the region. However, the
destruction of the Yugoslav economic infrastructure had deleterious impact on
neighboring nations, many o f whose economies were weak and unstable. One observer
claims, “NATO’s 11-week air war is estimated to have cost the struggling economies of
Yugoslavia’s neighbors more than $4.2 billion.71 This problem was exacerbated by the
massive influx of refugees, mainly in Albania and Macedonia, although NATO’s hurried
but effectual establishment o f refugee camps suggests that some planners anticipated this
secondary effect.

69. Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign— Summary,”
http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2000/mnato/natbm200.htm (accessed 22 March 2005). The report is critical o f
NATO operations strikes against heating plants and bridges that were not on major transportation routes or
had no apparent military functions.
70. Byman, Waxman, and Larson, A ir P ow er as a C oercive Instrument, 19. They acknowledge that
attempts to manipulate the opinion o f an adversary population “remains largely beyond the capability o f
planners and leaders” (ibid., 22).
71. Gary Dem psey, “Headaches in Neighboring Countries,” in NATO's Empty Victory, ed. Ted Galen
Carpenter (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 51 and 59.
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The attack on the party headquarters that was collocated with radio and television
studios was a prime indicator of NATO’s awareness o f and concern over secondary
effects. Despite their declaration o f the building as a legitimate military target, concern
over damage, loss o f life, and the perception of an attack on the press caused extensive
debate and discussion among NATO planners and the political leadership. Table 9
provides a sampling o f some o f the unintended effects resulting from NATO actions.

Table 9. Unintended Effects o f NATO Actions

MJ/VUJ Forces

Reduction in ethnic
cleansing operations

Secondary Effect
Civilian population; up
to 50,000 unemployed
Civilian population; up
to 7,000 unemployed
Weakened NATO
Alliance; accusations
o f war crimes
Increase in ethnic
cleansing operations

Steel works

Reduction in war
materials
Reduction in war
materials
Stop ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo

Damage to regional
economies
Environmental
damage;
Ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo

Node
Zastava auto plant
14 Octobar Factory
RTS Studio

Chemical Plant
MJ/MUJ Forces

Intended Effect
Reduce military related
production
Preclude reconditioning
o f tank engines
Reduction in M ilosevic
propaganda

Comment
Increased resolve and
support for FRY regime
Increased resolve and
support for FRY regime
Potential for loss o f
alliance cohesion and a
cessation o f operations
Kosovars displaced after
commencement o f
bombing causing a
refugee crisis in
neighboring nations.
Weakening o f NATO
international support
Weakening o f NATO
international support
Serb population departs
Kosovo

Despite the use of some of the principles of a system of systems analysis some
unintended effects still resulted. This is not surprising in that there is no pretense that the
adoption o f such a construct will eliminate the occurrences o f this phenomenon.
However, during Allied Force the determination o f linkages between nodes within and
across the PEMS systems did reveal insights that allowed planners to anticipate and to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

mitigate some o f the deleterious consequences o f unintended secondary effects. In some
cases alternative actions were utilized. In others, the unintended effect was anticipated
but the decision calculus supported continuing with the strikes on the target and accepting
the negative impact. In these situations attempts were made to minimize the expected
consequences. The objective of the analysis is understanding and management of
secondary effects, not their elimination. In NATO’s Kosovo intervention, this benefit was
evident, notwithstanding the unstructured and ad hoc manner in which the
interrelationships were determined. Hence, the potential value o f the adoption o f a system
o f systems construct was revealed.

Summation
This chapter used the 1999 Kosovo conflict to display how elements o f a systems
approach were utilized to plan and direct the use o f coercive force. Although not
explicitly conducted using a system o f systems approach, the selection o f actions by
NATO planners provides multiple examples o f how a holistic perspective afforded
decision-makers with a deeper understanding o f how the behavior o f an adversary may be
influenced. This was accomplished by using the knowledge o f connections between
nodes to enable the attainment o f effects that would be unachievable by direct means.
The lessons o f the 1991 Gulf War were utilized in the planning and execution of
the actions against military targets. Clearly the relationship between military nodes was
understood and exploited. However, the major difference in the overall campaign was the
expansion o f the use o f the principles o f the construct to include the other aspects of
power, i.e., political, economic, and social. This is a significant difference from earlier
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conflicts, including Somalia, where knowledge was compartmentalized, systems were
treated independently, and the effects across systems were not adequately addressed.
Although not all objectives were attained, most notably NATO’s inability to disrupt the
VJ/MUP operations in Kosovo, the conflict was brought to a conclusion with most o f the
alliance’s stated goals achieved. A post-conflict study contends that when the initial
efforts against the Serb ground forces failed, NATO then “concentrated instead on
•

second-order effects by going after bases, supplies, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL).

77

The U.S. Department of Defense Report on the operation concludes, “NATO
nations employed other economic and political means— enforcing economic sanctions,
tightening travel restrictions, freezing financial holdings— that raised the level o f anxiety
and discontent within Belgrade’s power circles.

73

This shift in strategy would not have

been possible without consideration o f interrelationships between elements of the
Yugoslav system of power.
While some o f the successes can only be postulated, it is apparent that NATO
used the basic principles of the system of systems construct in the conduct o f their
campaign against Milosevic. The system o f systems methodology presents three
advantages to the decision-maker. This analysis o f Allied Force and related activities
displayed instances of all of these.
(1)

Amplification o f the effects o f actions. The decision to concentrate air strikes

against command and control nodes, marshalling areas, and storage facilities indicates
that the military planners used the concept of node-to-node linkages in their efforts. As

72. Lambeth, NATO's Air War f o r K osovo, 29. Emphasis added.
73. U.S Department o f Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 11. The
assertion was that diplomatic and econom ic leverage combined with military force were the important
factors in bringing the crisis to a close (ibid., 12).
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the target list expanded, attacks on industrial facilities had an impact on the economic,
political, and social as well as the military system, and the effects on these systems also
supported attainment o f overall alliance objectives.
(2) Indication o f possible undesired effects. Recognizing the consequence o f
widespread civilian casualties and wanton destruction o f economic infrastructure, NATO
planners took extraordinary care in the selection o f targets and o f weapons to minimize
the undesired effects o f their actions.
(3) Recognition o f alternative actions. Precluded from going after “the head o f the
snake,” i.e., Milosevic himself, attempts were made to influence his behavior through
indirect means, notably actions that affected the financial interests o f his friends and
family. Importantly, recognizing that military actions alone would not achieve the overall
political objectives, the alliance embarked upon an extensive diplomatic effort, including
the use o f a Russian envoy.
Daadler and O ’Hanlon assert, “when military force is used, military means must
relate to political ends.”74 In the conduct of Allied Force NATO decision-makers
generally adhered to this guidance, although inconsistently and with debatable results.
However, the important insight obtained from this examination o f the conflict is that the
principles of a system of systems analysis were utilized and that the potential for further
development and application of the construct is evident.
Two years after the conclusion of Allied Force, another action would be
undertaken, this time in a dramatically different strategic environment. The next chapter
will examine American led operations in Afghanistan to further illustrate the extent to

74. Daalder and O ’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 210.
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which the use o f the principles o f a system o f systems analysis were utilized and the
benefits that may have accrued.
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CHAPTER VIII
AFGHANISTAN 2001

The Somalia and Kosovo case studies provided examples o f the use o f the
principles o f a system o f systems analysis by the United Nations in Somalia and by
members NATO alliance in Operation Allied Force. In several instances, utilization of
these tenets resulted in enhanced effectiveness in the attaining o f primary desired
outcomes and provided a limited level of ability to anticipate secondary effects. The
examinations revealed greater utilization o f the approach in Kosovo. However, a single
case study does not present sufficient justification, nor does it adequately support the
contention that the system of systems construct can provide additional tools with which
to make the hard choices between alternative courses o f action.
I will examine in this chapter a more recent and decidedly different scenario to
display instances where the principles of system o f systems analysis were applied, and to
further illustrate the potential advantages of adoption o f the approach. The predominantly
U.S. operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October through December
2001 provides an opportunity to explore the assertion that these principles can be applied
under a vastly different set of circumstances in a considerably dissimilar environment.
The confines on the analysis addressed in the Kosovo study also apply here;
primarily, the need to depend upon open source unclassified information of
undeterminable accuracy and reliability. Additionally, the U.S. operation removed the
Taliban from power, denied al Qaeda their base of operations, and established an elected
central government in Kabul; however, at the time o f this writing, the conflict is not yet
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concluded, and the attainment o f U.S. political objectives remains incomplete.
Nevertheless, as with the previous study, adequate information is available to determine
that the U.S. political leadership and military planners utilized the principles o f a system
of systems analysis to evaluate the possible consequences of actions. This will allow me
to identify and present examples o f occasions where their use produced the hypothesized
advantages o f the construct.
For illustration and comparison, I will utilize the Kosovo and Afghanistan
operations, since they provide significant dissimilarities, but were executed within two
years o f each other.. Table 10 provides a summary o f these differences from Kosovo.

Table 10. Comparison o f the Systems o f Power o f Yugoslavia and Afghanistan
System
Political

Yugoslavia 1999
Internationally recognized government
Authoritarian, but democratically elected
regime
Sophisticated bureaucratic structure
Multiple parties
Tradition o f strong central government

Afghanistan 2001
No recognition by international bodies
Regime not in complete control o f territory
Strict Theocracy
Unskilled and inexperienced management
Active autonomous militias (warlords)
Tradition o f dispersed political power

Economic

Weak, but functioning economy
Industry resource dependent
Fixed infrastructure
Limited international trade

Subsistence level
Bazaar economy
Primitive road networks
Smuggling/drugs primary foreign trade

Military

Armed Forces loyal to political leadership
Modern air defenses
Mechanized
High level o f tactical proficiency

Primary loyalty to tribe and warlord
Poorly equipped and supported
Limited armor and mechanized units
Tradition o f shifting allegiances

Social

Western
Homogeneous population, predominantly
Christian and Slavic (outside Kosovo)
High educational and literacy levels

South Asian Islamic
Multiple and sizeable ethnic groups
Tribal based
Extremely low education and literacy levels
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More than a function o f geography and demographics, the nature o f the
divergence is especially apparent in comparisons of the adversary’s systems o f national
power.
Several other noteworthy contrasts make Afghanistan a suitable scenario with
which to demonstrate the potential for wider application of the construct:
(1) Geography. Afghanistan is land-locked and was hundreds o f miles from the nearest
U.S. military base. The terrain and primitive road infrastructure provided few viable
targets for American airpower. Lack of foliage made troop maneuver susceptible to air
attack.
(2) Objective. The goal became regime change, instead o f behavior modification.
(3) Adversary. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were the threat and hence the primary
objective, and provided the justification for the operation. The Taliban government was
given the opportunity to avoid American military actions by giving up the terrorists
believed to be responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and
Washington. Once they refused, the defeat o f the Taliban forces became a key objective.
(4) Political Environment. The domestic and international conditions post 9/11 enabled
the adoption of a set o f rules of engagement that would not have been considered before,
and were not available to planners in 1999.
(5) Complexity. Although Balkan is a term that is utilized as an adjective to describe
issues that are deeply intertwined, Afghanistan provided an even more complicated
dilemma.1

1.
As early military plans were being discussed and analyzed, National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice was reported to have stated, “W e’re going to wish this was the Balkans.” Bob Woodward, Bush a t
War (N ew York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 80. He restates the depiction o f Afghanistan as “the fabled
deathtrap o f invading armies and the graveyard o f empires past” (ibid., 168).
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Therefore, the removal o f the Taliban regime provides a sufficiently dissimilar
environment from the previously examined cases through which to examine the use o f
the system of systems approach. A brief exploration into the relevant background and
extant conditions in Afghanistan is warranted prior to identifying specific instances of
application o f the construct.
By virtue o f its geographic location at the crossroads o f diverse civilizations,
Afghanistan has been invaded throughout its history. The most noteworthy early example
was the army led by Alexander the Great that spent over two years fighting its way across
the rugged terrain en route to its final conquests in India. Persians, Huns, and Turks
followed the Greeks in succeeding centuries. In the 7th century, conquering Arab armies
brought Islam along with their cavalry. Genghis Khan’s Mongol hordes devastated its
cities in the 13th century, and later Tamerlane and Babur also led armies into
Afghanistan. The common factor in all these invasions was the ferocious resistance o f the
warrior inhabitants o f the territory. This spirit of independence and combative culture
resulting from these invasions remains an important factor in understanding modem
Afghanistan.2
With advances in the means of maritime exploration and the discovery o f the
alternatives to the overland routes to India, Afghanistan became less important to EastWest trade, and a hiatus in foreign invasions ensued. However, by the 19th century,
Afghanistan once again emerged as a factor in world politics, this time as part o f the
Great Game for power and influence in the region between Russia and Great Britain. The

2.
See Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional P olitics an d the Rise o f
the Taliban (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2001), esp. 23-53, for a useful condensed history o f
the region with an emphasis on the impact on current conditions. Victoria Scholfield, Afghan Frontier:
Feuding an d Fighting in Central Asia (N ew York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003), likewise provides a
valuable history o f conflict in the region, particularly the British involvement.
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containment of Russia and the protection of their empire in India were the motivators for
the British who were to learn that Afghanistan was easy to invade but difficult to
conquer. Their strategy, rather effectively employed after their last significant military
adventure in 1877, was to use paid surrogates to govern internally, while foreign policy
was made in London. Although denied the prize of domination, Russia continuously
maintained interest in their neighbor to the south.
The next century brought relative peace but little economic or social progress to
Afghanistan, which was less o f a nation by Western standards than it was a collection o f
ethnic groups and tribes only loosely connected to the weak central government. The
monarchy, which lasted until 1973, was not enlightened or effective; however, it proved
to be adequate in maintaining a degree of internal order. With the end o f the British Raj
in 1947, Afghanistan gained its independence, but remained under the shadow o f the
communist superpower to the north—the USSR. Soviet efforts to bring Afghanistan into
its orbit were subtler than those employed in Eastern Europe and consisted primarily of
economic and technical aid and military assistance. Nevertheless, Afghanistan became
increasingly dependent upon this financial support, and although a form o f democracy
emerged in the 1960’s, Soviet cultivation o f local communists continued. The Afghan
armed forces also became increasingly dependent upon their Soviet suppliers for
weapons, parts, and technical training.
In 1973, while the reigning monarch, Zahir Khan, was temporarily away from the
country, Mohammad Daoud, who had served as prime minister from 1953-1963, declared
himself Head o f State, Prime Minister, and Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f a new Republic
o f Afghanistan. Although he had the backing o f communist elements, Daoud worked
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toward weakening ties with the Soviets, and by 1978, he was purging them from
government positions. This led to a revolt o f mainly communist officers in the Afghan
army, a coup d ’etat, and the establishment o f the Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan in
1978.
The reform program of the new communist government met with widespread
resistance, particularly in the rural areas. Religious traditionalists opposed the forced
modernization, since these reforms “struck at the very heart o f the socioeconomic
structure” o f society.3 The year-old constitution was abolished, The People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the only legal party, and relations with the USSR
were strengthened. In the spring o f 1979, this tension led to uprisings in Herat, which
spread rapidly to other parts o f the country. Hafizullah Amin assumed the position of
prime minister, although Nur Mohammed Taraki remained in the largely powerless role
of president.
The Amin regime was a disaster. Terror became the primary means o f internal
control, and its bungled foreign policy alienated the Soviets as well as the United States.
By November, the situation had deteriorated enough so that Soviet planning for direct
intervention progressed. On 24 December, with the 105th Airborne Division as the
spearhead, the Soviet Union invaded and very quickly occupied Kabul and the major
population centers, executed Amin, and set up a puppet regime. Thus began what was to
be the long 20th century nightmare in Afghanistan— a trauma that would eventually
contribute to the collapse o f the Soviet invader’s overall system o f national power.4

3. Goodson, A fghanistan’s Endless War, 57.
4. See William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 27-36, for a
more detailed account o f the events leading up to the decision for invasion. The author also addresses the
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Goodson characterizes the Soviet occupation in stages: (1) National Resistance
and Soviet Entrenchment, 1980-1983; (2) Air War, Interdiction, and Destabilization
1983-1986; and, (3) Resistance Gains and Soviet Withdrawals, 1986-1989. The saga o f
this period in Afghan history provides for a fascinating study, and the sources and
explanations for the Soviet failure have been topics o f extensive analysis and conjecture
that I will not repeat here. The important factor is that the elements o f Afghan society that
were responsible, largely with American support, for the expulsion o f the Soviet military
would reemerge in the subsequent U.S. operations against the Taliban.
The leaders o f the resistance (Mujahideen, or Holy Warriors, such as Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Ismail Khan), were to
have an influence on Afghanistan long after the Soviets withdrew. By 1983, the change in
the Soviet strategy from a focus on controlling the cities and major road connections to
attempts at actively confronting the insurgency resulted in an immense migrant problem
with a major impact on neighboring nations. An estimated 4 million refugees were now
in Pakistan and an additional 2.4 million in Iran.5
By early 1985, as Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR, an
amalgamation o f domestic and external factors led to his conclusion that the Soviet
Union should seek a means o f disengaging from this conflict. Dr. Mohammed Najibullah
was installed as president in May 1986, coincident with an attempt at a cease-fire and
establishment o f a national reconciliation government. Although the Soviet-backed
Afghan regime was largely ineffective, the opposition was even more fragmented. After a

impact o f other major events ongoing at this time, most notably the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis, leadership
changes in the Soviet Union, and the SS-20 IRBM deployment.
5.
Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless Wars, 64. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI),
which was to play an important role in the subsequent U.S. operation, began to train and supply mujahideen
elements in this timeframe.
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series o f discussions in Geneva, the beleaguered Soviets agreed to a phased withdrawal,
which they completed in February 1989. While the crossing o f the border by the last
Soviet occupation troops was a momentous event from a geopolitical perspective, sadly it
was not to represent the end o f the fighting and the tragedy o f modem Afghanistan.
The next five years were to witness multiple changes in government with a near
continuous shifting o f allegiances between the major tribal and ethnic leaders. Having
achieved its goal o f removal o f Soviet forces, the U.S. turned to other matters o f foreign
policy and left the fate of Afghanistan to the United Nations. Civil war ensued with
thousands o f civilian casualties resulting from the bombardment o f Kabul alone.
Hekmatyar and the former communist General Abdul Rashid Dostum formed a
temporary alliance in early 1994, but fighting continued. In October Kandahar fell to an
obscure band o f religious students (Taliban) led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. After a
series o f failed attempts at a coalition regime, in September 1996 Taliban forces took
control of Kabul, captured and publicly executed Najibullah, and declared Afghanistan to
be a completely Islamic state.
The rule o f the primarily Pashtun Taliban was not to extend throughout the
country. An anti-Taliban Council for the Defense o f Afghanistan, representing Uzbek and
Tajik minorities in the north, emerged. This Northern Alliance (also known as the United
Front) would engage in near continuous battles with the Taliban, which resulted in major
population centers changing hands multiple times. Into this morass entered al Qaeda and
its founder, Osama bin Laden, who seized the opportunity for a secure geographic base of
operations. His organization continued to support the Taliban financially, and their
common fundamentalist Islamic perspectives worked to cement the relationship.
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Although al Qaeda operatives were successful in assassinating the most viable
Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Mossoud, on 9 September 2001, the events o f two
days later were to have the most momentous effect on the future o f Afghanistan. The
American response to the attacks, which launched “The Wars o f 9/11,” is the focus of
this case study.6

The Impetus for Intervention
The American military undertook the operation in response to what was judged a
direct threat to the United States. Even while the ruins o f the World Trade Center were
still smoldering, President Bush was considering the options for retaliation. In his now
famous remark to workers at the site on 14 September, “the people who knocked these
buildings down will hear from all of us soon.”7 Recovering from the initial shock and
despair, the targets o f the promised retribution, as well as the means o f attacking them,
were debated within the National Security Council (NSC). Although, al Qaeda and bin
Laden were among the first perpetrators considered, the involvement o f Iraq and Iran
were also suspected. The dilemma presented was that if a non-state actor was responsible,
what is the appropriate response with regard to the nation that is providing it with a base
of operations?

6. Simon Serfaty o f the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Old Dominion University
first introduced this term for actions in reaction to the September 2001 attacks. See Simon Serfaty, “The
N ew Normalcy,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 211.
7. Woodward, Bush at War, 70. Earlier that day, at the Washington National Cathedral, Bush stated that
this conflict will “end in a way, and at an hour o f our choosing.” At this point, the nature o f the beginning
o f the U.S. response was far from decided. Much o f the subsequent summary o f the decision-making
process is taken from Woodward’s narrative, which at the time o f this writing is the best available account.
Since, the sources o f much o f his information (some o f which he claimed to be highly classified) are not
identified, his observations cannot be regarded as purely factual and objective.
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Essentially ignored by the U.S. after the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan prior to
9/11 was not at the apex o f the list; however, several factors kept it among American
international concerns. The perceived human rights abuses o f the Taliban regime,
particularly in its treatment o f women, generated nearly universal and unbroken
condemnation in the West.
The presence o f al Qaeda in Afghanistan was an open secret. After the August
1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration had
lobbed 66 Tomahawk cruise missiles into suspected al Qaeda bases with minimal effect.
The disdain within the Bush administration over the feckless futility o f this action was to
be a factor in subsequent planning. Fortunately, from the U.S. perspective, the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly had multiple assets in Afghanistan
attempting to monitor al Qaeda activities and to support Northern Alliance operations
against the Taliban regime. These operatives were to be the nucleus o f the American
effort. However, their use needed to be legitimized.
The United Nations Charter provides for every nation’s right o f self-defense.
However, when this document was drafted and adopted, aggressors were assumed to be
other sovereign nations. The emergence o f a non-state actor capable o f a devastating
attack on the world’s sole superpower was not envisioned. However, even potent non
state actors cannot defy the laws o f physics— they must physically be somewhere— and it
was indisputable that the regime in Kabul was providing al Qaeda with a geographic base
from which to train and deploy its operatives. The U.S. previously had warned the
Taliban “that we will hold them responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin
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Laden from Afghanistan.”8 This clear connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime was to provide the U.S. with an unambiguous target for retaliation.9
International sympathy for the U.S. and support for retaliatory actions was nearly
universal. The NATO Ambassadors had taken the unprecedented step o f invoking Article
V of the North Atlantic Treaty.10 There was little question that the perpetrators o f the
mass murder should be punished, the problem was to prevent the actions taken against al
Qaeda and their Taliban protectors from being interpreted as attacks against the Afghan
people. The Taliban leadership solved this dilemma for the Americans by continuing to
support al Qaeda elements within the country and refusing U.S. demands to apprehend
and provide them for justice.
On 28 September, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf dispatched the DirectorGeneral o f the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, to
Kabul to attempt without success to get the Taliban to hand over bin Laden.11 By early
October, the Bush Administration had decided that if the Taliban would not give up bin
Laden, then the U.S. would remove the Taliban from power. The U.S. demanded that the
Taliban “Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and
return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The Taliban: Engagem ent or
Confrontation, H earing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Hrg. 106—
8 6 8 ,2 0 July 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. Statement o f The Honorable
Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary o f State for South Asian Affairs.
9. Steven Tanner, The Wars o f the Bushes (Haverstown, PA: Casemate, 2004), 168, contends that the
defiant policy o f the Taliban in their support for al Qaeda was fortunate for the U.S. Other nations would
have been more w illing to rid themselves o f al Qaeda or intimidated by the threat o f U.S. attack. He notes
that if bin Laden were operating across the border in Pakistan the repercussions o f the use o f American
military power would have been decidedly more complex.
10. “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more o f them in Europe or in North America
shall be considered to be an attack against them all.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook,
1998), 396.
11. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 260. Ahmed, whose sympathies were with the Taliban, resigned two
weeks later and was replaced by a more moderate officer, Eshanul Haq.
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country.” 12 However, due to the geographic location and limited infrastructure of
Afghanistan, the means by which this objective could be achieved were to be remarkably
different from previous U.S. military campaigns.

U.S. Objectives
On 7 October, President Bush announced the commencement o f combat
operations: “These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of
Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability o f the
Taliban regime.” 13 Notably, no mention was made o f a desired political end state after
obtainment o f these objectives. The U.S. Secretary o f Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff declared that the objectives o f the military actions were:
(1) To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is
unacceptable and carries a price
(2) To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime that harbors the terrorists
(3) To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime
and the foreign terrorists that they support
(4) To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base
of operation
(5) To alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive
systems that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces, and

12. George W. Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, O ffice o f the Press Secretary,
7 October 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.htm (accessed 2 March
2005).
13. Ibid.
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(6) To provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions
under the Taliban regime.14
The inclusion o f the last objective on this listing indicates that senior decision-makers
were considering the social impact of the actions necessary to achieve the other stated
goals.
While the military strategy was relatively clear, Woodward reports that Secretary
of State Colin Powell and CIA Director George Tenet made repeated efforts within the
National Security Council to establish a political strategy.15 As later events were to
demonstrate, this lack o f an agreed political course o f action was to complicate the postconflict efforts at establishment o f a viable central government.

Taliban Political Objectives
Maley describes the Taliban as, “above all, an anti-modernist movement.” 16 He
adds that the goal o f the Taliban was to seek security and stability and establishment o f
Islamic Law (Sharia) in a domestically secure and externally strong nation. The near
anarchy o f the immediate post-Soviet occupation period made security a welcomed goal
for most of the populace. However, the strict interpretation o f Sharia provided order at
the price o f near universal ostracism and isolation from the international community.
Despite Taliban efforts to gain United Nations recognition and to occupy the
Afghan seat in the General Assembly, their requests were rebuffed six different times
between 1996 and 2001. Focused on internal matters and without experience in

14. U.S. Department o f Defense, “Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring Freedom,” 7 October
2001, http://www.defenselink.m il/transcripts/2001/tl0072001_tl007sd.htm (accessed 12 February 2005).
15. Woodward, Bush a t War. 226.
16. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 232.
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international affairs, the diplomatic record of the Taliban regime is a debacle. The
proposal for a trans-Afghanistan pipeline to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan gave the Taliban an economic impetus to improve relations with the rest o f the
world. However, their unwillingness to abate the human rights abuses in enforcement of
Sharia and refusal to turn over bin Laden as demanded by a series o f United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions indicated their contempt for international public
opinion and the world organization in particular.17
The Taliban had no clear objectives except to maintain themselves in power,
defeat the resistance in the north, extend their influence throughout the entire country,
and t resist any unwanted foreign influence on how they conducted their internal affairs.
This last goal, which included the protection of al Qaeda, was to be the principal
generator o f the American operation. The dilemma presented to American decision
makers was how to influence a regime that had no lawful foreign trade or discernible
willingness to moderate its policies in order to be accepted as the legitimate government
of Afghanistan. If economic and diplomatic actions were to be utilized, then their
application would need to be dramatically different from earlier conflicts, such as in the
Balkans. Success in this endeavor would require an understanding o f the systems of
power o f Afghanistan and the Taliban.

A Representational System of Systems Analysis
This cursory examination of Afghanistan from a systems perspective is presented
in order to maintain the connection to and focus on the use o f the system o f systems

17.
UNSCR 1267 o f 15 October 1999 and UNSCR 133 o f 19 December 2000. The latter added a
proscription against any military materials to include technical advice.
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construct. As with the previous examinations o f Somalia and Yugoslavia, it is intended to
be only a representational sampling o f the larger analysis that would be required to
effectively utilize the methodology.

Essential Elements o f the Systems
Political. Although Afghanistan has long been a recognized independent nation
despite a series o f foreign invasions and varying degrees of external influence, it has also
been described as a country without a state. While the criteria for statehood is not
precisely defined or universally accepted, among the characteristics normally associated
with sovereign statehood are: a defined geographic territory, an administrative system,
and a monopoly over the use o f force.18
Clearly, Afghanistan in September 2001 possessed internationally accepted, albeit
permeable borders, and the rudiments o f an administrative system, although one that was
exceptionally weak. The continuing battles with Northern Alliance forces and the
existence o f powerful warlord militias make the third factor (monopoly of force)
debatable. A more accurate depiction is that o f Afghanistan as a fa iled state. NoelleKarami, et al, contend that a key indicator o f a failed state is when “tribal, ethnic or
religious ties” replace the loyalty previously afforded to the state apparatus.19 The
political order o f Afghanistan in 2001 supports this characterization.
Historically, politics in Afghanistan have been characterized by a diverse and
decentralized structure. Loyalties are based primarily on language, ethnicity and tribal

18. Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conrad Schetter, and Reinhard Schlagintweit, Afghanistan - a Country
without a State? (Frankfurt-Main), Germany: IKO-Verlag fur Interulturelle Komminkation, 2002), 2-3.
19. Ibid., 7. The question o f Afghanistan as a failed state is the focus o f this edited volume o f essays.
The authors urge caution in using legitimacy and issues such as democracy and human rights as criteria for
determination o f failed statehood.
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connections, not by any uniting political ideology. The most powerful unifying factor in
Afghan politics has been resistance to foreign domination. Members of the largest ethnic
grouping, the Pashtun, long have been the dominant force in Afghan political affairs. The
Taliban leadership was primarily Durrani Pashtun and was connected to Afghanistan’s
most conservative provinces o f Kandahar, Hilmand, and Uruzgan. After the Taliban
assumed of control in Kabul, the Taliban’s spiritual and political leader, Mullah Omar,
elected to administer from Kandahar in the primarily Pashtun region. Even in nonPashtun areas, significant power resided within this group.
Taliban has been described as more of a movement rather than a political
ideology. Sharia, as enforced by the religious police responsible for “The Promotion o f
Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” is the most visible manifestation o f state power.
This blending o f the political and social is an important element in understanding the
overall system. Maley asserts that Taliban ideals were “the values o f the village as
interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or madrassa students who had typically had no
known normal village life.”20 Taliban power was absolute and directed by Mullah Omar
and an Interim Council of Ministers. The enigmatic and ideologically driven Omar
became isolated and received input from only a small core of advisors, most o f whom
possessed the same simplistic and fundamentalist vision of Afghanistan. Without any
structure or administrative experience, meetings o f the council were disjointed and
unorganized. This left the appointed governors who administered the 31 provinces o f the
country, with a lack o f guidance and control.

20.
Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 233, emphasis in original. The madrassi were fundamentalist schools that
produced many o f the most fanatical Taliban members. Afghan refugees comprised a sizeable portion, but
not the total number o f students in these schools.
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The internationally recognized Islamic State o f Afghanistan, headed by President
Burhanuddin Rabbani, controlled only the 10 per cent o f Afghanistan not under Taliban
authority. Its presiding Council o f Ministers included Minister o f Defense Abdollah and
Minster of Security General Fahim who would play an important role in the campaign to
remove the Taliban. This provided a shadow regime upon which to base a new
government upon removal o f the Taliban.
Pakistan was one of only three nations ever to recognize the Taliban regime.

21

Strong ties existed between the Pakistani intelligence organization (the ISI) and the
Taliban. After the 1999 coup that placed Musharraf in power, relations with Pakistan
deteriorated. Although officially condemning Taliban excesses and supporting UN
sanctions, the ISI reportedly continued to support the Taliban.
Afghanistan was almost completely isolated politically, although they embarked
upon some attempts at fostering relations with China. Taliban support for Chechen
separatists further deteriorated their relationship with Russia. Already under sanctions
from the United Nations and considered a pariah regime, there was little opportunity to
further threaten the international standing of the Taliban regime.
Political loyalty in Afghanistan traditionally has been fluid. Changing allegiance
based on perceived swings in the power equation or for economic gain are integral parts
o f the system. There is no tradition of a strong central government or ingrained loyalty to
it. This decentralized structure resulted in a lack o f critical sub-elements and nodes that
could be identified and acted upon.
Although Mullah Omar was the spiritual head o f the movement, his bureaucratic
skills and control over the regime and government policies were much different from
21. The others were the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
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Milosevic’s in Yugoslavia. Omar was not dependent upon an electorate and personal
popularity. This condition also provided a political strength, i.e., the government was
more than a cult o f personality around one person. Hence, the vulnerabilities o f the
political system were limited. Instead o f the central government leadership representing
the key elements, the key political nodes were to be the leaders o f the Northern Alliance,
and from outside the country, most notably in Pakistan.
Economic. Even before the latest decades o f the continuing warfare, Afghanistan
was one o f the poorest nations in the world. The destruction and carnage o f the Soviet
occupation, and the near continuous internal conflict since 1989, resulted in stagnation of
an already weak economy and a primitive level o f development.22 The system can be best
described as a bazaar economy, i.e., one in which “a capitalist free-market economy
regulates all economic activities in the absence o f state regulation.”

The inept

administration and policies of the Taliban only served to preclude any development. With
no industrial base and with hand woven rugs its principal legal export, Afghanistan was a
nation in severe economic crisis. Without any experience or expertise in economic
affairs, the inept Taliban bureaucrats were not able to control the national currency, and
they presided over a criminalized economy, with smuggling o f goods across the Pakistani
border being Afghanistan’s primary source o f income.
The other major source o f revenue was opium poppy cultivation. An estimated
200,000 Afghan farmers were engaged in poppy growing in 1999, and the government

22. Average per-capita GDP was less than $300, which includes the drug trade. William Byrd and
Christopher Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan, Social Development Papers: Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction Paper N o. 18 December 2004,” (N ew York: The World Bank, 2004), 1.
23. Schetter, in Afghanistan - a Country without a State? 110.
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did not attempt to conceal their support for this activity.24 When the Taliban authorities
banned opium poppy production in February 2000, those farmers who had become
dependent upon it as a source of income were left without an alternative source of
livelihood. The effects of the proscription on poppy cultivation were dramatic, with the
United Nations reporting a 91 per cent reduction in acres under cultivation in 2001.

Not

surprisingly, the level of popular support for the regime in the poppy producing areas was
affected by this banning o f poppy production.
While much of the illegal trans-border activity was beyond the reach or control of
the Taliban, it did represent a sizeable portion o f their financial support. Smuggling of
consumer goods, as well as the drug trade had economic benefits for those integrated into
the process; however, it presented enormous suffering for the larger population who was
not engaged in the growing, processing or transport of drugs. Hence, the economy, and
any o f its benefits, was in the hands of a few.
The very narrow and weak attempts to attack foreign investment failed due to the
political isolation resulting from the regime’s internal policies. As a result, opportunities
for an adversary to negatively affect the Afghan economic system were nearly nonexistent. It was an economy with essentially no strengths and no vulnerabilities.

Oft

While

24. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 372. UN sources are cited that estimate that 165,000 acres o f arable
land were under poppy cultivation. The strict code o f the Taliban condemns drug abuse, however, the
Taliban share o f the trade reportedly was 20 per cent o f the opium transported out o f the country. Estimates
vary, but at the acme o f Afghan drug production 75-90 per cent o f the world heroin supply had its source in
Afghan fields.
25. United Nations, International Drug Control Programme, “Annual Poppy Survey 2001,”
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/report_2001-10-16_l.pdf (accessed 12 February 2005). This resulted in a
tenfold increase o f the price o f dry opium to $300/kg. These UN supply estimates are a function o f the
estimated land under cultivation. The region was experiencing a drought in the period, which also affected
production. See also Byrd and Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” for additional detail and
statistics on the Afghan drug trade. Looking at the trade from a purely econom ic viewpoint, they
acknowledge benefits as w ell as costs o f the drug economy.
26. In 2003,1 participated in a German Bundeswehr sponsored workshop related to the International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. An anthropologist who has spent much o f his adult
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the number o f U.S. actions that could affect the overall economic system was negligible,
this condition made financial incentives (bribes) to individuals a viable means of
influence.
Military. Estimates o f the size o f the Taliban military forces vary greatly, ranging
from 10,000 to 125,000.27 Generally, they were lightly armed, with some artillery, no
large armored or mechanized units, and less than 100 tanks o f various vintage and states
o f repair. Its air force and air defense system were miniscule and woefully impotent
against any modem force. It was a “come as you are force” with little opportunity to
obtain sophisticated weapons from foreign sources, although the region possesses a near
endless supply o f small arms and ammunition, much o f it produced in home workshop
endeavors.
The advantage held by the Taliban force was in its battle-hardened elements,
ability to fight with minimum sustainment, and religious motivation. The legacy o f the
mujahideen gave them a mystique and an aura that they could defeat a modem and
sophisticated military. However, as a primarily Pashtun force, their support in Tajik,
Uzbek, and Hazara areas was minimal. The key characteristic for exploitation was the
tradition o f shifting allegiances when the advantage swings to the other side.
Social. A former U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan testified, “The Afghan
national identity is a unique, holistic blend o f Islam, tribal codes o f conduct and Afghan

life in the country made the observation that if the West devoted decades o f time, effort and extensive
funding to the building o f its economy, Afghanistan could rise to the level o f a third w o rld nation in 15-20
years.
27.
Michael E. O ’Hanlon, “Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs (May-June 2002): 49, and US DOD
press briefings use a range o f 50,000 to 60,000. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Ongoing Lessons o f
Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation and Nation Building" (forthcoming), 6 May
2004 draft, http://www.csis.org (accessed 2 March 2005) cites estimates o f up to 125,000 although only
25,000 o f these could be considered serious fighters.
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nationalism.”28 A diverse society, the largest ethnic groups were the Pashtun (38%), Tajik
(25%), and Hazara (19%), with Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch, and Uzbeks comprising most
of the remaining population. The Pashtun, residing primarily in the southern parts o f the
country historically have been the dominant group. Identity is defined by membership in
a qaum, which includes “a complexity o f affiliations, a network o f families or
occupations.”29 Goodson believes that it may be “inappropriate to refer to Afghan culture,
for Afghanistan is in many ways a society with differing cultures, both overlapping and
clashing.”30 Loyalty and group identification normally does not extend beyond family,
clan or tribe. Islam is one unifying influence with approximately 84 per cent o f the
population adherents o f the Sunni sect.
The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan was one o f the highest in Asia: approximately
70 per cent for males and 85 per cent for females. The near continuous conflict had
resulted in an exodus o f teachers and the destruction o f school buildings. Strict
interpretations o f Sharia resulted in the closure o f all schools for girls in 1998. Taliban
attitudes toward women, manifested in the proscription against females working (with
•j i

few exceptions) outside the home, degraded their popular support.

The low literacy rate

28. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The Taliban: Engagement or
Confrontation, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Hrg. 106—
868, 20 July 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. Statement o f Peter Tomsen.
29. Library o f Congress, “Country Studies, ‘Afghanistan,’” http://www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/
aftoc.html (accessed 2 March 2005). Qaum refers to descent groups, extended family or clan and tribal
affiliation. Family provides the major economic and social unity in Afghan society. However, years o f
warfare and the resultant refugee problem have weakened this element. Many Taliban fighters never
experienced a normal existence in their tribal homelands.
30. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 27.
31. Noelle-Karimi, Schetter, and Schlagintweit, Afghanistan, 98. In this same collection, Heike Bill
offers that although the Taliban rules were rigid, they “merely continue long-established cultural and
religious conditions” (ibid., 98).
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meant that radio was the principal means of communication, especially in the rural
areas.

32

A characteristic o f Afghan society that became a primary cause of the intervention
was the concept o f hospitality. Despite clear evidence o f their link to terrorist activities,
bin Laden and al Qaeda were considered to be guests in their country and Afghan social
mores would not allow for them to be given up to outsiders for justice. The motivation
was not entirely altruistic. Bin Laden’s substantial financial contributions strengthened
the Taliban resistance to surrender him.33
A phenomenon that is essential to understanding Afghan society is the role o f the
leaders of private armies, popularly known as warlords. The system provides for support
for the state but with the autonomy of the militia leaders intact: “Loyalty is contingent
rather than absolute.”34 The warlord culture has long been extant in Afghanistan with
tribal armies fighting against invaders when present and against each other when they
were not. Notable among these has been Hekmatyar, the Pashtun leader o f the
fundamentalist Hezb-I-Islami Party; Dostum, an Uzbek; and, Ismail Khan, a Shiite Tajik.
The vulnerabilities o f the social system were its ethnically diverse character, the
identification with tribe rather than with nation or the Taliban regime, and the tradition of
shifting loyalties. The strength was in its centuries-old tradition of resistance to foreign
influence and the uniting force that previous invasions had engendered.

32. Inexpensive transistor radios were abundant in Afghanistan. Radio Kabul became Radio Sharia and
represented the most important mode o f Taliban propaganda transmission.
33. The Pashtun custom o f melmastia (hospitality) was the justification for the protection o f bin Laden.
Omar was quoted, “Even if all the countries o f the world unite, w e would defend Osama by our blood.”
Scholfield, Afghan Frontier, 343.
34. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 110, asserts that the militias can serve as “a half-way house for those who
wish to shift their allegiance, but not completely lose their autonomy.”
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Table 11 provides an illustration o f the overall system o f power in Afghanistan
using a few examples from each system.

Table 11. Nodes in the Afghan System
System

Elements

Nodes

Sub-Elements

Political

Warlords
External support

Tajiks
Pakistan

Ismail Khan
Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI)

Economic

Opium poppy
production
Commercial goods
smuggling

Fields under cultivation

Opium refining facilities

Transit routes

Islam Qala

Military

Fielded forces
Foreign volunteers

Anti-air capability
A1 Qaeda

SA-3 radars
Osama bin Laden

Social

Religion
Ethnicity
Tribal Leaders

Fundamentalist Islam
Pashtun
Warlords

Mullah Omar
Kandahar
Ismail Khan
Abdul Sayyaf

Node Linkages - The System o f Systems
In Afghanistan the demarcation lines between the political and the social are
blurred to a point of near non-existence. All politics is tribal; patronage is a function of
ethnicity and clan and family connections. An important connection exists between the
Pashtun o f Afghanistan and those living across the border in Pakistan. Military and
economic support was provided enthusiastically to the Taliban because o f the close
religious and ethnic connections to the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) chief,
Lieutenant General Ahmed.35 This linkage was identified and subsequently broken as the

35.
Ibid., 35. The ISI was a key conduit o f American military aid to the mujahideen during the Soviet
occupation. Its financial support for the Taliban regime was estimated at $10 million by 2000. The spy
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U.S. operation unfolded. For illustration, a simple set o f linkages is provided in Figure
20 .

M usharraf

M adrassi

Ahmed

bin Laden

Mullah Om ar

Taliban

Figure 20. Pakistani-Taliban Connections

Ahmed was clearly a supporter o f Mullah Omar as well as the madrassi religious schools
that provided a significant number of Taliban fighters. The link between bin Laden and
Omar was well established. With some considerable U.S. pressure, Ahmed was removed
with the effect of breaking the link between the ISI, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.
Even after Musharraf removed Ahmed, thousands o f Pakistani Pashtuns were
•

•

entering Afghanistan to fight at the side o f their ethnic comrades.

liC

t

Religion is

inseparable from the political philosophy o f the Taliban, many o f whom were influenced

agency, with an estimated 40,000 operatives was a political force in itself, and the action o f Musharraf
involved considerable personal risk.
36. Tim McGirk, “Deep Loyalties, Ancient Hatreds,” Time, 19 November 2001, 53.
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by their time in the madrassi in Pakistan where an ultra conservative sect o f Sunni Islam
was preached.
These connections were not limited to Pashtuns who resided on both sides o f the
Afghan-Pakistani border. Elements o f the Northern Alliance also maintained close
contact with their ethnic kin across national boundaries; borders that were established
during great power struggles without much concern for the ethnicity o f the resident
populations. One o f these, Ismail Khan, was a Shiite and an ethnic Tajik, with his base of
power in Herat and ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The connections between the drug traffic and other illicit activity were well
established. Estimates o f Taliban profits from this trade were $75 million. The Pashtun
head of the Islamist Hizb-i Islami political party, engineer, warlord, and former Prime
Minister Hekmatyar was also linked to the drug trade. Hence, he could be a node in
multiple systems. Until their subsequent policy reversal on opium production, Taliban
authorities encouraged poppy cultivation, and yield increased steadily since 1996. Most
of this trade was through Pashtun regions and across the Pakistani frontier. Pakistan’s
Interior Minister, Nasrulla Babar, also a Pashtun and a Taliban sympathizer, was less than
energetic in reducing this illicit cross border trade.
The illustration provided in Figure 20 is exceptionally simple, including only a
few connections. However, the linkages within a complex adaptive system are extensive.
I provide Figure 21 for illustration of some additional connections that could have been
exploited. At its center is the Tajik-Shiite warlord, Ismail Khan. His connections to the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were well known and reinforced by their common
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adherence to the Shia sect o f Islam. Khan’s power center was in the city o f Herat near the
Iranian border.

Iran
Karzai
Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps

B. Rabbani

Tajiks

[Shia j-

Ismail Khan

Herat
Chagcharan

Jamiat-i-Islami
Dostum
Sayyaf

Mazar-i Sharif

i Sunni

Junbish-I milli-i Islami
r

....... - ~ i

j Pashtun I

! Uzbeks

Figure 21. Warlord Linkages

Khan’s connections to General Dostum extended back to their experiences in the
anti-Soviet war. Dostum, an Uzbek, drew his support from the area around Mazar-i
Sharif, which was to become vital as a supply route from Uzbekistan. The node city o f
Chacharan became important as a link between Khan’s forces in Herat and Dostum’s
near Mazar. Khan was also connected through party affiliation to Bumhanuddin Rabbani
who still represented the recognized government o f Afghanistan. Through the Jamiat-iIslami, Rabbani was connected to the Pashtun, Abdul Sayyaf, who later served under the
interim president Karzai. Sayyaf s forces included many Arabs, and he, unlike most
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Afghans, was a member of the strict Wahbabi sect o f Islam with connections to Saudi
A rabia.37
While there is no evidence that U.S. planners overtly used this type o f depiction in
their planning process, subsequent events indicate that their strategic thinking included
recognition o f some o f these linkages, either to enhance the effects o f actions, or to avoid
undesirable secondary effects. Since the links between nodes cut across system and
national boundaries the key to an understanding o f Afghanistan resides in an appreciation
of these interrelationships. As I will illustrate in the exploration o f U.S. actions that
follows, this knowledge was successfully exploited in many instances.

Effects o f the Coercive Actions
The primary U.S military objectives were the military collapse o f the Taliban; the
Northern Alliance in control o f the Northern provinces; and, the capture o f Osama bin
Laden or him on the run.38 However, even as the initial munitions were being deployed,
the official American line was that the military actions were only a part o f the overall
campaign. On the day the attacks commenced, Donald Rumsfeld opened a press briefing
with the statement that the direct overt military force was “to complement the economic,
humanitarian, financial and diplomatic activities which are already well underway. The
military action is designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive, and relentless
operations to drive them [the Taliban] out.” 39

37. Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004): 35-36. She
observes that many o f the linkages between warlords existed before the Taliban, and equates many o f their
ideology as more radical than the Taliban. Many o f these warlords are now part o f the interim government.
38. Woodward, Bush a t War, 229.
39. U.S. Department o f D efense, “Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing,” 7 October 2001.
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The pursuit o f these objectives included the dropping o f more than bombs over
Afghanistan. In the same press conference, General Richard B. Meyers described how
within hours after the initial arrival o f explosive ordnance on Afghan targets, American
aircraft commenced dropping o f humanitarian supplies including food, blankets, and
medicine with the intent of easing the conditions o f Afghan refugees.
As the attacks commenced, President Bush stated, “This military action is a part
o f our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined
through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing o f financial assets and the arrests o f known
terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries.”40 Hence, unlike Kosovo, military
coercion was only one element o f a comprehensive campaign to influence multiple
systems o f Taliban and al Qaeda power.
The strategy o f the Afghan campaign, subsequently renamed Enduring Freedom,
reversed the priority of targets used in Allied Force.41 In Kosovo, the fielded Yugoslav
forces were initially viewed as the principal object for attack, and the focus on
infrastructure was made later in the conflict. In Afghanistan, the opening targets were the
exceptionally limited number of fixed military targets. Although bomb damage
assessment (BDA) data remains closely protected, U.S. Department o f Defense (DOD)
spokesmen claimed that by the second day o f the bombing 11 o f 12 SA-3 radars, 7 o f 8
airfields, one-half o f long-range radars and several radio towers had been “damaged.”

40. George W. Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation, 7 October 7 2001,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8 (accessed 2 March 2005).
41. The original designator was Infinite Justice; however, this was changed to preclude the unintended
effect o f weakening international support due to Islamic sensitivities to the U.S. assuming a role normally
assigned to the Deity.
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Other targets included the al Qaeda Brigade, command facilities, SAM sites and terrorist
training camps.42
By the end o f October, concentration had shifted to “those Taliban forces arrayed
against the Northern Alliance.” A DOD spokesman briefed reporters: “The focus o f the
operational efforts included targets involving terrorists in Taliban command and control
locations, including bunkers and tunnels, as well as airfield facilities and Taliban military
forces that support the opposition forces.”43 Planners soon added caves and potential
hideouts for al Qaeda elements to the list o f primary targets.
The connections between the anti-Taliban forces and nations in the region,
particularly Pakistan, were an early concern o f the Bush security advisors. Hence, they
did not regard merely substituting the Northern Alliance leadership for the Taliban
regime as a prudent course. However, as battlefield events unfolded, it became clear that
the U.S. did not control this diverse and complex organization. Accepting this condition,
U.S. support for Northern Alliance operations emerged.
The objective o f the Northern Alliance forces, now augmented by U.S. military
Special Forces and CIA teams, was reported to be the city of Mazar-i Sharif. This was an
important node due to its location 35 miles from the Uzbekistan border and the perceived
improvement in the ability to supply Northern Alliance troops accrued from taking the
objective. The effectiveness o f this support increased due to continuous CIA contacts
with Northern Alliance elements, and their understanding of key cultural characteristics
of Afghan society.
42. Woodward, Bush at War, 213.
43. U.S. Department o f D efense, “N ew s Transcript, Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, Joint Staff, 31
October 2001,” http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/tl0312001.htm (accessed 2 March 2005). The
figure for Taliban combat troops was now estimated at 50,000 - 60,000, nearly double the figures used by
the NSC a month earlier. The previous day’s activities had brought the total number o f Human Daily
Rations (HDRs) intended for refugees to more than 1 million.
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Although it represented an important task, having anti-Taliban forces in control o f
the major population centers did not necessarily equate to the complete attainment o f all
U.S. objectives. As major military resistance by Taliban forces ceased, on 11 December,
Rumsfeld acknowledged this condition: “It does not end with the fall o f Kabul or Kunduz
or even Kandahar, or even with the capture o f some o f the individual Taliban and al
Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.”44 Even with this qualification, the military operation that
removed the protectors o f al Qaeda in a matter o f weeks may be considered to be a
notable success. Many pundits expected the Kosovo campaign to last for a few days;
others later predicted that removal o f the Taliban would take years. Events would prove
them wrong.
The important difference between the Kosovo and Afghanistan campaigns was
the incorporation in the latter case of more aspects o f a systems approach and actions that
influenced all elements o f Taliban power. Woodward reports that CIA operatives were
able to buy the allegiance o f warlords who were previously supporting the Taliban
regime for approximately $50,000 each. The premise, successfully exploited, was that
“you can’t buy an Afghan, but you can rent one.” Although counter to Western standards
and values, this observation indicates an appreciation of the cultural norms o f the
Afghans. Woodward claims that the CIA expended $70 million in direct cash payments
to support the military operations. When compared to the $569,000 price tag o f a single
Tomahawk missile, the relative cost/benefit ratio is put into perspective.45 Director

44. U.S. Department o f Defense, N ew s Transcript, “DOD N ew s Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and
Gen. Myers, 11 December 2001,” http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2 001/tl2112001_tl21 l.htm
(accessed 2 March 2005).
45. U.S. N avy cost figure, using 1999 data. U.S. Department o f the Navy, C hief o f Information,
“Tomahawk,” http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/misiIes/wep-toma.html (accessed 2 March
2005). Approximately 70 were employed in the conflict.
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George Tenet and others in the CIA understood that for the Pashtuns, “their allegiances
were negotiable in Afghanistan, just like everybody else’s in Afghanistan.”46
The major advantage of the use o f the principles o f a system o f systems approach
in Afghanistan resided in the more efficient attainment o f objectives and the ability to
influence multiple systems. However, some attempts to anticipate the secondary effects
of actions were also apparent.

The Secondary Effects
In general, there were fewer deleterious unintended secondary effects in Enduring
Freedom than in the Kosovo operation. This was due in part to a better understanding of
the systems o f power in Afghanistan, which allowed planners to better anticipate the
ancillary effects of actions. I will provide a few examples for illustration.
The links between actions to achieve effects in Afghanistan and secondary effects
across its geographic boundaries were considered in the development o f the overall U.S
strategy. The U.S. recognized that events in Afghanistan could not be contained within its
geographic borders. Hence, in deference to Pakistani concerns, establishment o f the
Northern Alliance as the new rulers o f Afghanistan intentionally was not an original goal.
However, once their military victory became inevitable, an extensive political effort was
made toward Pakistan to reassure Musharraf that the takeover by the primarily Tajik and
Uzbek Northern Alliance would not be a threat to him. Recognition o f the link between
the Pakistani intelligence service and the Taliban also resulted in U.S. encouragement for
Musharraf to remove his pro-Taliban ISI chief.

46. Woodward, Bush at War, 230.
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An unintended result o f military action, particularly air and missile attacks, is the
effect on the morale and allegiance o f the civilian population. The emphasis on providing
food and other humanitarian assistance in concert with military activities mitigated the
historically fierce Afghan resistance to foreign invaders. Even while the military actions
were ongoing, the U.S. Agency for International Development established a “five-point
assistance strategy for Afghanistan: reduce death rates; minimize population movements;
lower then stabilize food prices; ensure aid reaches those it is intended for; and, begin
developmental relief programs.”47 This type o f activity, which exploited knowledge of
the social and economic systems, allowed the U.S. to weaken the linkage between the
Taliban and the general population, and to reduce the impact of the destruction resulting
from the air and missile operations.
Despite the increased awareness o f the connections between elements in the
political, economic, military, and social systems, not all secondary effects were
anticipated. Largely for ethnic and religious reasons, the Iranian government had
distanced itself from the Taliban regime and established ties with Ismail Khan (a TajikShiite). However, once Northern Alliance forces led by other warlords threatened Mazari Sharif, Iran reassessed their allegiance. By 8 November, some U.S. officials believed
•

that the Iranians might have switched sides and gone over to the Taliban.

48

Another issue was the unintended civilian casualties resulting from attacks on
military targets. An extensive study suggests “a level o f civilian fatalities in Afghanistan

47.
George W. Bush, “The Global War on Terrorism: The First Hundred Days,” (Washington, DC: The
Coalition Information Centers, 2002), 16, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ 12/
100dayreport.pdf (accessed 2 March 2005).
48.
Woodward, Bush at War, 298. The connections between Ismail Khan and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps were w ell known, however, Iranian fears over the U.S. gaining a foothold in the region took
precedence over loyalty to former clients. However, by November, there was little that Iran could do to
rescue the Taliban regime.
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greater that that experienced in the 1999 Kosovo war.”49 Analysts attribute this to
different objectives, more limited target intelligence, and a more dynamic battlefield with
more synergy between ground and air forces.
U.S. planners recognized that every Afghan non-combatant fatality weakened the
solidarity of the coalition.50 The use of cluster munitions also had a tragic effect. On
occasion, explosives believed to be humanitarian packages were picked up by hungry
Afghans, with appalling results. Table 12 provides some examples o f unintended
secondary effects that ran counter to stated U.S. objectives.

Table 12. Unintended Secondary Effects
Node
Mazar-i Sharif

Intended effect
Removal o f Taliban regime

Secondary Effect
Iranian support for Taliban

Comment
Iranian concerns over
U.S. foothold

Refugees

Survival/Support

Casualties

Confusion with
unexploded ordnance

Mullah Omar

Remove Taliban from power

Increased supply o f heroin

Lack o f planning for
alternatives

Breakdown o f local
government
Ismail Khan

Strengthen for use against
Taliban

Post conflict autonomous
power

Threat to interim
government

Although the Bush security advisors expertly managed the warlords of the
Northern Alliance during the period o f active combat, they were less adroit in controlling
49. Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate o f Civilian Bombing Casualties,”
Project o f Defense Alternatives, 18 January 2 0 0 2 ,2 , http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html (accessed 2
March 2005). He uses sources that estimate that there were 1000-1300 civilian casualties as compared to
500 in Kosovo. This equates to one death for every 12 bombs or missiles expended, compared to one
civilian fatality for every 46 bombs dropped in the Balkan campaign (ibid., 6).
50. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, A l Q a ’ida an d the H oly War (Sterling,VA:
Pluto Press, 2003), 287. These Human Daily Rations (HDRs) were designed to conform to Muslim dietary
restrictions.
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the post-conflict political situation. Having embellished the power o f the warlords, and
concurrently removed the existing regime, U.S. actions created a power vacuum that
resulted in powerful militias without direct allegiance to any central authority.51 This
resulted in conditions, in some cases, as bad as during the Taliban reign. The Human
Rights Watch claimed, “Human Rights abuses in Afghanistan are being committed by
gunmen and warlords who were propelled into power by the United States and its
coalition partners after the Taliban fell in 2001.”
Despite their many undesirable characteristics, the Taliban were relatively
successful in dramatically reducing opium production in Afghanistan. Once they departed
the scene, drug production almost immediately returned to and subsequently exceeded
pre-2000 levels.53 While some increase in production was expected, the elimination of
strict Taliban enforcement and the lack of a viable alternative government once they were
removed made opium poppy cultivation an attractive, if not the only option available to
Afghan farmers. The U.S. did not establish viable alternatives to it. However, lack o f
success does not connote lack o f attempts. U.S. humanitarian funding for Afghanistan in
the October-November 2001 timeframe alone exceeded $250 million.54
Ex post facto identification of instances o f unintended secondary effects is simple;
anticipation during the heat of combat is not. Despite these and other occurrences, the
51 .The existence o f private militia has been a primary danger to the interim government in Afghanistan.
In September 2004, President Hamid Kharzai was successful in removing Khan as Governor o f Herat.
52. Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Warlords Implicated in N ew Abuses,” 29 July 2003
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/afghan072903.htm (accessed 22 March 2005). See also N.C. Aizenman,
“Afghan Crime Wave Breeds Nostalgia for Taliban,” Washington P ost, 17 March 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/a45302-2005marl7 (accessed 22 March 2005).
53. In 2000 an estimated 82,000 hectares were under cultivation. This was reduced to 7,600 in 2001, but
rose to 80,000 in 2003 and 131,000 in 2004. United Nations, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Summary
Finding on Opium Trends in Afghanistan,” http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ afghanistan-2005_summary_opiumafghanistan-2005.pdf (accessed 2 March 2005).
54. U.S. Department o f State, Fact Sheet, “Summary o f U.S. Assistance to the Afghan People since Oct.
1, 2001,” 23 November 2001, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/6303).htm (accessed 4 March 2005).
Nearly half o f these totals were the Defense Department food drops, consisting o f over 1,175,000 HDR’s.
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number o f unintended effects of actions appears to be smaller than in the Kosovo
operation. Multiple variables exist; however, it is reasonable to conclude that a better
understanding o f the connections elements within the political and social systems were a
factor in this consequence.

Summation
The primary objective o f this chapter was to illustrate the application o f the
principles o f a system o f systems analysis in a milieu that was significantly different from
both Somalia and Kosovo. Somalia and Afghanistan were similar in that they both
occurred in failed or collapsed states. Clans and tribes comprise the foundation o f both
societies; however, Somalia is homogeneous, while Afghan society is diverse. Although
separated by only two years, coercive operations in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were
conducted against a dramatically different adversary in a vastly dissimilar geographic and
political environment. However, in both cases, decision-makers achieved some o f their
objectives through an approach that considered the opponent from a holistic perspective.
In the Afghan scenario, this utilization was more evident.
As the American offensive military operations concluded and organized Taliban
resistance collapsed, President Bush observed: “Our intelligence professionals and
special forces have cooperated with battle-friendly Afghan forces— fighters who know
the terrain, who know the Taliban, and who understand the local culture.”55 Successes in
this phase o f Enduring Freedom were due largely to this degree o f understanding o f the
adversary. Linkages beyond the borders were also important. American decision-makers
55.
George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at the Citadel, South Carolina, 11 December 2001,”
White House, Office o f the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/
2001121 l-6.htm (accessed 2 March 2005).
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recognized Pakistan’s Musharraf as a key political node. Severing the connections
between the Pashtuns in the Pakistani intelligence service and the predominantly Pashtun
Taliban was a critical element in the rapid military victories.
By 11 December, the objectives that were stated two months earlier, i.e.,
destruction o f the Taliban military and the denial o f Afghanistan as a base for terrorists
were attained. Despite the immense difficulties encountered, the U.S. actions were almost
totally successful. O ’ Hanlon’s depiction o f Enduring Freedom as “a masterpiece of
military creativity and finesse” is supportable by the evidence.56
A more complete understanding o f the antagonist was a factor in this result.
American planners were aware that loyalty in Afghanistan was principally to tribe and
clan, rather than to any central government. This appreciation, combined with awareness
o f the acceptability and tradition of changing sides in a conflict, allowed for expectations
that small victories could result in significant advantages as perceptions o f the tide o f the
battle shifted. Although acceptance of bribes to change allegiance could be considered to
be treacherous by Western standards, CIA operatives achieved many o f their objectives
with suitcases o f cash instead o f cruise missiles. This reduced the potential for harmful
secondary effects inherent in kinetic attacks.
The skillful use of American Special Forces embedded within Northern Alliance
forces and an expert coordination o f air and ground power certainly also contributed to
the successes.57 However, these actions were dependent upon target intelligence and an

56. O ’Hanlon, “Flawed Masterpiece:” 47. He contends that it will be remembered as “one o f the greater
military successes o f the twenty-first century” (ibid., 63).
57. President Bush asserted, “This combination— real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special
forces, and precision air power— has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught
us more about the future o f our military than a decade o f blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums.”
See Bush, “Remarks by the President at the Citadel." Steven Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future o f
Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 32, does not agree with those who assert that the
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understanding o f the adversary’s culture and social interrelationships. Appreciating
Afghan sensitivities to foreign troops, Special Forces often donned local apparel and
means of transport. The U.S. took advantage o f the connections between warlords that
existed during the Soviet occupation. The ethnic diversity, suspicions and jealousies
among the warlords who made up the Northern Alliance was appreciated, and efforts
were made to maintain and strengthen this fragile coalition. The Afghan concept that the
“enemy o f my enemy is my friend” was appreciated and successfully incorporated into
the strategy.
An understanding of the financial support and connections to al Qaeda and the
Taliban was recognized and exploited. Treasury Department and Federal Bureau o f
Investigation efforts to cut off financial support through non-governmental organizations
met with some limited success.58 Therefore, the use of the principles o f a system of
systems analysis contributed to the successes o f the operations that took place between
October and December o f 2001. However, these objectives were relatively limited in
scope.
The primary objective had always been Osama bin Laden “dead or alive.”
Although denied a geographic base o f operations and much of its source o f funding, al
Qaeda remains an acknowledged threat, and its founder, as well as his protector Mullah
Omar, remains at large despite enormous efforts. The merits o f going after the key
leadership o f the Taliban are arguable. Pape does not view decapitation strategies as

Afghan model represents new way o f warfare, Rather he asserts that the war “was much more orthodox,
and less revolutionary, than most now believe.”
58.
Central Intelligence Agency, “Annual Report o f the United States Intelligence Community, Support
to the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security 2002,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/
ann_rpt_2002/swtandhs.html (accessed 4 March 2005).
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effectual and contends that any attempts to kill Omar proved to be largely ineffective.59
The question o f the broader effect o f the killing or capture o f bin Laden on the terrorist
threat against the United States is equally contentious.
In Afghanistan, the holistic understanding o f the adversary and the connections
between elements within and across system boundaries contributed to a more efficient
campaign at achievement o f objectives. However, those objectives were limited to only
one phase o f the campaign.
President Bush was reportedly frustrated by the lack o f an existing plan for
Afghanistan. With constant pressure on them, defense officials and Central Command
planners, hurriedly built the plan after 9/11. An existing assessment o f Afghanistan using
the system o f systems construct could have been useful in commencing the operation
sooner. However, the major benefit would have been in the phase that followed the
removal o f the Taliban.
Despite reluctance o f the Bush national security team to use the military in nation
building roles, it is clear that the U.S. cannot afford to make the same mistake of
disengagement that it did in 1989. Although the use o f the system o f systems construct
provided benefits during the active military campaign, its principles may be even more
useful in the more difficult and demanding task o f establishing an economically viable,
socially diverse, and democratically governed nation of Afghanistan.

59.
Robert Pape, “The True Worth o f Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 11617. He concludes that the combining o f air and ground power continues to be a winning strategy. Steve
Coll, G host Wars (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 287-88, provides an insightful appraisal o f the
enigmatic Pashtun, Omar, who seems to be an unlikely candidate to lead a radical movement.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

An objective of this study is to determine if a multi-disciplinary approach to
assessments can contribute to a holistic understanding o f overall systems o f national
power. The product is a process and a methodology framework that provides a tool for
the decision-maker in anticipating the effects o f coercive actions. The benefits are an
increased likelihood o f attainment o f objectives through more efficient application of
coercive power. Additionally, the methodology contributes to an ability to anticipate the
secondary effects resulting from those actions.
I organized this dissertation around three fundamental and interrelated questions:
(1) Can the processes and capabilities through which a nation accomplishes its overall
objectives be considered complex and nonlinear?
(2) Can the principles o f nonlinearity that are used to describe and understand physical
systems be applied to non-physical systems? and,
(3) If national systems o f power are complex and nonlinear, and if a systems approach is
useful to understanding physical systems, then can the application o f the principles
derived from studies in diverse academic disciplines provide a metaphor or model that
could contribute to the understanding of national systems of power?
I have illustrated that national power operates, in both structure and function, as
an open complex system, and that system models developed in mathematics and the
physical sciences provide a paradigm for enhanced understanding o f all nonlinear
systems. Subsequently, I concluded that utilization o f such an approach provides a
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metaphor or model for increased understanding o f the systems and the secondary effects
o f actions taken to influence those systems.
Chapter II introduced concepts o f national power and the means that historically
have been used to influence it. This required a brief examination o f the theoretical
foundations, components, and uses o f coercion. The contention that nations are likely to
continue to exert coercive power is independent o f the justification or motivation for the
actions. Hence, the moral aspects are not at issue here. Historically, stated rationales have
ranged from self-serving conquest and economic dominance, to altruistic peacekeeping
and humanitarian relief. While analysis, evaluation, and debate over jus ad bellum and
the moral right o f nations to intervene in the affairs o f others are important considerations
in the study o f relations between nations, they are not a topic o f this inquiry.
The observation most relevant to this study is that the elements o f power are not
universally fungible; however, they characteristically are interconnected. While
constituent parts of power may be isolated and identified, they are invariably linked to
others. These multiple connections make the system complex. The important deduction is
that the relationships between elements within complex systems o f national power are not
amenable to linear analysis. Therefore, an improved method o f conducting assessments is
required.
This realization segued to the examination o f nonlinearity, including chaos and
complexity theories, which I presented in Chapter III to determine if these approaches
had applicability to the task o f understanding national systems o f power. I illustrated how
the integration o f perspectives on complexity provides a promising path for further
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analysis and concluded that the complex adaptive system provides the most appropriate
model upon which to base assessments.
Further progress required an examination of systems theory in order to determine
which components could be applied to the task set forth in the hypothesis. In Chapter IV,
I described how the sources of national power could be examined and better understood
through utilization of a systems approach. However, even if it is insightful, a model is
inadequate if it does not provide any practical value to the decision-maker. Therefore, in
Chapter V, I proposed a methodology, based on a system of systems construct, which
utilizes the applicable components o f systems theory in the context o f assessments of
national power. I contend that employment of this process can provide a means through
which a more holistic understanding o f the system may be attained, as well as some
limited capability to anticipate the secondary effects o f actions.
The task o f supporting this argument is challenging; empirical data that can
provide irrefutable evidence are not available. Accepting that limitation, I relied on an ex
post illustration o f how the fundamentals of the construct were utilized, albeit without the
overt recognition or cognizance of the involved decision-makers. However, since these
principles have been frequently utilized, an extensive intellectual reach was not required.
Knowledge o f the adversary has been an element o f conflict since the days o f Sun Tzu,
Genghis Khan, and Alexander the Great.
What is missing, and the contribution that I attempt to make, is the application of
commonly held tenets into an organized and coherent methodology that provides a
structure and a framework for assessments of national power. This could serve to fill a
void in the knowledge base available to decision-makers, and represents the primary
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purpose o f this undertaking. However, prior to identification o f the impact o f adoption of
the proposed process, a brief recapitulation o f the limitations o f current approaches and
hence the justification for this study is warranted.

Rationalization Revisited
Nations apply power in order to influence the systems o f other states. I illustrated
that power is comprised of more than a summation o f military assets. Hence, a calculus
that considers the political, economic, military, and social systems as interrelated
elements of an overall system o f power is critical to the assessment. Importantly, the
overall system o f power is different from the sum o f the parts. Therefore, a construct that
can enhance the level o f comprehension of the functioning o f that system can contribute
to more effective and efficient attainment of objectives. An effective utilization o f such
an approach requires an understanding o f the systems to be acted upon, especially in the
interrelationships between elements within and across the systems.
The objective of the process and methodology presented in Chapter V is to
provide a tool that could mitigate existing analysis shortfalls. Since there are no examples
o f overt utilization o f the proposed methodology, I relied on an alternative means to
demonstrate the potential value of the construct. Using three case studies, I illustrated
how elements o f the system of systems construct were utilized, albeit not explicitly, in
three distinct scenarios. The reasons for the varied degrees o f success of these operations
are themselves complex, and have been the object o f extensive analysis.
In these scenarios, I identified instances of the utilization o f the principles o f the
systems o f systems approach, and examples where the decision-maker was provided with
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advantages. These benefits were: (1) amplification of the effects o f actions; (2) indication
o f possible secondary effects; and, (3) recognition o f alternative actions. The section that
follows amalgamates and integrates the previously presented observations in order to
illustrate how these advantages were evident in three significantly different scenarios.

Synthesis of The Case Studies
The important conclusion from these case studies is that the principles o f the
approach are applicable to accomplishment o f a wide variety o f objectives in diverse
geopolitical environments. Each of the interventions, which were examined
independently, provided examples where the benefits associated with the system of
systems construct were attained. The key principles o f the approach are: (1) nations
operate as complex adaptive systems; (2) understanding of the structure and functioning
of these systems is critical to assessments; and, (3) linkages between entities (actors)
within and across systems provides a foundation for a holistic assessment o f the potential
effect o f coercive actions. The particular case studies were selected since they provided a
diverse set of illustrations upon which to base the claim of applicability beyond a single
intervention. The differences between the three are summarized in Table 13.
From a holistic perspective, and despite the differences across all the systems of
power, these cases provide examples o f utilization of the basic principles o f the system of
systems construct. That is, regardless o f the type o f political organization, extent of
industrial development, level o f military modernization, and nature o f cultural
foundation, a basic understanding of the structure and the functions o f the systems and
the interactions could be extracted. Additionally, the model appears to be appropriate
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independent o f the organization applying the coercive force— be it the UN, NATO, or a
single nation.

Table 13. Comparison o f the Systems o f Power
System

Som alia 1992-95

Yugoslavia 1999

A fghanistan 2001

Political

N o functioning
government
Unstable political
movements
Vision o f a Greater
Somalia extending
beyond current borders

Internationally recognized
government
Authoritarian, but
democratically elected
regime
Sophisticated bureaucratic
structure
Multiple parties
Tradition o f strong central
government
Separatist movement in
Kosovo

N o recognition by
international bodies Regime
not in complete control o f
territory
Strict Theocracy
Unskilled and inexperienced
management
Active autonomous militias
(warlords)
Tradition o f dispersed
political power

Economic

M ost industry defunct
Limited agricultural
exports
Near total dependence
upon foreign assistance
Bandit economy

Weak, but functioning
economy
Industry resource
dependent
Fixed infrastructure
Limited international trade

Subsistence level
Bazaar economy
Primitive road networks
Smuggling and drugs the
primary means o f foreign
trade

Military

Loose loyalty to more
powerful warlords
Independent armed bands
Varied level o f
connections between
military and clan
leadership

Armed Forces loyal to
political leadership
Modern air defenses
Mechanized ground forces
High level o f tactical
proficiency

Primary loyalty to tribe and
warlord
Poorly equipped and
supported
Limited armor and
mechanized units
Tradition o f shifting
allegiances

Social

Single ethnic group
Complex clan, tribe and
family relationships
Primary loyalty based on
clan affiliation

Western
Homogeneous population,
predominantly Christian
and Slavic (outside
Kosovo)
High educational and
literacy levels

South Asian Islamic
Multiple and sizeable ethnic
groups
Tribal based
Extremely low education and
literacy levels
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An important characteristic of the system o f systems approach is that the
methodology has near universal applicability. The foundation o f the analysis and the
logic behind the process that produces the assessments remains apposite regardless of the
type o f political structure under examination. The three case studies provided illustrations
of the applicability o f the methodology to a range of regime types. The Afghanistan study
includes a political regime as well as a non-state actor. While the extremes o f the political
spectrum were not examined in the case studies, there would be no essential difference
between the use of the methodology in assessments o f a fascist dictatorship or a modem
liberal democracy.
This aspect of the methodology provides additional advantages as well as inherent
dangers. An examination o f a nation’s own systems o f power would provide valuable
insights. Those engaged in the protection o f vital infrastructure and broader aspects of
homeland security could utilize the tenets o f the system o f systems approach as an aid in
determination of key vulnerabilities. As stated earlier, the construct and principles are
amoral and may be applied for the most noble or most iniquitous purposes. The danger is
that adversaries could also use the principles o f the construct in planning terrorist
activities. Due to their dependence on complex information systems, modern and highly
developed economic systems are particularly susceptible to outside attack. Hence,
industrialized nations fear intrusion into their commercial networks and have applied
significant assets to cyber defense.
The primary purpose o f the case studies was to illustrate the principles o f the
system o f systems construct by using data from actual operations. The proposed
methodology is based on the presumption that the quality of decisions is dependent upon
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the level of understanding of the systems and the relationships between elements.
However, decisions in a crisis are rarely made in isolation; multiple other imperatives
influence the process. Hence, the task is not to evaluate the policy decisions, but rather to
demonstrate how use o f the principles of the construct contributed to an enhanced level of
understanding. Previous chapters explored each o f the scenarios in some detail. However,
in order to reinforce the assertion o f wide applicability, I will provide a summation o f the
key elements o f the cases as they relate to the assessment process.

Somalia
The environment was a collapsed state with non-functioning systems. Somalia
itself was not an adversary; there simply was no government to coerce. In this political
vacuum, armed bands ranging from organized militia to roving gangs o f teenage thieves
vied for power. This internal conflict exacerbated the effects o f famine resulting in tens
of thousands o f Somalis dying o f disease and hunger. The intervention was designed to
confront this humanitarian disaster, sanctioned and sponsored by the largest and most
inclusive multinational organization, and carried out by military forces provided by its
most powerful member nation. Therefore, it provides an appropriate test to determine if
the construct can be applied to attempts to influence the most undeveloped and fragile
systems.
The study revealed occasions o f recognition of the importance o f understanding
the systems, and examples o f a focus on specific nodes, as well a consideration of
possible secondary effects. The close alignment and extensive overlap between the social,
political and military systems in Somalia presented challenges, since actions taken to
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influence one system invariably produced effects in the others. Characterization of
figures such as Aideed and Ali Mahdi as nodes within a single system was problematic
since they were key figures in each system. However, it was apparent that they were
considered key actors and much of the UN. and U.S. actions were directed at them.
Among the important lessons from this intervention is that when actions are taken
to influence a system, the entity taking that action becomes a part o f that altered system.
Due to the lack o f a government in Somalia and the scale o f the military and civilian
agency presence, the UN. dominated the political, military, and economic systems,
significantly altering the means o f operation. When the supports were withdrawn, the
system, not surprisingly, collapsed.
The efforts of Mohamed Sahnoun and Robert Oakley reflected an appreciation for
the Somali social system and its linkages to the political and military systems. However,
for a variety o f reasons, including the lack of clearly defined objectives and the political
will to achieve them, these insights were not fully exploited and the overall objectives o f
the intervention were not achieved. Their efforts were notable for the consideration o f the
larger impact o f their actions and the recognition that the belligerents could be influenced
by means other than direct military confrontation. However, after the departure o f Oakley
and Sahnoun from the scene and the June 1993 attacks on the Pakistani troops, Aideed
transformed from a partner to an antagonist, and attrition of the adversary became a
primary UN. objective. The force-on-force operations that followed resulted in casualties
beyond what the United States was willing to accept, and led to the almost immediate
decision to withdraw from the operation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

294

Aideed was the military node. He was connected to the populace o f Mogadishu.
The attacks on Aideed’s forces produced the unintended effect o f reinforcing his stature
and support among the local population. When the actions taken to influence the node
(Aideed) changed from persuade, flatter and support to capture or destroy, the secondary
effects also changed. This was manifested in the celebrations and mutilations o f the
bodies o f the American soldiers, which was vividly displayed by the American media.
Consequently, The Battle of Mogadishu had an impact on the systems o f power o f the
United States, just as it did in Somalia. This illustrates an important consequence of
coercive actions. This secondary and unintended effect was to extend into the next
operation.

Kosovo
The Kosovo operation was undertaken by the NATO alliance with the objective
of precluding the continuation of ethnic cleansing within the borders o f a sovereign UN.
member nation. Its legal basis was a set o f UN. Security Council Resolutions, but the
intervention was not organized as a UN. force as in Somalia. The task was to influence
the behavior of the political leadership in a relatively modem and developed European
nation. The initial and relatively ineffective actions that targeted the Serb ground forces
suggest that those directing and planning the campaign did not possess, or failed to
optimally utilize, an understanding o f the Serb culture, military traditions, and
capabilities. Attacks on Serb ground forces in Kosovo were largely unproductive, and
may have actually increased the level o f violence against the Kosovars. The related
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attacks on military infrastructure in Serbia proper had a minimal impact on and
contributed little to the attainment o f NATO’s stated objectives.
As a result of lessons accrued earlier in the decade from the successes achieved in
Operation Desert Storm against the Iraqi military, U.S. and allied planners made effective
use of the connections between military nodes. The Yugoslav integrated air defense
system was expeditiously neutralized, and attacks on logistics and support activities were
steadily achieving the desired effect on Serb military capabilities. However, NATO
planners did not exploit the linkages between the economic and political systems until
later in the conflict. When they eventually utilized it, this knowledge was useful in
achievement o f the stated objectives.
An advantage o f the system o f systems construct is identification o f alternative
actions and the multiplication o f the effect of actions. These were realized in the later
stages o f the bombing campaign. Milosevic was the key decision-maker and therefore a
key node to be influenced. However, there were limited means o f acting directly against
him, so a NATO employed a strategy that exploited knowledge o f connections. The
destruction o f commercial entities controlled by the family and political supporters of
Milosevic are claimed to be factors in his eventual capitulation. Actions against economic
and social nodes provided alternate paths to the major political node— Milosevic.
Another indirect approach was manifested in NATO diplomatic actions to influence an
external node, Chernomyrdin, who was able to play an important role in the eventual
outcome, due to his connections to Milosevic.
It is apparent that the secondary effects of actions were also a consideration of
NATO planners. However, they did not always correctly assess the effect o f the bombing
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operations on internal support for Milosevic. Nevertheless, it was a consideration. The
use o f non-explosive devices to disrupt electrical power displayed NATO concerns for
permanent impact on the Yugoslav economy, collateral damage, and civilian casualties.
The objective also was to minimize the secondary effects on the political systems o f the
NATO member nations. As asserted earlier, the coercing nation, alliance, or coalition can
become a part o f the system it is attempting to influence. Additionally, it is possible for
these actions to have an influence on the systems o f the nation taking the actions.
An unintended secondary effect of the Somalia operation on the U.S. political
system emerged in Kosovo. Due in part to the Somalia experience, avoidance o f alliance
military casualties was a primary consideration of operation planners. U.S. decision
makers appreciated the secondary effects on its political system that resulted from media
images o f prisoners and mutilated bodies o f servicemen. The requirement to conduct
aerial bombing from higher altitudes to preclude loss o f aircraft and crewmen degraded
the ability o f NATO tactical aircraft to attack Serb ground forces. Milosevic reportedly
believed that NATO distaste for combat casualties would mean that there would be no
ground operation to support the air campaign. This confidence allegedly strengthened his
resolve. Convinced that he could wait for NATO to tire and become frustrated, he hoped
that public opinion in the NATO nations would turn against the military action. As the
leader o f a complex and adaptive system, he was not passive in this regard and strove to
exploit every possible instance o f collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Since Kosovo was such a dissimilar environment, and the systems to be
influenced were far more complex and developed, it is not possible to declare with a great
deal o f certainty that the lessons of the failures in Somalia contributed to additional use of
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elements of the system of systems construct in Kosovo. However, it is apparent that
NATO planners possessed a better understanding of the systems of power in Yugoslavia,
that they understood connections between the nodes within and across systems, and that
when they exploited this knowledge, objectives were more readily achieved.
Afghanistan
The primarily U.S. operation in Afghanistan utilized a holistic understanding of
the system o f power in a failed Central Asian state that had been under the economic and
political influence of a non-state actor. Decision-makers made use of the knowledge of
Afghan culture, the multi-system characterization of the warlords in Afghan society, the
fragile state o f the economy, and the transitory quality o f political and military loyalties.
More so than in the previous scenarios, uses o f the principles o f the system o f systems
construct were more evident.
Upon initial investigation, the systems o f Somalia and Afghanistan appear
similar: Islamic, loyalties based on clan and tribe, technologically undeveloped,
subsistence economies, low literacy, nomadic populations, and independent militias led
by warlords. However, U.S. objectives were dramatically different: feeding the starving
masses in Somalia; regime removal in Afghanistan. The major factor was the radically
changed security situation in which the Afghan system operated in late 2001. The attacks
of 9-11 had radically altered the geo-political environment. Actions that were readily
supported in Afghanistan would have been politically unacceptable in the previous
scenarios.
The Taliban had not attacked the United States and murdered thousands o f its
citizens. However, their refusal to apprehend and deliver the perpetrators o f the attacks
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made them unequivocally an adversary. There was little discussion o f influencing their
behavior. The fury over the attacks on Washington and New York and the desire for
retaliation meant that the objective was the forceful removal o f the Taliban. In this
respect, the Afghanistan campaign was similar to a war for national survival. Hence, a
traditional attrition campaign, employing the overwhelming power of the U.S. military
could have been conducted. However, American policy-makers adopted an alternative,
effects-based approach.
Selection of the nodes was not difficult; the means to attack them without massive
destruction and undesired effects on Afghan society was the limiting factor. Being
resource limited in the area proved to be an advantage. Instead o f a Gulf War style
massive build-up and land invasion preceded by an intense air campaign, the U.S.
adopted a different approach. This strategy required an understanding o f the Afghan
culture, history and its social system to be effectively employed. Fortunately, from the
American perspective, this knowledge existed and was effectively exploited. On scene
operatives understood the propensity of Afghans to change sides as the fortunes of war
shifted. The amplification o f effects of turning a single warlord was effectively utilized.
Since the attacks had such widespread support and Afghanistan had very little
infrastructure that could be damaged, secondary effects were not as large o f a
considerations as in Kosovo. While hundreds o f Afghan civilians were reportedly killed
by the U.S. actions, still fresh images o f collapsing skyscrapers made this less o f a factor
in internal U.S. politics. The major warlords o f the Northern Alliance—Rabbani, Ismail
Khan and Dostum—were the primary nodes. The action was to support them militarily
and economically. This produced the cascading effect o f bring lesser warlords and
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militias into the anti-Taliban alliance. This also amplified the effects o f actions, since
small military victories often resulted in massive defections o f Taliban supporters.
Exploitation o f node-to-node linkages also was not confined to the borders of
Afghanistan. The connections between Mullah Omar and the head o f the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI) directorate were recognized and acted upon, albeit with
indirect effects. The principal node in this case was Pakistani President Musharraf, who
replaced the ISI chief and cut the linkages and support to the Taliban. The financial
connections between al Qaeda and the Taliban were identified and severed, denying the
Taliban leadership o f much o f their economic base.
I have illustrated that the principles o f the system o f systems construct were
applied in all three scenarios. Over a ten-year period, these principles were utilized more
often, and their benefits were increasingly accrued. Their use provided the reward of
amplification of the effects of actions, indication o f possible secondary effects, and
recognition o f alternative actions. Post event analysis allows for identification of
instances where the approach could have been more extensively and effectively
employed.1 The common element is that in all three cases, objectives may have been
more readily achieved through a better understanding o f the adversary and the
environment. Again, there is nothing radically innovative here; few would refute that
contention. The new assertion is that a systematic approach that recognizes the
importance o f the relationships between entities within and across systems and provides a

1.
These observations are not a critique o f the commanders and planners o f the operations, who were
under significant political pressure and constraints. They were making decisions with the best information
available to them, without the benefit o f knowing the reactions o f the adversaries or the eventual outcome
o f the campaign.
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holistic perspective makes achievement o f this requisite understanding an achievable
goal.
These case studies focused on the periods when offensive military operations
represented the principle coercive actions. When the military aspects o f the operation are
isolated, the objectives were for the most part attained. Despite the casualties in the Battle
of Mogadishu, the UNOSOM and supporting U.S. forces were never in danger of being
defeated militarily. Milosevic has been removed and the organized murder and eviction
of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has ceased. The Taliban is no longer in power, its
remnants are widely dispersed and Osama bin Laden is a fugitive in hiding.
However, more than ten years after the withdrawal o f UNOSOM II, Somalia
remains essentially a stateless society, and susceptible to influence by organized terrorist
elements. Kosovo is relatively stable, but only due to the presence of a NATO
peacekeeping force, six years after the conclusion o f the bombing missions. The primary
antagonist, Slobodan Milosevic awaits the deliberations o f the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but Kosovo has been effectively “cleansed” o f its
former Serb occupants and the fundamental issues o f power in Kosovo remain unsolved.
While the Taliban has been removed from power and most al Qaeda operatives are now
fugitives without a permanent geographic base, a sizeable U.S. force, in concert with the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will remain in Afghanistan for the
indefinite future.
In all three cases, the coercive actions taken to influence the systems o f the target
nation were at least partially successful. However, a common unintended effect was
significantly altered systems that needed to be rebuilt. Herein is the greatest potential
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benefit o f a holistic knowledge of the systems of power. While useful when planning and
conducting offensive military actions, the system o f systems construct and the proposed
methodology may prove to be o f more value in the post active combat phases o f the
operation.
If the system was better understood, different actions may have been taken that
could serve to minimize the deleterious secondary effects taken. These extend beyond the
offensive military operations phases. For example, if the UN had possessed a better
appreciation o f the impact o f its presence and o f abandoning Somalia without a viable
political system in place, the strategy and actions may have been different. Similarly, if
the potential benefits o f actions against economic nodes and their linkages to elements
within the political system had been made earlier, the objectives may have been achieved
without continued destruction in Kosovo. Identification of shortfalls after the fact is an
easy task. The more difficult and important undertaking is attainment o f a means to
mitigate these reoccurring problems in the future. That is the objective o f the next
section.

Implications: What Must Be Done?
Appreciation that nations operate as complex adaptive systems, and that the
elements that comprise these systems are interrelated, is an important realization. An
essential first step is acceptance o f the premise that an understanding o f the adversary as
a holistic system is beneficial. Over the period covered by the case studies, the apparent
upward slope o f the extent o f utilization o f the related principles suggests increased
recognition o f the potential rewards o f such an approach. However, since an objective of
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this study is to move beyond conceptualization and to provide practical tools for the
decision-maker, the challenges to implementation must be considered. Exploitation will
require enhanced capabilities, and adaptations in existing organizational structures and
policies.
Capabilities
The methodology presented in Chapter V provides a framework. However, when
implementation o f the process is considered, several practical problems emerge. Chief
among these is how to manage the immense trove o f required information. That is, how
can analysts determine the important interrelationships, and once they do, how can the
potentially thousands o f linkages be captured and handled to present some practical
knowledge to the decision maker?
The importance o f information on the adversary is nothing new. Intelligence
agencies exist to do this. However, what is still needed is a process that collects, analyzes
and synthesizes information across the political, economic, and, and as well as the
military systems, and provides the critical holistic view. The problem is more than an
ability to collect information. Rather it is the ability to manage the data and to transform
it into actionable knowledge.
The use o f connections and linkages between entities has been effectively
employed in more recent operations. The eventual capture o f Saddam Hussein is credited
in part to the efforts o f two junior intelligence analysts who plotted the connections
between the deposed dictator and his family and supporters. This analysis reportedly was
conducted using paper notebooks and presented on a handwritten chart. Effective

2.
Farnaz Fassihi, “Two N ovice Gumshoes Charted the Capture o f Saddam Hussein, The Wall Street
Journal, 18 December 2003. The depiction o f the relationships, which included information on over 300
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utilization of the approach will require tools that are more sophisticated. Many o f these
may already exist, and could be readily adapted for the specific analysis tasks. The rapid
pace o f software development makes identification o f the optimum knowledge
management and analysis tools itself a formidable task that will require dedicated and
organized effort.
Advances in information technology make the knowledge management dilemma
less daunting, but the inherent complications are immense and the difficulty in
developing the adequate tools should not be underestimated. Likewise, maintenance and
keeping current such a knowledge system is an enormous task. Decision support aids
such as modeling and simulation, and structured argumentation tools will be required.
The discussion o f systems in Chapter IV identified feedback as a critical element
in the understanding o f system behavior. A complex adaptive system is continuously
responding to stimuli. Among these are the coercive actions taken to influence them.
Development o f measures o f performance (how well the action was accomplished) and
measures of effectiveness (how well the objective was accomplished, e.g., did the action
have the desired impact on the node and hence the overall system?) is a challenging
undertaking. In some cases, the problem is relatively uncomplicated. For example, battle
damage assessment using sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities may provide with some assurance whether an air attack on a bridge actually
destroyed or damaged the node. To a lesser extent, determination o f the attainment o f the
effect, e.g., insurgents unable to move forces from point A to point B is more
problematic. In the political and social systems, determination o f the effect o f actions is

individuals was credited with leading to a source who eventually provided the precise information that
enabled the capture.
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exceptionally difficult. Indeed the effect o f the bombing o f commercial enterprises in
Yugoslavia on the behavior o f Milosevic is still being debated. Since the process of
coercive activity is dynamic, knowledge o f the feedback loops within the system is an
exceptionally confounding, but mandatory capability. This requirement mandates
methods of intelligence collection beyond the abundant imagery and electronic
surveillance resources.
Capabilities are comprised of more than equipment; the manner in which human
and technology resources are applied is an equally important element. Hence, adaptation
in concepts, doctrine, and processes also must be accomplished. The principal raison
d ’etre for applying a system o f systems construct to assessments of national power is an
enhanced ability to achieve the desired effects that support attainment o f overall
objectives, as well as to anticipate the secondary effects o f those actions. There is less
incentive for a new approach if a traditional attrition based model is utilized. A recent
trend in security thinking has been a movement toward focus on desired outcomes instead
of actions. As part o f its transformation efforts, the U.S. military is adopting effects-based
operations as the model for future engagements.
This approach is more than a specific concept; rather it is a different way of
looking at achievement o f objectives. Its antithesis is the attrition paradigm where the
primary considerations are actions conducted to destroy or degrade the target— often
without a clear connection to the objective to be achieved. The value o f effects centric
thinking in determination o f the potential cascading effects o f military actions was
demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War. The classic example was the disruption o f electrical
power to an entire city through non-kinetic attacks on a very small umber o f targets.
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The same principles apply to uses of all national power resources, including diplomatic,
information, and economic, as well as military assets.
Edward Smith takes this broader view and defines an effect as “a result or impact
created by the application o f military or other power.”3 Successful use o f an effects based
approach, where all elements o f national power are employed, necessitates a holistic
understanding o f the adversary’s system o f power. This will require true integration of
information gathering and dissemination procedures. However, as the ordeal o f the post
9-11 efforts to develop processes for information sharing among varied intelligence
agencies in the U.S. displayed, addressing the organizational and policy issues may be the
more intimidating task.

Organization and Policy
Effective utilization o f the system o f systems construct will require a shift away
from current structures for information collection, analysis, and dissemination that focus
on individual systems. The common analogy is that of stovepipes, i.e., responsibility for
specific information requirements assigned to particular agencies. In the U.S., for
example, military, political, and economic collection is accomplished primarily in the
Defense, State and Commerce Departments respectively. While suitable for information

3 . Edward A. Smith, Effects B ased Operations: Applying N etwork Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis
an d War (Washington DC: DOD Command and Control Research Program, 2002), 111. He considers these
efforts to be incomplete and that even after 9-11, U.S. approaches remain focused on “destruction o f an
opponents physical capacity to make war,” and he contends, “it remains attrition based” (ibid., 17). This
volume remains the basic text for an introduction to effects based operations. A U.S. DOD strategy
document asserts that the goal o f effects based operations is not physical attrition o f the enemy, but rather
“to induce an opponent to or an ally or a neutral to pursue a course o f action consistent with our own
security interests.” U.S. Department o f Defense, ““The National Military Strategy o f the United States o f
America,” 34.
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collection, such structures make synthesizing information into actionable knowledge
problematic. Realignment o f assets to meet this requirement is already being undertaken.
One o f the reoccurring themes from the investigation into intelligence failures
arising from the attacks o f September 11th is the conclusion that the degree of
information sharing and level o f coordination between intelligence agencies was
inadequate.4 This problem is exacerbated when working in a multinational context, since
the sources o f much o f the required information are sensitive at the national level. The
dilemma goes beyond the willingness to share information. The current structure, where
agencies focus on their specific areas and are unwilling or unable to share information
will not provide the requisite holistic view o f the systems to be acted upon. The ability to
share and synthesize information across the systems area is a critical enabler of a system
o f systems construct. However, increased information sharing, in itself, will not be
sufficient for the methodology to be effectively employed.
Development o f assessments based on a system o f systems construct will require
teams o f analysts dedicated to the task. Governments will be unable or reluctant to
augment the staffing levels o f the agencies that will be responsible for the assessments.
This will require internal reorganizations and realignment of existing assets between
agencies; both tasks are normally painful processes. Effective utilization of the
methodology will also require a diverse set o f skills and expertise. Anthropologists,
sociologists, psychologists, and economists must be incorporated into the process along
4.
Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence
A gencies,” CRS Report for Congress, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21217.pdf. A goal is
the fusing o f information across the spectrum to provide a holistic view. “National Intelligence” is the term
used for intelligence that is o f concern to more than one department or agency and provides the basis for
national security policymaking. A U.S. Senate study identifies systematic weaknesses in analyses
“compounded by lack o f information sharing.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence,
“Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 7 July 2004,
108th Cong., 2nd sess., http://intelligence.senate.gOv/iraqreport.2.pdf (accessed 1 April 2005).
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with the more traditional physicists and military intelligence experts. Importantly,
constant dialogue between analysts must be accomplished. Enhanced communications
technology provides the option o f dispersed but networked teams who need not be
physically collocated. In addition to these internal organizational transformations, the
traditional characterization of the objects o f assessments must be reconsidered.
I have demonstrated how the system o f systems approach can improve the
knowledge available to the decision-maker. While a critical element in the process,
enhanced knowledge is not in itself adequate to guarantee more effective decision
making. The process through which policy is determined is itself exceptionally complex
and multiple elements may be factors in the ultimate decisions. While the Rational Actor
Model, which uses an analysis o f aims and calculations o f governments in explaining
decisions, appears to be the major beneficiary o f enhanced knowledge o f the system to be
influenced, alternate paradigms will also enter into the calculus. Graham Allison and
Philip Zelikow address other explanations, most notably the Government Politics Model.
They argue that there is no decision-making monolith, and that resolutions are the result
of bargaining among players in the governmental hierarchy.5 Actions result from collages
of multiple interests from actors who focus on different issues.
A holistic understanding of the system can provide benefits regardless o f the mix
o f decision-making models that influence the process. I described several o f these
advantages in the case studies. I also identified instances, notably in Somalia, where

5.
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis,
Second ed. (N ew York: Addison-W esley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999). W hile the Cuban M issile
Crisis provides the single case for illustration, the authors include an excellent presentation o f the various
models utilized to explain the decision-making process and their relationship to the major themes o f
international relations theory. For a similarly engaging presentation and application o f theory using the
1991 G ulf War see Steven A. Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-M aking in the Persian G u lf
War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
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superior knowledge was rendered ineffectual by flawed bureaucratic processes in the UN.
Hence, adoption o f a system o f systems approach to assessments does not represent the
complete solution. The approach does not solve decision-making pathologies; hence,
significant institutional reform is still required.
One area where organization and policy changes are evident is in the treatment of
entities that are not sovereign nations. Recently, and tragically for the United States, the
need for assessments o f non-state actors has been made apparent. A1 Qaeda is the
infamous and best-known example. Investigations into the organization have revealed
economic and social as well as military and political elements. In some areas, notably in
international funding, its economic system was as sophisticated and far-reaching as those
of several nations. A1 Qaeda may be thought of as conducting its own foreign affairs.
“The role o f the al-Qaeda network is apparently one o f co-ordinating and supporting
various groups around the world that have a militant Islamist and anti-western agenda. As
a consequence, al-Qaeda has developed a global reach, with cells in up to 50 countries.”6
Without question, its impact on international security has been as significant as any
nation’s in the post cold war era. Due to its basic similarities to a sovereign nation, the
principles of the construct may be applied to al Qaeda as well.
The major difference is ownership o f autonomous territory from which to operate.
Nevertheless, even non-state actors must be physically somewhere. As was made clear in
Afghanistan, a powerful non-state entity may be potent enough to dominate an existing
failed or collapsed state. The sizeable differences between non-state actors and sovereign

6.
House o f Commons Library, “ 11 September 2001: the Response,” Research Paper 01/72, 85,
http://www.parliament.uk (accessed 1 April 2005). The study adds, “Mr. bin Laden and al-Qaeda have a
broad ideological base, advocating a pan-Islamic, rather than a pan-Arab, approach. Ties with other groups
reportedly cross sectarian lines, bringing together Sunnis in al-Qaeda with Shi’as belonging to Hizbollah in
Lebanon.”
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nations cannot be ignored or discounted. However, the similarities are strong enough so
that for purposes of assessments of power the system of systems construct also is
appropriate for use when dealing with non-state actors.

The Way Ahead
The stated goal o f this dissertation was to determine if a multi-disciplinary
approach to assessments could contribute to a holistic understanding o f national power.
The examination of the principles o f non-linearity in mathematics and physical systems
resulted in the conclusion that nations (as well as some non-state actors) may be
described as operating as complex adaptive systems. Hence, I displayed how a systems
approach to assessments is an appropriate basis for development o f an enhanced
understanding o f the functions of system elements as well as the interactions between
entities within and across the systems that comprise national power. The proposed
methodology provides the framework for a tool to assist decision-makers in
understanding the effects o f coercive actions.
While I assert this to be a worthwhile contribution, a framework does not in itself
provide near-term practical benefits. Therefore, continued investigation into the use of
the system o f systems construct is needed if progress beyond the existing, and less than
adequate, supply o f tools available to the decision-maker is to emerge. The opportunities
for follow-on research are many and myriad.
I have not provided empirical evidence that adoption o f the system o f systems
construct will enhance decision-making. The case studies identified examples where the
principles o f the construct were utilized, and may have provided the purported
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advantages, specifically the ability to better understand the effects o f coercive actions. I
used these to illustrate the potential o f the approach in dissimilar environments.
Individually, the examinations were not of sufficient depth to establish causation between
the use o f the principles of the construct and better comprehension o f system effects. The
analysis also was constrained by the limited amount o f information about the decision
process. A dedicated and exhaustive reassessment of the cases when this information is
declassified and made available to researchers would be a valuable enterprise.
I acknowledge the vast scope o f the effort that is required to resolve the
considerable organizational issues and knowledge management challenges. However,
while extensive, they are not insurmountable. The ongoing experimentation efforts in the
U.S. and NATO are developing and refining the processes and procedures to implement
the concept.7 Movement beyond model, to produce capability has been the objective of
ongoing concept development and experimentation efforts. These programs provide the
means o f confronting and resolving the practical problems that preclude wide adoption of
Q

the construct.
In conclusion, this analysis and proposed methodology provide a multi
disciplinary approach to assessments of national power that could provide tangible
enhancements to the decision-making process. Adoption of the construct is required now
because the environment and consequently the nature o f coercive power have changed. It

7. The U.S. efforts center on the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) concept that is a process that
“frames our understanding o f a potential adversary’s political, military, economic, social, information and
infrastructure system s.” Link analysis, network analysis, and structured argumentation are used to identify
critical nods and vulnerabilities. United States Joint Forces Command, “About the Operational Net
Assessment (O N A),” http://www.jfcom.mil/abaout/fact_ona.htm (accessed 15 April 2005).
8. The U.S. Joint Forces Command has conducted experimentation with a system o f systems construct
since m id-2001. Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the U.K. have participated in some o f these
efforts. N A T O ’s Allied Command Transformation established its own, more limited system o f systems
experimentation program in 2005.
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is possible now due to innovative approaches to military operations and advances in
information technology. The framework represents only a necessary first step. Efforts in
this area should be continued and expanded. The alternative is to continue to utilize
processes and procedures that are inappropriate for assessments o f the complex adaptive
systems that characterize national power.
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